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A rapist not only violates a victim’s privacy and personal integrity, but 
inevitably causes serious psychological as well as physical harm in the process.  
The long-range effect upon the victim’s life and health is likely to be 
irreparable; it is impossible to measure the harm which results. . . .  Rape is not 
a mere physical attack—it is destructive of the human personality. 
–Chief Justice Burger1 
 
Among deprivations of rights, none is so effective in cowing a 
population, crushing the spirit of the individual and putting terror in every 
heart. . . . [T]he human personality deteriorates and dignity and self-reliance 
disappear where homes, persons and possessions are subject at any hour to 
unheralded search and seizure by the police. 
–Justice Jackson2 
I. INTRODUCTION 
I begin by echoing Chief Justice Burger’s conviction that the 
profound harm suffered by the victim of a rape is immeasurable and 
can be compared with few other violations of the human body, 
personality, and spirit in its scope and magnitude.  Without 
trivializing or diminishing the gravity of the injury imposed upon 
victims of rape, or making any comparison in degree, I also share 
Justice Jackson’s sentiment, expressed above, that the victims of 
Fourth Amendment violations, whether through physical intrusions 
of home, body, or effects, or through other more intangible assaults 
on liberty, privacy, and dignity, also suffer significant harm.  At a 
basic conceptual level, in each context, one entity asserts a claim of 
power over another, using that power to extract from the victim that 
which it seeks to obtain. 
This Article seeks to explore and develop a theoretical 
relationship between rape law and Fourth Amendment search 
doctrine in order to apply, by way of analogy, the insights and lessons 
of the rape reform movement to the task of promoting a broader, 
 
 1  Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 611–12 (1977) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).   
 2  Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 180–81 (1949) (Jackson, J., 
dissenting). 
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more inclusive definition of the Fourth Amendment search.3  The 
Article argues that the Court, in crafting its search doctrine, has 
created a regime favoring law enforcement at the expense of 
individual privacy and autonomy, much as traditional rape law was 
well-disposed towards alleged perpetrators at the expense of victims. 
At the outset of this Article, I wish to note my choice of the word 
“victim” to connote one who has endured a rape as well as one who 
has been the target of unlawful government surveillance.  In the rape 
context, I am aware of the debate surrounding the use of this label, 
perhaps because the word “victim” is imbued with an aura of passivity 
or helpless vulnerability, and perhaps because there is still some 
residual shame (and blame) associated with victimhood in the sexual 
abuse context.4  On the other hand, while some may find the use of 
the word “victim” offensive in the search context—after all, it may be 
hard for some to imagine many criminal defendants as victims 
(especially those factually guilty defendants seeking to suppress the 
evidence of their unlawful behavior uncovered by the surveillance)5—
 
 3  At least one other scholar has also recognized the benefit of turning to rape 
law to inform consent doctrine in the Fourth Amendment realm.  See Josephine Ross, 
Blaming the Victim: ‘Consent’ Within the Fourth Amendment and Rape Law, 26 HARV. J. ON 
RACIAL & ETHNIC JUST. 1 (2010) (identifying the parallels between rape law and 
Fourth Amendment consent doctrine and arguing that feminist theory should be 
imported into Fourth Amendment law in order to promote a more realistic 
conception of consent that takes into account the imbalance of power between 
police and citizens, that does not equate consent with submission to authority, and 
that focuses on individual autonomy).  I would like to emphasize that, while I seek to 
draw parallels between these two areas of law in the abstract, I am in no way equating 
the atrocity of the crime of rape, or the devastation suffered by those who have 
experienced this heinous crime, to government surveillance and the impact of such 
surveillance on its subjects, and I am aware, of course, that the law of rape is a matter 
of substantive criminal law, while the law of searches is a matter of criminal 
procedure.  Further, I also acknowledge the legitimate law enforcement purposes of 
government surveillance in the interests of detecting and preventing crime, which, of 
course, has no parallel in the discussion of rape.  Nonetheless, in constructing a 
framework for substantively defining the Fourth Amendment search, I look to the 
law of rape, in both its substantive and procedural aspects, for guidance.  
 4  Sharon Lamb, Constructing the Victim: Popular Images and Lasting Labels, in NEW 
VERSIONS OF VICTIMS: FEMINISTS STRUGGLE WITH THE CONCEPT 108, 118–19 (Sharon 
Lamb ed., 1999) (“[T]he term survivor evokes . . . heroic adaptation.  The new label 
was the first suggestion that the victim was an active resister in her abuse, and that 
whatever she did . . . she did this to ‘survive.’ . . . Why did victims resist being called 
‘victims’?  It is shameful to be a victim in our culture.  No matter how much victims’ 
rights advocates and therapists have told victims that they are not to blame for their 
abuse, that they did not provoke it, and that it had nothing to do with them, it is still 
shameful to be a victim.”). 
 5  Ross, supra note 3, at 10 (“The public tends to view the victims of police 
searches as unworthy of the “victim” label because they were caught with drugs or 
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this is precisely the term used to describe those claiming an unlawful 
search.6  For clarity and ease of description, as well as to engage the 
analogy between these areas of law, I will use the term “victim” in 
both contexts. 
I was led to this analogy between the law of rape and the law 
defining searches, which is the focus of this Article, by my 
examination of, and dissatisfaction with, current Fourth Amendment 
standing doctrine.7  In Rakas v. Illinois, the first in a set of three cases 
that established the Supreme Court’s approach to standing, the 
Court held that a defendant may seek suppression of evidence 
discovered through an allegedly unlawful search only if she has a 
“legitimate expectation of privacy in the particular areas” searched.8  
 
other contraband.  This article aims to do for victims of searches what feminists have 
done for victims of unwanted sexual touching.  Certainly there are differences 
between rape and police searches . . . but these differences do not require the law to 
treat like elements as unalike.”).  Professor Ross seeks to help “humanize the victims 
of nonconsensual search and seizures” and encourages her readers to “grapple with 
the antipathy they might normally accord to victims of Fourth Amendment violations 
and consider how this response skews logic and fairness.”  Id. 
 6  See, e.g., United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 350–51 (1974) (“[T]his Court 
declined to extend the exclusionary rule to one who was not the victim of the 
unlawful search.”); Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 261 (1960) (“In order to 
qualify as a ‘person aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure’ one must have been 
a victim of a search or seizure.”). 
 7  See Nadia Soree, The Demise of Fourth Amendment Standing: From Standing Room to 
Center Orchestra, 8 NEV. L.J. 570 (2008) (providing analysis and critique of current 
Fourth Amendment standing doctrine). 
 8  439 U.S. 128, 148 (1978).  In reaching its holding, Rakas repudiated the 
“legitimately on the premises” test of standing announced in Jones v. United States, 362 
U.S. 257 (1960).  Rakas, 439 U.S. at 142.  In announcing the legitimate expectation 
of privacy test as the proper test of standing, the Court also disapproved of the 
concept of standing as a separate procedural inquiry, merging the standing inquiry 
with the merits of the suppression hearing: “But we think the better analysis 
forthrightly focuses on the extent of a particular defendant’s rights under the Fourth 
Amendment, rather than on any theoretically separate, but invariably intertwined 
concept of standing.”  Id. at 139.  I will continue to use the term “standing” to refer 
to the ability of a given defendant to seek suppression of evidence, as a matter 
independent from the ultimate resolution of the suppression hearing.  Although the 
Rakas opinion left open the possibility of a defendant’s ability to seek suppression on 
the basis of a property or possessory interest in the item seized, the Court’s opinions 
in Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98 (1980), and United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83 
(1980), left no doubt that even such an interest in the item seized does not suffice to 
permit a defendant the opportunity to press a Fourth Amendment claim based on an 
allegedly unlawful search.  Rakas, 439 U.S. at 137 n.6.  In Rawlings, although the 
defendant admitted ownership, for suppression purposes, of the drugs found in his 
companion’s purse, the Court denied him “standing” to challenge the search 
because he had no legitimate expectation of privacy in the purse.  Rawlings, 448 U.S. 
at 105–06.  Thus, the police conduct in searching the purse was simply never 
examined at all. 
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In other words, the Court adopted, although not entirely accurately, 
the substantive test used to define a Fourth Amendment search, 
derived from Katz v. United States,9 as the proper measure of a 
defendant’s ability to challenge the government activity that 
unearthed the evidence to be used against her at trial.10  In Rakas, the 
Court used this test to preclude the defendants from challenging the 
search of an automobile that produced evidence against them 
because “they made no showing that they had any legitimate 
expectation of privacy in the glove compartment or area under the 
seat of the car in which they were merely passengers.”11  Therefore, 
because Rakas, a mere passenger, had no legitimate expectation of 
privacy in these particular areas of the car,12 the Court never had to 
address whether the police acted in accordance with the Fourth 
Amendment.13 
What I believe to be the most troubling consequence of the 
decision to subsume standing under the substantive definition of a 
search is that, even when the government is clearly acting improperly, 
such misconduct receives no judicial scrutinya perverse outcome if 
one conceives of the Fourth Amendment as a provision meant to 
regulate the government’s use of power against its citizens.14  It 
should be no surprise, then, that what I argue is the most troubling 
 
 9  389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
 10  In adopting this test, the Court in Rakas, citing Katz at page 353, stated, “the 
Court in Katz held that capacity to claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment 
depends not upon a property right in the invaded place but upon whether the 
person who claims the protection of the Amendment has a legitimate expectation of 
privacy in the invaded place.”  Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143.  However, a thorough 
exploration of the cited page in Katz fails to reveal either the word “expectation” or 
“place.”  Katz, 389 U.S. at 353.   
 11  Rakas, 439 U.S. at 148. 
 12  Justice White, in dissent, wonders what, short of ownership, would have 
satisfied the Court to establish the requisite expectation of privacy.  Id. at 165 (White, 
J., dissenting). 
 13  See Rakas, 439 U.S. at 130; see also Soree, supra note 7, at 621 (explaining that 
the Rakas majority made no pretense of concern with whether there was, in fact, the 
proper level of justification for the search at issue, stating at the outset of the 
discussion that a brief exposition of the facts was adequate because “we are not here 
concerned with the issue of probable cause.”  (quoting Rakas, 439 U.S. at 130)). 
 14  One need not look any further than United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727 
(1980), for evidence that the Court’s standing doctrine permits, perhaps even 
encourages, the government’s lawless behavior in investigating crime.  In Payner, 
government agents broke into and retrieved documents from a banker’s briefcase, 
knowing that third parties would not have “standing” to claim a Fourth Amendment 
violation with respect to the briefcase and thus, the evidence gained from an 
obviously unlawful search would be (and was) admissible against Payner, who was 
convicted of falsifying his income tax return.  See id. at 728–32. 
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flaw of current standing doctrine—that courts may, even must,15 turn 
a blind eye to governmental misconduct—is also to a significant 
extent a characteristic of the test used to define a search, at least as 
currently applied.  Although I have elsewhere argued that the Court 
should once again separate standing from the substantive definition 
of a search,16 assuming the status quo, the reasonable-expectation-of-
privacy test should be reconceived to include a more meaningful 
examination of the government’s conduct in seeking information. 
Recently, the Court has indicated its willingness to reexamine 
and reevaluate its post-Katz search doctrine.  On January 23, 2012, the 
Court, in holding that the Government’s placement of a Global 
Positioning System (GPS) on defendant’s vehicle and the use of the 
GPS to monitor his movements over a period of four weeks 
constituted a Fourth Amendment search, announced that “Jones’s 
Fourth Amendment rights do not rise or fall with the Katz 
formulation.”17  The Court framed its decision fairly narrowly, 
restricting its holding to the fact that the Government, for the 
purpose of gaining information, “physically intrud[ed] on a 
constitutionally protected area,”18 leaving open whether such long-
 
 15  The Court in Payner held that a federal court was not permitted to exclude 
evidence pursuant to its supervisory powers, even in the face of “the Government’s 
knowing and purposeful bad faith hostility to any person’s fundamental constitutional 
rights.”  Id. at 730–31 (internal citations omitted). 
 16  See Soree, supra note 7, at 620. 
 17  United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 947 (2012).  
 18  Id. at 950 n.3.  The Court found it unnecessary to ascertain whether Mr. Jones 
had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements, reasoning that “Katz did 
not erode the principle ‘that, when the Government does engage in physical intrusion 
of a constitutionally protected area in order to obtain information, that intrusion 
may constitute a violation of the Fourth Amendment.’”  Id. at 951.  Justice Scalia, 
writing for the Court, stated his judgment that the Fourth Amendment must be 
interpreted to “provide at a minimum the degree of protection it afforded when it was 
adopted,” hinting that the application of the Katz formulation to these facts might 
have mandated the opposite result.  Id. at 953 (“The concurrence does not share that 
belief.  It would apply exclusively Katz’s reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test, even 
when that eliminates rights that previously existed.”).  Justices Sotomayor and Alito, 
in their respective concurring opinions, however, indicated their belief that such 
long-term GPS monitoring would indeed impinge upon reasonable expectations of 
privacy, although Justice Sotomayor found it unnecessary to reach that question in 
this case.  Id. at 955, 957 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“When the Government 
physically invades personal property to gather information, a search occurs.  The 
reaffirmation of that principle suffices to decide this case.”); Id. at 964 (Alito, J., 
concurring) (“But the use of longer term GPS monitoring in investigations of most 
offenses impinges on expectations of privacy. . . . We need not identify with precision 
the point at which the tracking of this vehicle became a search, for the line was surely 
crossed before the 4-week mark.”). 
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term surveillance accomplished without physical intrusion would 
constitute a search under the Katz formulation.19 The Court 
indicated, though, that “the Katz reasonable-expectation-of-privacy 
test has been added to, but not substituted for, the common-law 
trespassory test.”20  Further, in her concurring opinion, Justice 
Sotomayor, while agreeing with the trespass-based reasoning of the 
Court under the particular facts of the case, urged that it may be 
“necessary” to reconsider the Court’s existing post-Katz 
jurisprudence.21  Additionally, Justice Alito, in his concurrence, 
although not embracing the trespass rationale and, instead, adhering 
to the reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test, noted that this test “is 
not without its own difficulties.”22 
What is clear, after Jones, is that absent a trespass on a 
constitutionally protected area (for the purpose of gathering 
information),23 the Katz reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test still 
controls the threshold question of whether a Fourth Amendment 
search has occurred,24 and is therefore the subject of this Article’s 
efforts to induce much needed reform.  What is equally clear is that 
the law of searches is in flux, and that the Court has recognized the 
inability of Katz, in its application to this point, to adequately protect 
the public against modern-day encroachments on privacy.  The time 
is ripe for the development of Fourth Amendment search doctrine, 
and the law of rape provides a rich source of grist for the mill of 
change. 
The primary goal of this Article, then, is to propose a more 
balanced approach to defining Fourth Amendment searches that 
takes into account the conduct of both law enforcement and the 
 
 19  Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 954 (“It may be that achieving the same result through 
electronic means, without an accompanying trespass, is an unconstitutional invasion 
of privacy, but the present case does not require us to answer that question.”). 
 20  Id. at 954.  See infra Part II.B for a discussion of Katz as departing from a 
definition of a search that required a governmental trespass (or physical intrusion) 
into a constitutionally protected area. 
 21  Id. at 957 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).   
 22  Id. at 962 (Alito, J., concurring).   
 23  The Court’s opinion, interestingly, stressed the Government’s purpose of 
gathering information as a factor in defining the search, id. at 951 n.5, as has been 
urged by Professor Thomas Clancy.  See Thomas K. Clancy, What Is a “Search” Within 
the Meaning of the Fourth Amendment?, 70 ALB. L. REV. 1, 39 (2006).  Professor Clancy 
has also noted that the Court has generally found the Fourth Amendment to apply to 
physical invasions, even minor ones, which is consistent with the Court’s decision in 
Jones.  See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 949. 
 24  Id. at 953 (“Situations involving merely the transmission of electronic signals 
without trespass would remain subject to Katz analysis.”). 
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victim of surveillance to determine whether a search has occurred, 
resulting in a doctrine truer to the letter and spirit of Katz.  As this 
Article will demonstrate, the current application of Katz places almost 
exclusive scrutiny on the conduct and precautions taken by the victim 
of the surveillance, and in fact requires unreasonably onerous efforts 
to maintain privacy, with scant attention given to the measures taken 
by the government to overcome those precautions.25 
We can now begin to examine how the law of rape can provide a 
relevant analogy and useful framework for a new understanding of 
Fourth Amendment searches.  At common law, forcible rape was 
defined as follows: “carnal knowledge of a woman forcibly and against 
her will.”26  While force and nonconsent were both required elements 
of the crime of rape,27 traditionally these elements were defined 
almost exclusively in terms of the victim’s conduct, making the 
victim’s resistance a de facto element of rape.28  Further, under the 
traditional model of rape, not only was resistance required on the 
part of the victim, but it was necessary for the victim to resist to the 
utmost in order for the law to recognize what occurred as rape.29 
Naturally, the requirement of utmost resistance resulted in a 
definition of rape that punished only the most extreme uses of force, 
as only severe force used by the perpetrator would be successful in 
overcoming this mandatory level of resistance, even in the face of the 
victim’s clear nonconsent.  This Article argues that current search 
doctrine suffers from the same defect identified by critics of 
traditional rape law: as rape was originally defined by the victim’s 
conduct and state of mind, so the Fourth Amendment search is 
currently defined primarily by the conduct and state of mind of its 
victim as well.  While a rape was not deemed to have occurred absent 
the actor’s use of force sufficient to overcome the utmost resistance 
of the victim, a search similarly is not deemed to have occurred unless 
 
 25  See infra Part III.   
 26  4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 210 (1769). 
 27  E.g., JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW § 33.04 (5th ed. 2009) 
[hereinafter DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW]. 
 28  See, e.g., Anne M. Coughlin, Sex and Guilt, 84 VA. L. REV. 1, 16–17 (1998) 
(setting forth common objections to the traditional approach in rape prosecutions, 
which “places the victim’s behavior and demeanor at the center of the trial”); Susan 
Estrich, Rape, 95 YALE L.J. 1087, 1094 (1986) (arguing that requirements of force and 
nonconsent are both determined in reference to the victim’s behavior).   
 29  E.g., Michelle J. Anderson, Reviving Resistance in Rape Law, 1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 
953, 957 (1998); Estrich, supra note 28, at 1099; Richard Klein, An Analysis of Thirty-
Five Years of Rape Reform: A Frustrating Search for Fundamental Fairness, 41 AKRON L. REV. 
981, 987 (2008). 
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the government is able to overcome what amounts to utmost 
resistance, measured by the precautions taken to maintain one’s 
integrity against governmental intrusion.30 
While this Article does not seek to make any normative claims 
with respect to the reforms achieved in the law of rape,31 there are 
valuable insights to be gained from examining the evolution of rape 
law, and the concerns animating that evolution, that can illuminate 
the pursuit of a new paradigm for defining Fourth Amendment 
searches.  Part II discusses Katz and some of its progeny, taking into 
account the Court’s recent decision in United States v. Jones,32 and 
briefly sketching the argument that the language and spirit of Katz 
support the more balanced, conduct-oriented approach that this 
Article proposes.  This section begins, however, by emphasizing the 
significance of the injury suffered by victims of compelled searches of 
body or home, and by reasserting the importance of recognizing 
more than simply the most egregious practices of governmental 
surveillance as deserving of Fourth Amendment protection.  Part III 
focuses on the law of rape, discussing the primary critiques of 
traditional rape law and the broader goals sought to be achieved by 
reformers in this area, as well as the specific reforms developed as a 
response to these critiques and goals.  Part IV returns to the task of 
redefining the Fourth Amendment search and invites the reader to 
complete the conceptual journey connecting rape law with search 
law.  This section will demonstrate that in many significant ways, the 
grievances animating the rape reform movement can be analogized 
to the Fourth Amendment context, and indeed, one can discern a 
compelling parallel between the two areas of law.  The section 
concludes by illustrating how the reforms achieved in the rape 
context can provide a model for reform in Fourth Amendment 
 
 30  See infra Part IV. 
 31  The focus of this Article is not to evaluate the reforms achieved in rape law, 
but to apply the reasoning and substance of those reforms to the context of defining 
Fourth Amendment searches.  Although in order to accomplish this objective it is 
necessary to explore rape law in depth, this Article is really about Fourth 
Amendment searches.  That said, there is a certain irony in urging a Fourth 
Amendment doctrine that will be more generous to defendants by highlighting rape 
law reforms that have made rape convictions easier to obtain, causing many scholars 
concern that, perhaps, certain of these reforms have gone too far and may raise the 
risk of unfairly convicting defendants accused of rape.  See, e.g., Joshua Dressler, 
Where We Have Been, and Where We Might Be Going: Some Cautionary Reflections on Rape 
Law Reform, 46 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 409 (1998) [hereinafter Dressler, Where We Have 
Been] (praising many of the legal reforms achieved while urging caution in moving 
forward in order to achieve a balance between the rights of victims and defendants). 
 32  132 S. Ct. 945 (2012). 
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search doctrine as well, reform that can promote the goals of 
improved government behavior, individual autonomy, and equality.  
In concluding, the Article briefly highlights a few cases in which the 
Court has indicated its willingness to reconsider its post-Katz 
jurisprudence and which have set the stage for the beginnings of the 
shift in defining Fourth Amendment searches that has emerged in 
United States v. Jones, and that will, hopefully, continue to evolve. 
II.  FROM 1967 TO 1984 AND BEYOND: DECONSTRUCTING AND 
RECONSTRUCTING KATZ 
A. Nothing to Hide, Nothing to Fear . . . But the Search Itself 
They rape us with their eyes, their laws, and their codes. 
—Marilyn French33 
 
There was no way of knowing whether you were being watched at any 
given moment.  How often, or on what system, the Thought Police plugged in 
on any individual wire was guesswork.  It was even conceivable that they 
watched everybody all the time. . . .  You had to live—did live—from habit 
that became instinct—in the assumption that every sound you made was 
overheard, and, except in darkness, every movement scrutinized. 
—George Orwell34 
Just as the Article began, this section again juxtaposes two 
quotations to impress upon the reader the fundamental affront to 
personhood perpetrated through psychic, as well as physical, 
intrusions into private realms of life.  Although we have not reached 
the Orwellian state of affairs described by the second quotation, we 
may be moving dangerously close.  In 1984, the protagonist explains: 
It was terribly dangerous to let your thoughts wander when 
you were in any public place or within range of a telescreen.  
The smallest thing could give you away.  A nervous tic, an 
unconscious look of anxiety, a habit of muttering to 
yourself—anything that carried with it the suggestion of 
abnormality, of having something to hide.  In any case, to 
wear an improper expression on your face . . . was itself a 
 
 33  MARILYN FRENCH, THE WOMEN’S ROOM 433 (Ballantine Books 1977).  The 
Women’s Room was feminist novelist Marilyn French’s debut novel, and the material 
quoted above was spoken by one of the novel’s characters, preceded, however, by the 
following statement: “All men are rapists, and that’s all that they are.”  Id.  I chose to 
open Part II with this (quite controversial) quote to emphasize the concept of 
nonphysical means of breaching personal barriers. 
 34  GEORGE ORWELL, 1984 3 (Signet Classics 1950). 
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punishable offense.  There was even a word for it in 
Newspeak: facecrime . . . .35 
In Orwell’s dystopian world, constant surveillance, whether 
through direct human observation or via telescreen, of facial and 
body expressions provided officials with information as to citizens’ 
inner thoughts and emotions.  Had Orwell been writing his novel 
today rather than in 1948, perhaps the Thought Police would have 
had even more effective means of “prob[ing] deeper and deeper into 
the reaches of our cognitive existence”36  by utilizing a process 
referred to as Brain Fingerprinting.37  Professor Christian Halliburton 
describes this process in the following way: 
Brain Fingerprinting can tell the operator what an 
individual does or does not know without any voluntary 
action, response or consent by the subject.  While Brain 
Fingerprinting can’t “read minds” in the absolute sense, it 
does allow irresistible access to one’s thoughts, with any 
decision to keep those thoughts and ideas private effectively 
overridden. . . .38 
Professor Halliburton mentions various scientific techniques 
“designed to provide the means to tap into human cognitive contents 
and cerebral functioning for information-gathering . . . purposes,”39 
and continues: 
The common thread uniting these complex and varied 
approaches is the belief that technological innovation can 
provide the power to peer behind the veil that keeps our 
thoughts and thought processes confidential, and that 
developing the power to do so ultimately serves the public 
good.40 
As experience has shown, the erosion of individual interests for the 
 
 35  Id. at 145. 
 36  Christian M. Halliburton, Letting Katz out of the Bag: Cognitive Freedom and 
Fourth Amendment Fidelity, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 309, 309 (2007) [hereinafter Halliburton, 
Cognitive Freedom]. 
 37  See id. 
 38  Id. at 309–10. 
 39  See id. at 310.  Professor Halliburton refers to these various methods as 
Cognitive Camera Technologies, or CCTs.  Id. at 310.  Brain Fingerprinting primarily 
utilizes electroencephalographic monitoring, although there are other techniques 
available and in use with the capability of providing access to our cognitive domain.  
Id.  Brain Fingerprinting uses imagery to measure brain responses to selected stimuli, 
with the potential, for example, to indicate whether the subject has been previously 
exposed to a certain event or location.  Halliburton, Cognitive Freedom, supra note 36, 
at 320. 
 40  Id. at 310. 
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“public good” is not only the stuff of (then) futuristic novels, but it is 
the stuff of Supreme Court opinions as well. 
With advances in technology and, due in part to the War on 
Terror, the increased vigilance of the government, the importance of 
a more inclusive definition of a search cannot be understated.  As 
Professor Anthony Amsterdam has asserted, “I can think of few issues 
more important to a society than the amount of power that it permits 
its police to use without effective control by law.”41  To be sure, the 
most extreme intrusions upon individuals by the government are 
classified as searches and are, thus, regulated under the Fourth 
Amendment.  Indeed, if the government seeks to retrieve evidence of 
crime by drugging a “citizen—not yet convicted of a criminal 
offense—with narcotics and barbiturates into a state of 
unconsciousness, and then to search beneath his skin for evidence of 
a crime,”42 something more than probable cause and a warrant is 
required.43  Yet, under the special needs doctrine, the government 
may compel “a person to submit to the piercing of his skin by a 
hypodermic needle so that his blood may be extracted”44 with no 
individualized suspicion at all.45 
 
 41  Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives On the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 
349, 377 (1974). 
 42  Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 765 (1985) (internal quotations omitted). 
 43  The Court stated that the reasonableness of conducting surgical intrusions is 
properly determined on a case-by-case basis.  Id. at 760.  Weighing the severity of the 
intrusion against the government’s need to surgically retrieve a bullet from under 
the defendant’s collarbone for use as evidence in an attempted robbery prosecution, 
the Court held the proposed surgery to be unreasonable, as this particular piece of 
evidence was not critical to the government’s case and therefore, the government 
failed to demonstrate a compelling need for the bullet.  Id. at 766. 
 44  Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 644 (1989) (Marshall, J., 
dissenting).  At issue in Skinner were Federal Railroad Administration regulations 
concerning toxicological testing of the blood and urine of railroad employees 
directly involved in certain types of train incidents.  Id. at 609–12.  
 45  Id. at 634 (“In light of the limited discretion exercised by the railroad 
employers under the regulations, the surpassing safety interests served by 
toxicological tests in this context, and the diminished expectation of privacy that 
attaches to information pertaining to the fitness of covered employees, we believe 
that it is reasonable to conduct such tests in the absence of a warrant or reasonable 
suspicion . . . .”).  Skinner is one example of the Court’s special needs doctrine, under 
which the usual requirements of a warrant and individualized suspicion are 
suspended and reasonableness is determined by balancing the severity of the 
intrusion upon the individual against the government’s need to search in order to 
advance an interest unrelated to criminal law enforcement.  See, e.g., Skinner v. Ry. 
Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989) (upholding Federal Railroad regulations 
that allowed toxicology tests of railroad employees without a search warrant or 
individualized suspicion); Nat’l Treas. Emp. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989) 
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The special needs doctrine also gives school administrators and 
officials relief from the warrant and probable cause requirements of 
the Fourth Amendment, permitting searches that are simply 
reasonable “under all the circumstances.”46  As documented in a 2009 
New York Times article: 
Savana Redding still remembers the clothes she had on—
black stretch pants with butterfly patches and a pink T-
shirt—the day school officials here forced her to strip six 
years ago.  She was 13 and in eighth grade.  An assistant 
principal, enforcing the school’s antidrug policies, 
suspected her of having brought prescription-strength 
ibuprofen pills to school.  One of the pills is as strong as two 
Advils.  The search by two female school employees was 
methodical and humiliating, Ms. Redding said.  After she 
had stripped to her underwear, “they asked me to pull out 
my bra and move it from side to side,” she said.  “They 
made me open my legs and pull out my underwear.”  Ms. 
Redding, an honors student, had no pills.47 
Clearly, Savana Redding was the victim of a search, even, as it 
turned out, an unreasonable one.48  However, Ms. Redding was not 
entitled to relief in her suit against school officials because it was not 
“sufficiently clear” that forcing a 13-year-old girl to “expose[] her 
breasts and pelvic area”49 with no reason to suspect that the ibuprofen 
was being secreted in her underwear, would violate the Fourth 
Amendment.  In other words, although the Court in T.L.O. warned 
officials that a search “excessively intrusive in light of the age and sex 
of the student and nature of the infraction” would not be 
reasonable,50 and indeed described the strip search at issue here as a 
 
(holding that the U.S. Customs Service’s testing of employees who apply for 
promotion to positions directly involving the interdiction of illegal drugs, or to 
positions that require the incumbent to carry firearms, is reasonable despite the 
absence of a requirement of probable cause or of some level of individualized 
suspicion); Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868 (1987) (stating that supervision of 
probationers is a “special need” of the State that may justify departures from the 
usual warrant and probable cause requirements); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 
U.S. 523 (1967) (upholding administrative home searches).  But see Ferguson v. City 
of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67 (2001) (holding that a hospital’s mandatory drug 
screening of pregnant women is a type of search that does not meet the special needs 
criteria).  
 46  New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 326 (1985). 
 47   Adam Liptak, Strip-search of Girl Tests Limit of School Policy, N.Y. TIMES, March 
23, 2009, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/24/us/24savana.html. 
 48  Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 379 (2009). 
 49  Id. at 369. 
 50  T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 342. 
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“quantum leap from outer clothes and backpacks to exposure of 
intimate parts,”51 it was apparently still not sufficiently clear that this 
was excessively intrusive, and therefore the officials were entitled to 
qualified immunity.52 
While Savana Redding at least could claim the satisfaction of 
knowing that her outrage was legally justified (though not 
compensable), Max Rettele, his girlfriend Judy Sadler, and her son 
Chase Hall were told, in a per curium decision, that, despite the fact 
that the “frustration, embarrassment, and humiliation” they suffered 
was “real,”53 seven deputies acted reasonably54 when, executing a 
warrant for the search of a home for African-American suspects of 
fraud and identity theft, they entered the home of Rettele, Sadler, 
and Hall (all Caucasian) at 7:15 A.M., unaware that Rettele had 
purchased and moved into the home three months before the 
search.55  Hall, upon answering the door to the deputies, was ordered 
“to lie face down on the ground.”56 
The deputies’ announcement awoke Rettele and Sadler.  
The deputies entered their bedroom with guns drawn and 
ordered them to get out of their bed and to show their 
hands.  They protested that they were not wearing clothes.  
Rettele stood up and attempted to put on a pair of 
sweatpants, but deputies told him not to move.  Sadler also 
stood up and attempted, without success, to cover herself 
with a sheet.  Rettele and Sadler were held at gunpoint for 
one to two minutes before Rettele was allowed to retrieve a 
robe for Sadler.  He was then permitted to dress. . . . By that 
time the deputies realized they had made a mistake.  They 
apologized to Rettele and Sadler, thanked them for not 
becoming upset, and left within five minutes.57 
The Court, in reaching its decision, mentioned that the officers 
left the home less than one quarter hour after having arrived, and 
that Ms. Sadler was “unclothed for no more than two minutes, and 
Rettele for only slightly more time than that.”58  One cannot help but 
wonder how long those two minutes felt to Sadler and Rettele, 
 
 51  Redding, 557 U.S. at 377 (emphasis added). 
 52  Id. at 378–79. 
 53  L.A. Cnty., Cal. vs. Rettele, 550 U.S. 609, 616 (2007). 
 54  Id. 
 55  Id. at 611. 
 56  Id. 
 57  Id. at 611. 
 58  Id. at 615. 
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standing naked in front of seven deputies and their drawn guns. 
It is worth leaving the reader with one more example of a 
physically invasive search, one is commonly experienced by many 
citizens, especially those who frequently travel by air.59  While the 
examples above all constitute searches, the Terry frisk also qualifies as 
a search, but requires only reasonable suspicion because it is deemed 
to be less intrusive than a full search,60 although still a “serious 
intrusion upon the sanctity of the person.”61  The Court, in Terry v. 
Ohio, asks us to 
[c]onsider the following apt description: “The officer must 
feel with sensitive fingers every portion of the prisoner’s 
body.  A thorough search must be made of the prisoner’s 
arms and armpits, waistline and back, the groin and area 
about the testicles, and entire surface of the legs down to 
the feet.”62 
If “such a procedure performed in public by a policeman while 
the citizen stands helpless”63 gets something less than full Fourth 
Amendment protection under the Court’s balancing approach, it 
should not be surprising that a great many intrusions warrant no 
Fourth Amendment protection at all.  In fact, one view of Terry is that 
the balance struck by the Court, accommodating law enforcement 
needs while taking into account the individual interest, is preferable 
to one alternative: not classifying anything short of a full arrest and 
search as implicating the Fourth Amendment at all, thereby leaving 
police officers completely to their discretion to “merely” stop and 
frisk with no judicial oversight.64  Of course, this is precisely the result 
 
 59  I refer to the frisk that many travelers are required to endure as a condition to 
boarding an airplane, either in lieu of agreeing to a full-body scan by the back-scatter 
x-ray machines in use at many airports, or upon some indication from the x-ray that 
indicates a need for the frisk.  These airport frisks are sufficiently routine, however, 
that they likely do not equal the humiliation and embarrassment felt by the 
individual receiving a frisk, based on suspicion, on a public sidewalk in full view of 
gawking passersby.   
 60  Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 26 (1968) (describing the frisk as “something less 
than a ‘full’ search.”).  
 61  Id. at 17. 
 62  Id. at 17 n.13 (quoting Priar & Martin, Searching and Disarming Criminals, 4 J. 
CRIM. L., CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 481 (1954)).  
 63  Terry, 392 U.S. at 16–17. 
 64  See Eric J. Miller, The Warren Court’s Regulatory Revolution in Criminal Procedure, 
43 CONN. L. REV. 1, 48–65 (2010) (arguing that Terry actually expanded regulation of 
law enforcement to include judicial oversight over areas of citizen-police encounters 
that fell outside the usual warrant and probable cause standard).  But see Amy D. 
Ronner, Fleeing While Black: The Fourth Amendment Apartheid, 32 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. 
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with a great many surveillance techniques the Court has classified as 
non-searches: permitting police, at their whim, to peer into our back 
yards from hovering aircraft,65 probe into our personal relationships 
by tracking whom we telephone,66 stalk us in public with electronic 
devices,67 rummage through our garbage,68 delve into our personal 
finances,69 and yes, even search our friends’ cars as we ride with 
them.70  Professor Amsterdam is correct: there are few more 
important issues. 
B. A First Look at Katz: Was It All We Expected? 
In 1967, the Supreme Court famously announced that “the 
Fourth Amendment protects people, not places.”71  With that bold 
statement, the Warren Court sought to expand the scope of the 
Fourth Amendment72 by rejecting the traditional requirement of a 
physical trespass into a “constitutionally protected area” as the trigger 
for Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable searches.73  
Thus, Mr. Katz successfully claimed a violation of the Fourth 
Amendment when government agents, acting without a warrant, 
listened to and recorded his side of a telephone conversation by 
 
REV. 383, 400 (2001) (referring to Terry as the “foundation upon which the Supreme 
Court has built its racially biased Fourth Amendment jurisprudence”).  Professor 
Ronner argues that the Court briefly acknowledged, and then repressed and 
negated, the awareness that stop and frisks could be, and often were, used by police 
as tools of harassment and humiliation directed against minority citizens, a practice 
that would likely increase in light of the reduced Fourth Amendment protection 
afforded citizens by the reasonable suspicion standard, and a practice the Court 
found the exclusionary rule ineffective to control.  Id. at 404–05.  With its decision in 
Terry, Professor Ronner claims, the Court effectively “inaugurated what was to 
become an insidious pattern—namely the exile of minorities from the dominion of 
Fourth Amendment protection.”  Id. at 405–06. 
 65  See Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 
(1986). 
 66  See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979). 
 67  See United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983). 
 68  See California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988). 
 69  See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976). 
 70  See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978). 
 71  Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967). 
 72  See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.  “The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, 
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, 
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be 
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”  Id.  
 73  See Katz, 389 U.S. at 350.  “[T]he correct solution of Fourth Amendment 
problems is not necessarily promoted by incantation of the phrase ‘constitutionally 
protected area.’”  Id.  
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affixing electronic recording equipment to the outside of the 
telephone booth he used to place his call, despite the facts that he 
had no traditional property interest in the public booth (the inside of 
which was partially exposed to public view),74 the electronic device 
did not physically intrude into the phone booth, and the words 
spoken by him could not be “seized” in the usual meaning of the 
word.75  Thus, Mr. Katz received the protection of the Fourth 
Amendment not because he claimed some property right to an 
invaded place, but because the “Government’s activities in 
electronically listening to and recording the petitioner’s words 
violated the privacy upon which he justifiably relied . . . .”76 
So, if Katz was meant to herald a new age of expansive Fourth 
Amendment protection broadly available to all “people” based on 
some inherent right to privacy77 rather than upon the ability to assert 
 
 74  Id. at 352. 
 75  See id. at 348–49, 353, 359.  Justice Black, in dissent, criticizes the majority for 
straying so far from the text of the Fourth Amendment, which he reads to protect 
against the unreasonable search and seizure of tangible things, concluding that the 
Amendment simply does not apply to eavesdropping, whether by naked ear or with 
the assistance of technology.  Id. at 365–66 (Black, J., dissenting). 
 76  Id. at 353.  This is not to say, however, that property law is irrelevant in 
determining the existence of one’s right under the Fourth Amendment to be free 
from governmental intrusions, as the Court in United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 
(2012), has recently recognized.  See supra notes 1724 and accompanying text.  The 
Court has finally heeded the many scholars who have disapproved of the 
conventional view that Katz outright rejected any reliance on property law in favor of 
a privacy-based regime, and who have argued, instead, that the focus on privacy was 
meant to supplement the existing property framework, thereby expanding the 
protective reach of the Amendment.  See, e.g., Christian M. Halliburton, How Privacy 
Killed Katz: A Tale of Cognitive Freedom and the Property of Personhood as Fourth Amendment 
Norm, 42 AKRON L. REV. 803, 824–25 (2009) [hereinafter Halliburton, How Privacy 
Killed Katz]  
[T]he Katz opinion does not wholly require, nor justify, the shift from a 
property to a privacy perspective that we attribute to it.  The most 
salient aspects of the Katz Court’s analysis . . . are its rejection of the 
limitations of the trespass doctrine and the refusal to invest any 
significance in the difference between tangible and intangible items.  
The trespass doctrine itself is not wholly irrelevant after Katz because 
Katz merely held that a trespass is not necessary to trigger the Fourth 
Amendment, but it nowhere stated that it is insufficient.  
Id. (emphasis in original); Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: 
Constitutional Myths and the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801, 816 (2004) (“While 
existing scholarship often interprets the shift [in Katz] as a wholesale rejection of 
property-based principles . . . it is better understood as a shift of degree from 
common law rules to the looser property-based approach that currently governs.”).   
 77  Justice Black also accuses the majority of “clever word juggling” and of 
“rewriting the Fourth Amendment” to reconstruct that Amendment as a law 
protecting privacy rather than one prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures.  
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a sufficient property interest in a given location (which would limit 
the number of individuals qualifying for protection),78  how did we 
get to the state of affairs described above?  Perhaps the fault lies 
somewhat with Justice Stewart’s Katz opinion itself.  While 
dismantling the existing trespass doctrine, the Katz majority did not 
clearly construct its replacement,79 leaving Justice Harlan, in his 
concurring opinion, to offer his understanding of the majority’s 
holding, still in terms of places and areas, but with an emphasis on 
the privacy an individual may expect in association with those places 
and areas rather than with a sole focus on any property interest that 
may be claimed.80  Thus, for Justice Harlan, the phone booth into 
which Mr. Katz entered, after he shut the door and paid his toll, 
became a “temporarily private place whose momentary occupants’ 
expectations of freedom from intrusion are recognized as 
reasonable.”81  It was Justice Harlan’s concurrence that provided the 
two-pronged test that came to define a search as a government 
violation of “an actual, subjective expectation of privacy” that “society 
is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”82  This Article will show, 
however, that Justice Harlan’s formulation is capable of a much more 
 
See Katz, 389 U.S. at 373 (Black, J., dissenting). 
 78  Justice Alito, in his concurring opinion in Jones, urged the continued need to 
look to reasonable expectations of privacy, noting that the physical trespass-based 
approach would not have protected the defendant if, for example, the GPS device 
had been affixed to the car before it came under his exclusive control or if the 
Government made use of a GPS device already installed upon the car by the 
manufacturer.  See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 961 (Alito, J., concurring).  Of course, the irony 
lies in the fact that the reasonable expectation of privacy test has also been used to 
limit the number of individuals who can successfully claim the protection of the 
Fourth Amendment, as demonstrated in many of the Court’s “standing” cases.  See, 
e.g., Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978) (holding that defendants who were mere 
passengers in an automobile did not have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the 
portions searched); Rawlings v. Kentucky, 488 U.S. 98 (1980) (holding that 
defendant did not have a legitimate expectation of privacy in his companion’s 
purse). 
 79  See James J. Tomkovicz, Beyond Secrecy for Secrecy’s Sake: Toward an Expanded 
Vision of the Fourth Amendment Privacy Province, 36 HASTINGS L.J. 645, 650–51 (1985) 
(describing the Katz majority opinion as “an efficient dismantler, but neglectful 
reconstructor”).  
 80  Katz, 389 U.S. at 360–61 (Harlan, J., concurring).   
 81  Id. at 361.  
 82  Id.  The Court officially adopted Justice Harlan’s formulation defining a 
Fourth Amendment search in Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979), taking 
care to link each of the two prongs of Justice Harlan’s test to Justice Stewart’s 
language in the Katz majority opinion.  See Katz, 389 U.S. at 361.  It is also important 
to remind the reader that, even after United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012), this 
remains the test of a search in the absence of a physical trespass into a 
constitutionally protected area. 
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nuanced and subtle application than the Court has chosen to 
endorse, especially when read carefully in conjunction with Justice 
Stewart’s majority opinion. 
A careful reexamination of Katz, with greater fidelity to both 
language and intent, is particularly urgent, in light of the twin 
pressures of a perceived need for both increased surveillance 
(making government surveillance more frequent and routine) and 
technological innovation (making such surveillance more effective 
and revealing), both of which act on the current definition of a 
search by consistently eroding societal expectations of privacy.  Thus, 
a definition of a search that focuses solely on those continually 
diminishing expectations to delineate the scope of constitutional 
protection will result in a Fourth Amendment that increasingly 
permits the very entity meant to be cabined by that Amendment ever 
more power: 
[S]earches are defined as anything agents of the 
government do that infringes a reasonable expectation of 
privacy.  As every criminal procedure class learns, if the key 
to that definition is the word “expectation,” the definition is 
circular.  People expect what they think will happen, and 
what they think will happen is a function of what has 
happened in the past.  By altering its behavior, the 
government can change how people expect it to behave.  
Thus, if the government is bound only to respect people’s 
expectations, it is not bound at all, for it can easily 
condition the citizenry to expect little or no privacy.83 
Ironically, although the Katz Court found the prior property and 
trespass-based approach to defining a search inadequate to protect 
citizens against the government’s use of novel, high-tech forms of 
surveillance, its privacy-based solution, especially when distilled into 
Justice Harlan’s two-pronged reasonable expectation test, has proved 
vulnerable to manipulation and equally inadequate (as it has been 
interpreted and applied) to protect privacy.  Katz has left significant 
questions unanswered, even with Justice Harlan’s clarification of the 
Court’s holding, and has generated significant debate and criticism 
 
 83  William J. Stuntz, The Distribution of Fourth Amendment Privacy, 67 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 1265, 1268 (1999).  As Professor Thomas Clancy observed, “[t]he peculiar logic 
of the diminished expectation of privacy rationale, therefore, is that it permits the 
scope of Fourth Amendment protections to diminish as governmental regulation 
increases.  Yet, the mandates of the Fourth Amendment demand heightened, not 
lowered, respect, as the intrusive regulatory authority of government expands.”  
Thomas K. Clancy, What Does the Fourth Amendment Protect: Property, Privacy, or Security?, 
33 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 307, 342 (1998) (internal quotations omitted). 
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among scholars and Justices alike, as has the Court’s post-Katz 
jurisprudence.84 
Justice Black, in his Katz dissent, reiterated his “fear of the 
dangers involved when [the] Court uses the broad, abstract and 
ambiguous concept of privacy as a comprehensive substitute for the 
Fourth Amendment’s guarantee against unreasonable searches and 
seizures.”85  Justice Black continued by expressing his grave 
reservations concerning the adoption of such an amorphous standard 
by which to define the scope of the Fourth Amendment (substituting 
a general right to privacy for the concrete terms of the Amendment, 
giving the Court “unlimited power to hold unconstitutional 
everything which affects privacy”).86 
 
 84  See generally Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 91, 93 (1998) (Scalia, J., & 
Thomas, J., concurring) (describing the legitimate expectation of privacy as 
providing a “fuzzy standard” and further critiquing Justice Harlan’s formulation of 
the Katz test as, at least in light of the case law generated in the three decades after 
that test was announced, as “self-indulgent”); Sherry Colb, What Is a Search?: Two 
Conceptual Flaws in Fourth Amendment Doctrine and Some Hints of a Remedy, 55 STAN. L. 
REV. 119, 120–21 (2002) (noting her agreement with numerous scholars who critique 
the Court’s post-Katz decisions as so narrowly defining “the scope of protected 
privacy . . . that much of the universe of investigative activity does not even trigger 
the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness requirements” and arguing that the 
doctrinal “moves” the Court has made in its decisions have eroded and threaten to 
altogether eradicate privacy); Halliburton, How Privacy Killed Katz, supra note 76, at 
810 (describing the Court’s privacy doctrine as “schizophrenic” and criticizing the 
Katz Court for “articulat[ing] a descriptive explanation of its decision that 
masquerades as a principle”); William C. Heffernan, Fourth Amendment Privacy 
Interests,  92 J. CRIM L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 3, 35 (2001) (arguing that the Court has 
“hardly . . . shown a serious concern for privacy” and describing the results of the 
Court’s application of Katz as “deplorable”); Brian J. Serr, Great Expectations of Privacy: 
A New Model for Fourth Amendment Protection, 73 MINN. L. REV. 583, 584 (1989) (arguing 
that the Court, in interpreting the Fourth Amendment, has “tipped the balance 
unnecessarily further and further away from individual freedom, significantly 
diminishing the realm of personal privacy,” and critiquing the Court’s application of 
Katz to a variety of situations and advocating for a new model of protection based on 
degrees of exposure); Tomkovicz, supra note 79, at 647 (arguing that Katz did not 
provide much guidance with respect to the application of its new paradigm, leading 
the Court to refine and develop the doctrine, unfortunately in ways that have 
“neither fulfilled the promises of Katz nor been consonant with an appropriately 
conceived fourth amendment core”). 
 85  Katz, 389 U.S. at 374 (Black, J., dissenting) (quoting Griswold v. Connecticut, 
381 U.S. 479, 507–27 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 86  Katz, 389 U.S. at 374.  Justice Black continued, “Certainly the Framers, well 
acquainted as they were with the excesses of governmental power, did not intend to 
grant this Court such omnipotent lawmaking authority as that.  The history of 
governments proves that it is dangerous to freedom to repose such powers in courts.”  
Id. 
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What Justice Black did not predict, however, was that rather than 
holding unconstitutional all investigative conduct of police that 
impinges on a suspect’s privacy, the post-Warren Court would use the 
very test meant to expand protection of the Fourth Amendment 
beyond traditional and rigid notions of property and trespass to, in 
fact, narrow the Amendment’s protective reach.  Thus, in the hands 
of a more conservative Court, the reasonable-expectation-of-privacy 
test resulted in a great many investigative techniques being deemed 
non-searches, and thus, subject to no constitutional scrutiny 
whatsoever.87  As one scholar has noted, 
Today, it is common to find scholarly discussion of Supreme 
Court “search” cases that is highly alarmist in tone.  Indeed, 
it is difficult to disagree with the view that these decisions 
describe a society too redolent of the totalitarian: no 
business relationship is confidential, especially with banks 
and utilities; the use of an automobile, especially as a 
passenger, must be avoided; only in your own home are you 
secure, and then only if you live alone, do not have guests, 
do not share, and keep the windows covered and the door 
bolted.88 
Returning to Justice Harlan’s formulation of the reasonable-
expectation-of-privacy test and the Court’s application of that test, it 
is appropriate, put plainly, to question whether the Court got it right.  
Do individuals truly expect that the phone company will (or should) 
release the numbers dialed from inside one’s home upon request 
simply because placing a call necessarily requires divulging the 
number of the intended recipient to the phone carrier for 
connection?89  Is it objectively unreasonable to expect that the police, 
whose behavior should serve as a model, will refrain from sifting 
through one’s curbside garbage, even though “animals, children, 
scavengers, snoops, and other members of the public” could 
(although not necessarily would or commonly do) engage in such 
rubbish-rummaging practices?90  Does society not accept as legitimate 
 
 87  See supra notes 65–70 and accompanying text. 
 88  Peter Goldberger, Consent, Expectations of Privacy, and the Meaning of “Searches” 
in the Fourth Amendment, 75 J. CRIM L. & CRIMINOLOGY 319, 323 (1984). 
 89  See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745 (1979) (holding that the use of pen 
registers to disclose the numbers dialed from inside of defendant’s home was not a 
search, because the defendant “in all probability entertained no actual expectation 
of privacy in the phone numbers he dialed, and that, even if he did, his expectation 
was not ‘legitimate’”). 
 90  See California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40 (1988) (holding that there is no 
reasonable expectation of privacy in garbage left at the curb for pickup). 
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the expectation that we won’t be hovered over and peered at in our 
fenced back yards, like exhibits in a menagerie, by police, simply 
because the helicopter from which they are staging their observation 
maintains the minimal height permitted by aviation safety 
regulations?91  Or, is the expectation preposterous that, if we place an 
item in the glove compartment of a companion’s car as we ride 
together, police will not have unfettered access to that item simply 
because we are guests in, rather than the owners of, the car?92 
It is no happy coincidence, as noted by Justice Scalia, that “those 
actual (subjective) expectation[s] of privacy that society is prepared 
to recognize as reasonable bear an uncanny resemblance to those 
expectations of privacy that this Court considers reasonable.”93  And, 
when, due to social or political pressures,94 the majority of the Court 
is inclined to place a finger on the scale of reasonableness to tip the 
balance in favor of law enforcement interests,95 that same Court will 
likely find an expansive notion of privacy to be unreasonable, 
regardless of what expectations society actually holds.96 
How the Court determines the question of reasonableness 
should be a matter of grave importance to anyone concerned with 
maintaining some sphere of personal dominion.  After all, once the 
Court decides that a defendant has no expectation of privacy in a 
given context, the government may seek and find, but still will not 
 
 91  See Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989) (holding that surveillance conducted 
from a helicopter at four hundred feet did not constitute a search). 
 92  See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 148 (1978) (holding that defendants, as 
“mere passengers” had no “legitimate expectation of privacy in the glove 
compartment or area under the seat of the car” in which they were traveling, as they 
“asserted neither a property nor a possessory interest in the automobile”). 
 93  Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 97 (1998) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (internal 
citations and quotation marks omitted). 
 94  President Nixon was elected, in part, on a “law and order” platform and, 
during his presidency, had the opportunity to nominate four conservative Justices to 
the Supreme Court: Chief Justice Burger and Justices Blackmun, Rehnquist, and 
Powell. 
 95  See Tracey Maclin, Constructing Fourth Amendment Principles from the Government 
Perspective: Whose Amendment Is It, Anyway?, 25 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 669, 669 (1987) 
[hereinafter Maclin, Government Perspective] (arguing that the Court’s post-Katz 
Fourth Amendment doctrine is fashioned from a police perspective, rather than 
from a perspective favoring the individual interests of those who are the subject of 
police investigation). 
 96  See Christopher Slobogin & Joseph E. Schumacher, Reasonable Expectations of 
Privacy and Autonomy in Fourth Amendment Cases: An Empirical Look at ‘Understandings 
Recognized and Permitted By Society’, 42 DUKE L.J. 727 (1993) (offering stark empirical 
evidence that judges often incorrectly assess which expectations of privacy society 
considers to be reasonable or unreasonable). 
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have searched, thus leaving its conduct and methods completely 
beyond judicial reproach.97  And, while the reasonable-expectation-of-
privacy test often leads to the odd conclusion that seeking is not 
searching, the Court’s standing doctrine, and its merger of standing 
and substance, creates an even greater paradox, as now searching is 
not always searching either.98 
This merger of standing and merits effectively narrows the set of 
defendants who are even permitted to bring the government’s 
conduct to a court’s attention, which in turn allows fewer 
opportunities to develop search and seizure law at a time when the 
 
 97  Justice Scalia was clearly aware of the tension between the common 
understanding of what it means to “search” for something and the Court’s insistence 
on classifying purposeful visual inspection on the part of police as somehow not 
being a search, offering the explanation that the Court avoided the alternative 
means to validate warrantless surveillance—acknowledging it as a search, but holding 
it to be reasonable—”perhaps in order to preserve somewhat more intact [the] 
doctrine that warrantless searches are presumptively unconstitutional.”  Kyllo v. 
United States, 533 U.S. 27, 32 (2001).  Of course, there is a point, as the Court 
observed in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), in upholding as reasonable warrantless 
frisks based on reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, where it becomes “nothing 
less than sheer torture of the English language to suggest” that a highly intrusive 
inspection, such as the “careful exploration of the outer surfaces of a person’s 
clothing all over his or her body” at issue in Terry is not a search.  Id. at 16–17.  
 98  For example, when police search the glove compartment referred to above, 
they have conducted a Fourth Amendment search, at least with respect to the owner 
of the car.  However, with respect to the passenger, the identical conduct of the 
police in opening and looking into the glove compartment is transformed into a 
non-search because the passenger cannot legitimately expect the contents of the 
glove compartment to remain private, even though that is precisely what the owner 
of the car can and does expect.  Ironically, while maintaining that the car owner 
retains a reasonable expectation of privacy in the vehicle, her actual privacy is more 
likely to be invaded because police may have an incentive to search automobiles with 
multiple passengers, knowing that any incriminating evidence found will likely be 
admissible against the passengers (assuming a lawful stop) in the event of a criminal 
prosecution.  This, of course, demonstrates why Professor Stuntz described the 
reasonable expectation of privacy test as “circular.”  See Stuntz, supra note 83, at 1268, 
and accompanying text.  I have previously expressed my concern that this approach 
to standing could affect the scope of Fourth Amendment protection even as to the 
owner of the car, when she chooses to invite others inside.  See Soree, supra note 7, at 
61920 (“After all, how can I, driving down the freeway on my way to work, 
reasonably expect that the government will not intrude into my car when my 
coworker, to whom I’ve offered a lift, sitting alongside me in the same car, expects 
exactly the opposite?”).  Justice Ginsburg, expressed precisely this concern in 
Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83 (1998), which held that individuals inside a home for 
a limited period solely to conduct business did not have a legitimate expectation of 
privacy in the home: “As I see it, people are not genuinely ‘secure in their . . . 
houses . . . against unreasonable searches and seizures . . . if their invitations to 
others increase the risk of unwarranted governmental peering and prying into their 
dwelling places.”  Carter, 525 U.S. at 108 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
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privacy rights of citizens may be in need of the most protection.  The 
paradox identified above can be addressed by redefining the Katz test 
to take the government’s conduct into account.  This Article argues 
that, in fact, the government’s conduct must be considered in the 
context of answering two substantive questions: first, whether a 
legitimate expectation of privacy has been invaded; and second, 
whether such invasion is constitutionally permissible, with the focus 
of this Article on the former inquiry.  Under the conduct-oriented 
approach proposed herein, the conduct of both police and 
defendants will play a role in determining whether government 
surveillance is a search, triggering the protection of the Fourth 
Amendment. 
C. A Second Look at Katz: Conduct in the Content 
Despite the oft-noted lack of clarity in the Katz opinion, a careful 
examination of the language contained in that opinion, as well as in 
Justice Harlan’s concurrence, will reveal support for this more 
balanced, conduct-oriented approach to defining a search.  This 
Article has already shown that the Katz Court sought to expand the 
reach of the Fourth Amendment by rejecting sole reliance on 
property concepts to define the parameters of a search, traditionally 
limited to physical intrusions into traditionally protected places or 
areas (such as a home, for example).  Chartering new territory, the 
Katz Court chose to define a search by focusing on what an individual 
“seeks to preserve as private”99 as meriting Fourth Amendment 
protection, versus that which “a person knowingly exposes to the 
public,”100 without defining the individual’s intentions with respect to 
disclosure or nondisclosure solely in reference to her location at the 
time of the search, or non-search, as the case may be.101 
 
 99  Katz, 389 U.S. at 351. 
 100  Id. 
 101  See id.  In fact, if those phrases are read in the context of the full sentences in 
which they appear, it is clear that the Court went further than simply stating that an 
individual’s presence in a protected area is not dispositive to the question of whether 
or not a search has occurred, and the Court used two diametrically opposed 
locations to make its point: the home (or office) and a publicly accessible area.  See 
id.  Thus, an individual located inside the home, an area that has consistently 
received the greatest protection and deference, may nonetheless relinquish Fourth 
Amendment protection through her actions in exposing information or objects to 
public view, while an individual in public may nevertheless still claim the protection 
of the Fourth Amendment because of her efforts to maintain something as private.  
See id.  “What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or 
office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection.  But what he seeks to 
preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally 
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This is not to say that places and areas are irrelevant.  As Justice 
Harlan noted in his concurring opinion, determining the level of 
protection the Fourth Amendment confers on an individual 
“[g]enerally . . . requires reference to a ‘place.’”102  Since the Court 
formally adopted Justice Harlan’s formulation as the definition of a 
Fourth Amendment search,103 his opinion merits careful attention.  I 
quote (again) the actual language setting out Justice Harlan’s two-
prong test: “there is a twofold requirement, first that a person have 
exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, 
that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as 
‘reasonable.’”104  Note what is missing from this language: there is no 
reference to an area or place directly after “expectation of privacy.”  
To be sure, Justice Harlan began his opinion with the “reading” of 
the Court’s opinion as holding that “an enclosed telephone booth is 
an area where, like a home, and unlike a field, a person has a 
constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy.”105  
However, Justice Harlan qualified the assertion that a home, for 
example, is an area giving rise to a reasonable expectation of privacy 
a bit later in his opinion, stating that “a man’s home is, for most 
purposes, a place where he expects privacy,” while conversations held 
in the open, or indeed objects exhibited in the plain view of 
outsiders, are not constitutionally protected from discovery because 
there is no objectively discernible intention to keep these 
conversations or objects hidden.106 
Thus, a constitutionally recognized expectation of privacy 
derives its reasonableness from all the circumstances surrounding its 
breach by the police, which include, but are not limited to, the 
individual’s location in a given place or area.  Returning to Mr. Katz 
in his phone booth, we see that the nature of what the person seeks to 
keep private also informs the determination of whether or not an 
expectation of privacy is reasonable; this refers to “nature” in its 
general, rather than in its most specific, sense.107  Because Mr. Katz 
 
protected.”  Id. (internal citation omitted).   
 102  Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 103  See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979). 
 104  Katz, 389 U.S. at 361. 
 105  Id. at 360. 
 106  Id. at 361 (emphasis added).  Justice Harlan’s caveat, then, regarding the 
home as a place where one usually, but not always, can expect privacy is entirely 
consistent with the majority’s language with respect to knowing exposure, even from 
the home.  Id.   
 107  Thus, it suffices to note that Mr. Katz was intending to keep a conversation 
SOREE.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 1/9/2013  3:10 PM 
152 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43:127 
 
sought to keep a conversation private, the phone booth became an 
area from which he could (and should) reasonably expect to do just 
that.  If instead, however, Mr. Katz decided to disrobe inside the 
phone booth, or decided to dismantle and damage the telephone, he 
would have had no legitimate expectation of not being seen and 
consequently arrested for indecent exposure or destruction of 
property, as the case may be, despite the fact that the activities would 
have taken place in the very same “area.”  It is, in other words, highly 
relevant that Mr. Katz sought to exclude from the glass phone booth 
“not the intruding eye,” but the “uninvited ear.”108 
Many scholars have analyzed and identified various factors that 
the Court takes into account when determining whether a defendant 
can claim a reasonable expectation of privacy, trying to give content 
to what is often described as an open-ended and amorphous test.109  
But such a lack of structure may be precisely what Justice Stewart and 
the Katz majority had in mind—to supplement a rigid doctrine based 
solely on trespass and property rights with one more capable of 
meeting the challenges to privacy presented by the advance of 
technology and the modern reality of living in a highly regulated 
society.  Just as the Framers could not possibly have anticipated the 
electronic device used by government agents in Katz, perhaps the 
Katz majority also strove to create a test flexible enough to withstand 
technologies that the Court, writing its opinion in 1967, also could 
not predict. 
Of course, the danger with creating such an open test is that, 
rather than accepting the invitation Katz arguably offered to establish 
a more nuanced, balanced approach to defining searches, courts may 
instead opt for an uncritical application of the test that simply 
provides the desired outcome.  A mere four years after Katz, Justice 
Harlan himself expressed concern that the Court’s application of 
Katz lacked normative content and vigorously dissented from the 
result in United States v. White, in which the Court held that the 
government’s surreptitious listening to the defendant’s conversation 
 
private, without taking into account the subject of the conversation.  After all, Mr. 
Katz’s conversation could be viewed as a type of contraband, as he was convicted 
under a statute prohibiting the transmission of gambling information through wire 
communication.  See id. at 348 n.1 (setting out 18 U.S.C. § 1084).   
 108  Katz, 389 U.S. at 352. 
 109  See, e.g., Michael Campbell, Defining a Fourth Amendment Search: A Critique of the 
Supreme Court’s Post-Katz Jurisprudence, 61 WASH. L. REV. 191 (1986); Goldberger, supra 
note 87; Richard G. Wilkins, Defining the “Reasonable Expectation of Privacy”: An 
Emerging Tripartite Analysis, 40 VAND. L. REV. 1077 (1987). 
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with an informant wearing a concealed radio transmitter did not 
violate the Fourth Amendment.110  The Court, in reaching its 
decision, relied on the misplaced trust, or assumption-of-risk, 
rationale of Hoffa v. United States,111 Lewis v. United States,112 and Lopez v. 
United States,113 which was left undisturbed by the test announced in 
Katz.114  In other words, when one chooses his confidences unwisely, 
and assumes the risk that the one to whom he is speaking is in fact a 
government agent or informant, he cannot justifiably rely on an 
expectation of privacy.  In his dissent, Justice Harlan stated, 
While these formulations represent an advance over the 
unsophisticated trespass analysis of the common law, they 
too have their limitations and can, ultimately, lead to the 
substitution of words for analysis.  The analysis must, in my 
view, transcend the search for subjective expectations or 
legal attribution of assumptions of risk.  Our expectations, 
 
 110  United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971).  The various conversations 
overheard by government agents included a conversation taking place in the 
defendant’s home.  Id. at 747.  For Justice Harlan’s dissenting opinion, see id. at 
76895 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 111  385 U.S. 293 (1966) (holding that information received from a secret 
government informer and used to obtain a conviction of James Hoffa, the Teamsters’ 
union leader, did not constitute an illegal search, because the informer was an 
invited guest).  
 112  385 U.S. 206, 211 (1966) (“When the home is opened as a place of illegal 
business to which outsiders are invited for commercial purposes, the Fourth 
Amendment is not violated when a government agent enters pursuant to an 
invitation and then neither sees, hears, nor takes anything either unrelated to the 
business purpose of his visit or not contemplated by the occupant.”). 
 113  373 U.S. 427 (1963) (holding that an undercover agent’s secretive wire 
recording of a conversation with defendant did not violate defendant’s Fourth 
Amendment rights, despite the fact that the conversation took place in defendant’s 
office). 
 114  In reaching its decision, the Court reversed the Court of Appeals, which had 
found that simultaneous broadcasting of the conversation at issue in White violated 
Katz, and thus, the Fourth Amendment.  See White, 401 U.S. at 745.  The Court of 
Appeals had reasoned that, although Hoffa, Lewis, and Lopez remained good law after 
Katz, On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747 (1952), a case, like White, also involving real-
time broadcasting of a conversation, did not survive, prompting its decision in favor 
of the defendant.  White, 401 U.S. at 745.  The Supreme Court upheld On Lee, based 
not on the original rationale of the case—that there was no Fourth Amendment 
violation in the absence of a physical trespass—as that reasoning was rendered 
irrelevant after Katz, but based on the alternate argument that the defendant in On 
Lee “‘was talking confidentially and indiscreetly with one he trusted, and he was 
overheard . . . .’”  Id. at 750 (quoting On Lee, 354 U.S. at 75354).  Thus, the Supreme 
Court was able to maintain its previous precedents condoning the use of informants 
and undercover officers (a significant source of information for law enforcement) 
without reliance on trespass doctrine, by fitting that type of surveillance into Katz’s 
reasonable expectation of privacy framework.  See White, 401 U.S. at 750. 
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and the risks we assume, are in large part reflections of laws 
that translate into rules the customs and values of the past 
and present. . . .  [W]e should not, as judges, merely recite 
the expectations and risks without examining the 
desirability of saddling them upon society.  The critical 
question, therefore, is whether under our system of 
government, as reflected in the Constitution, we should 
impose on our citizens the risks of the electronic listener or 
observer without at least the protection of a warrant 
requirement.115 
Justice Harlan answered that critical question in the negative,116 
and his misgivings about a facile and uncritical application of the 
reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test were well founded, for the 
phrase has indeed taken on the talismanic quality the Katz majority 
sought to avoid by rejecting recognition of Fourth Amendment 
interests based on a mechanical identification of “constitutionally 
protected area[s].”117  The post-Katz Court simply substituted 
constitutionally protected areas for those areas or places in which a 
defendant has a legitimate expectation of privacy, at least under the 
formulation adopted by the Court in Rakas.118  Ironically, the Rakas 
Court criticized the “legitimately on premises” test of standing it 
overruled as being “simply a label placed by the courts on results 
which have not been subjected to careful analysis.”119  And yet, Justice 
Rehnquist, in his opinion for the Court, failed to explain why the 
defendants did not have the requisite interest in a private vehicle they 
occupied with the owner’s consent, and in which they concealed 
objects in the glove compartment and under the front passenger 
seat.120  For Justice White, the reason for this failure is simple, and he 
 
 115  White, 401 U.S. at 786 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 116  See id. 
 117  See Katz, 389 U.S. at 350 (“We decline to adopt this formulation of the issues.  
In the first place, the correct solution of Fourth Amendment problems is not 
necessarily promoted by incantation of the phrase ‘constitutionally protected 
area.’”). 
 118  See Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143, 148.  
 119  Id. at 148.  Rakas overruled the much broader test for standing provided in 
Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 267 (1960) (“No just interest of the Government in 
the effective and rigorous enforcement of the criminal law will be hampered by 
recognizing that anyone legitimately on premises where a search occurs may 
challenge its legality by way of a motion to suppress, when its fruits are proposed to 
be used against him.”). 
 120  Rakas, 439 U.S. at 165 (White, J., dissenting) (“More importantly, how is the 
Court able to avoid answering the question why presence in a private place with the 
owner’s permission is insufficient.  If it is ‘tautological to fall back on the notion that 
those expectations of privacy which are legitimate depend primarily on cases 
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challenged the Court, if concerned with the costs of the exclusionary 
rule, to deal directly with the legitimacy of that rule itself and not 
reach the Court’s desired outcomes by distorting Fourth Amendment 
doctrine and values.121 
Putting aside, for the moment, Justice White’s assessment that, 
upon deciding Rakas, the Court held “that the Fourth Amendment 
protects property, not people,”122 what can be said with certainty some 
forty years after Katz was decided?  Having a legitimate expectation of 
privacy in a house or curtilage does not necessarily require ownership 
of such premises, nor is an ownership interest sufficient.123  When it is 
a car that is searched, an ownership interest seems to be necessary, 
but again, not sufficient.124  And what about a public phone booth?  
The result in Rakas is difficult to reconcile with Katz, even as the 
former adopted the test of the latter (or, as this Article submits, some 
version of it).  It is difficult to explain, in any real-world sense, how 
Mr. Katz had a legitimate expectation of privacy in a conversation 
held in a public phone booth, while Mr. Rakas did not have a 
legitimate expectation of privacy in the items he concealed from the 
public in the privately owned car of his companion.  Imagine that, 
instead of hiding rifle shells and a sawed-off shotgun in the vehicle, 
Mr. Rakas entered the vehicle, shut the door, and engaged in a 
conversation with his companion, the owner of the car.  Would the 
police be entitled to place a listening device on the outside of the car, 
without the car owner’s permission, and record the conversation 
taking place inside? And, would Mr. Rakas even be permitted to 
object?  Perhaps there is something more sacred about conversations 
than shotguns, but perhaps not.  After all, just as our conversations 
 
deciding exclusionary-rule issues in criminal cases,’ then it surely must be 
tautological to decide that issue simply by unadorned fiat.”) (internal citation 
omitted). 
 121  Id. at 157. 
 122  Id. at 156. 
 123  See Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91 (1990) (holding that overnight guests do 
have a legitimate expectation of privacy in their host’s home, despite a lack of 
ownership or other property interest); Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989) (holding 
that, although ordinarily, one has a legitimate expectation of privacy in one’s 
curtilage, there is no such expectation with respect to aerial observation from 
navigable airspace); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979) (holding that one has 
no legitimate expectation of privacy in the phone numbers dialed from inside one’s 
home).   
 124  See Rakas, 439 U.S. 128 (1978); see also Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405 (2005) 
(holding that there is no legitimate expectation of privacy implicated when a trained 
dog sniffs and alerts to contraband located in one’s car). 
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are constitutionally protected,125 so, too, can we claim a constitutional 
right to bear arms.126  Ignoring (as we must) the fact that the shotgun 
in Rakas was an instrumentality of crime, and Katz’s conversation 
itself was unlawful,127 it seems that both Mr. Rakas and Mr. Katz would 
have been reasonable in their expectations that what they sought to 
keep private would remain so. 
It is not helpful simply to say that Rakas reached the wrong result 
and identified the wrong standard, without discerning what the 
correct standard should be.  For that, one must return to the majority 
opinion of Katz itself.  Places and areas are relevant, as are the 
questions of ownership or other possessory interests in, and physical 
trespasses onto, such places and areas, and Katz did not repudiate 
this; it simply said that such factors should not be considered “in the 
abstract”128 and that the reach of the Amendment “cannot turn upon 
the presence or absence of a physical intrusion into any given 
enclosure.”129  The key to determining whether a Fourth Amendment 
search has occurred, and the closest the majority comes to 
articulating a “test” is to ask whether the government violated not an 
expectation of privacy, but the actual privacy upon which the defendant 
“justifiably relied.”130  In other words, was the information or object 
discovered by the police otherwise hidden, would it have remained 
so, and would the individual seeking to keep it hidden have been 
entitled to believe that it would have remained so, absent some action 
on part of the police? 
The Katz majority, while not reducing this concept to a more 
concrete test, did elaborate by providing that the conduct of the 
defendant in trying to maintain his privacy and his intent to keep the 
object of the government’s search to himself (or, in the case of a 
conversation, to himself and his conversant) are relevant in 
determining whether the protections of the Fourth Amendment have 
been triggered.  Justice Stewart wrote in Katz, “[w]hat a person 
 
 125  See U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the 
freedom of speech . . . .”). 
 126  See U.S. CONST. amend. II (“[T]he right of the people to keep and bear arms 
shall not be infringed.”); Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (affirming 
personal right to bear arms under the Second Amendment). 
 127  Of course, the precise contents of the glove compartment or the conversation 
would be unknown to law enforcement until after privacy is breached and the search, 
or non-search, has already occurred.  Thus, such ex-post knowledge cannot play a role 
in determining, ex-ante, the reasonableness of defendant’s expectation of privacy. 
 128  Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967). 
 129  Id. at 353 (emphasis added).  
 130  Id.  
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knowingly exposes to the public . . . is not the subject of Fourth 
Amendment protection.  But what he seeks to preserve as private . . . 
may be constitutionally protected.”131  Notice that although one seeks 
to preserve one’s privacy, one may not ultimately be successful in 
doing so. 
Justice Harlan’s formulation of the Katz test seems to take this 
language as a departing point and focuses solely on the conduct and 
expectations of the defendant.132  A more symmetrical, and more 
accurate, understanding of the Katz “justifiable reliance” test also 
requires an examination  of the government’s conduct in the 
threshold analysis of whether a search has occurred, before turning 
to the government’s conduct once again, if that threshold is met, to 
determine the ultimate issue of whether that search is reasonable.133  
Modern post-Katz doctrine has focused solely on the defendant’s 
perspective for purposes of determining the threshold question, and 
nowhere is this more obvious than in the standing cases, in which the 
defendant’s relationship with the place searched is the sole criteria 
examined, and the second, substantive stage of determining whether 
police acted reasonably is never even reached. 
While the Katz opinion does speak to the defendant’s conduct, 
the government’s conduct must be examined at the threshold stage 
as well, and this is implicit, if not explicit, in Katz.  We know that Mr. 
Katz’s conversation did not in fact remain private, but it is the 
method of its disclosure to government agents that made it a search.  
Had Mr. Katz, fully intending to keep his conversation private, shut 
the door to the telephone booth, but nonetheless shouted so that 
agents, or indeed any passersby, could hear him, then there would 
have been no search.  In modern terms, his subjective expectation of 
privacy would not have been objectively reasonable.  But Mr. Katz’s 
conversation with his bookie did not come to light because it was 
audible by the naked ear outside the phone booth; it was revealed to 
government agents because of their “activities in electronically 
 
 131  Id. at 351 (internal citation omitted). 
 132  See White, 401 U.S. at 786 (Harlan, J., dissenting).  As previously discussed, 
Justice Harlan himself indicated his dissatisfaction with the Court’s treatment of his 
test, because of the concentrated focus on the defendant’s expectations without any 
normative inquiry as to what sort of surveillance on the part of the government we 
should tolerate in a free society.  See id. 
 133  For example, once it is determined that a search occurred, the Court must 
examine the government’s conduct in conducting that search and decide whether it 
conformed to the requirements of the Fourth Amendment. 
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listening to and recording [Mr. Katz’s] words.”134  In other words, if 
one examines and focuses on the agents’ conduct (as the Katz 
majority did), they were not merely passing by, or even secreting 
themselves in a nearby bush to overhear the conversation.135  They 
placed a listening and recording device on the outside of the booth, 
and it was this conduct that made the discovery of the evidence a 
search and, consequently, a subject of Fourth Amendment scrutiny.136 
While this analysis of the Katz’s underlying facts and conclusion 
may seem simple, perhaps even painfully obvious, this Article seeks to 
illuminate what has been obscured, but nonetheless is inherent in the 
reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test, especially when read in 
conjunction with Justice Stewart’s majority opinion: that an 
expectation of privacy on which one may justifiably rely must take 
into account the expectations that society harbors with respect to 
government conduct, which entails a normative inquiry as to how we 
expect, and indeed, want, our government to interact with its citizens.  
Such a conduct-oriented test will require careful analysis of specific 
facts and circumstances each time a court is called upon to determine 
whether or not a search has occurred, and this may impact the clarity 
(if any such claim can be made) of the existing regime.137  Police are 
 
 134  Katz, 389 U.S. at 353. 
 135  Justice Black, in dissent, points out that eavesdropping by the unaided ear, 
even in secret, was not unknown to the Framers.  See id. at 366 (Black, J., dissenting).  
“There can be no doubt that the Framers were aware of this practice, and if they had 
desired to outlaw or restrict the use of evidence obtained by eavesdropping, I believe 
that they would have used the appropriate language to do so in the Fourth 
Amendment.”  Id. at 366.  What Justice Black failed to acknowledge, however, is that 
it is much easier to protect oneself against the type of eavesdropping the Framers 
would have been familiar with, for example, by whispering, although this Article does 
not make a normative claim that we should all assume that someone is lingering 
outside our windows and at all times speak in hushed tones.  That said, however, it is 
much more difficult to protect a conversation against technology that the average 
citizen may not be aware of, and may not realistically be able to overcome. 
 136  The focus of this Article is on the necessity of examining governmental 
conduct as part of the threshold search determination.  It is worth pointing out here, 
however, that the conduct of the government would be further examined at the 
second stage, the determination of reasonableness.  As the Katz Court stated, the 
agents acted “with restraint” and did not gather any more information than would 
have been authorized by warrant.  Id. at 356.  However, that was simply not sufficient 
to satisfy the demands of the Fourth Amendment, which requires a warrant before 
the government may conduct a search, at least in the absence of some lawful 
justification for the failure to acquire one.  Id. 
 137  While it is nearly impossible to make a claim that current Fourth Amendment 
doctrine provides an easily administrable set of rules, a categorical approach to 
defining searches at least establishes certain definite boundaries that police officers 
can follow.   
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certain, for example, that they may trespass upon a suspect’s land, as 
long it is far enough from her home, regardless of what signs she has 
posted or fences she has erected to keep the public off of her 
property.138 
While there is a valid argument for providing the police with 
bright-line rules to guide them in their day-to-day enforcement 
decisions, there is also a real danger that Fourth Amendment rights 
are violated when individual rights are subservient to clarity and 
efficiency.139  The Fourth Amendment does offer a bright-line rule: a 
warrant is required before the government may search, but this 
bright line has already been dimmed by considerations to efficient 
law enforcement that have resulted in a myriad of exceptions to the 
general rule.  Just as officers are required to make judgments as to 
whether, for example, an exigency truly exists that makes a warrant 
unnecessary,140 officers may make judgments as to whether their 
investigative activities constitute a search.  It would be unfair and 
impractical to require police officers to make hair-splitting 
distinctions, but just as the conduct of the suspect (with respect to 
maintaining her privacy) is held to a standard of reasonableness, so 
too, should the conduct of the officer.  Thus, police conduct is not 
evaluated in a vacuum, but in light of societal norms and existing law.  
In the context of a due process challenge to a criminal statute, the 
Court stated: 
A criminal statute must be sufficiently definite to give notice 
of the required conduct to one who would avoid its 
penalties, and to guide the judge in its application . . . .  But 
few words possess the precision of mathematical symbols, 
most statutes must deal with untold and unforeseen 
variations in factual situations, and the practical necessities 
of discharging the business of government inevitably limit 
the specificity with which legislators can spell out 
prohibitions.  Consequently, no more than a reasonable 
degree of certainty can be demanded.  Nor is it unfair to 
 
 138  See Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984).  The Court indeed eschewed a 
test that would be based on factual inquiries as to the height of fences and the 
number and nature of posted signs.  Id.   
 139  In Robinson v. United States, 414 U.S. 218 (1973), the Court adopted a bright-
line approach to searches incident to lawful arrest, permitting the search of the 
entire person and all containers, regardless of whether the actual justifications for 
this exception to the warrant requirement exist, namely the danger that the arrestee 
will harm the officer or others, or otherwise impede law enforcement by resisting 
arrest or destroying evidence.  See id. 
 140  See Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967). 
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require that one who deliberately goes perilously close to an 
area of proscribed conduct shall take the risk that he may 
cross the line.141 
Is it unfair to require of police officers a similar assumption of 
risk when police conduct violates social norms, when that risk entails 
very little in terms of personal consequence to the officer?  After all, 
the police officer whose conduct crosses over the line of what is 
constitutionally permissible generally faces only suppression of 
evidence, while the defendant whose conduct has violated a criminal 
statute faces great personal consequences.142 
Thus far, this Article has identified one of the most significant 
flaws in the Court’s Fourth Amendment search jurisprudence: the 
concentrated attention on the acts of the victim and the victim’s 
relationship with a given area to define whether the government has 
conducted a Fourth Amendment search.  This almost exclusive focus 
on the victim has led to a narrow definition of Fourth Amendment 
searches, one that does not comport with the reality of society’s 
expectations, is ill-equipped to protect against further encroachment 
against privacy, and is decidedly government-friendly.  This Article 
has also shown, however, that Katz, even taking into account Justice 
Harlan’s formulation of the majority’s holding, does not mandate an 
approach that only contemplates the victim’s actions and 
expectations, but in fact supports a more robust examination of the 
conduct of both victim and law enforcement in defining a search. 
Although, at first blush, it may seem unlikely that the law of rape 
might inform the pursuit of a normatively sounder definition of a 
search, rape law has undergone the very transition this Article 
suggests is necessary in the Fourth Amendment search context: a shift 
from a definition of the offense that relies solely on the victim’s 
actions and intent to one that meaningfully takes into account the 
conduct of the perpetrator (of the rape or of the search, as the case 
may be).  An examination of the evolution of rape law, to which the 
Article now turns, including the specific reforms achieved as well as 
the conditions that fueled the movement for drastic change, will 
 
 141  Boyce Motor Lines v. United States, 342 U.S. 337, 340 (1952). 
 142  While it is true that federal officers may face damages under Bivens v. Six 
Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), and state 
officers may face civil suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the doctrine of qualified 
immunity, established by the Court in Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982), 
offers considerable protection to officers who may violate one’s Fourth Amendment 
(or other constitutional or statutory) rights, as long as the rights at issue are not 
“clearly established” at the time of the violation.  See id.   
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reveal striking parallels to Fourth Amendment search law, as it has 
developed under Katz, and will illuminate the pressing need for a 
similar evolution in defining the search. 
III. THE EVOLUTION OF RAPE LAW: WE’VE COME A LONG WAY, BABY143 
A. Rape Law Then: Helpful to Defendants, Hostile to Victims 
[Rape] is an accusation easily to be made and hard to be proved, and 
harder to be defended by the party accused, though never so innocent. 
–Mathew Hale144 
The prospect of being raped is terrifying to its potential victim, 
so much so that feminists conceived of rape as a method of control 
that “kept women off the streets, confined to their homes, and unsafe 
even there.”145  However, as evidenced by Sir Matthew Hale’s 
observation, quoted above, men were also terrified of rape, not 
necessarily as victims,146 but as potential accusees.  While the law may 
 
 143  See Highlights: Marketing Cigarettes to Women, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND 
PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/tobacco/data_statistics/sgr/2001/highlights 
/marketing (last visited Nov. 24, 2012).  The phrase “We’ve Come a Long Way, Baby” 
is almost certain to conjure up images of elegantly dressed women smoking long, 
slender cigarettes (demonstrating how effective the Phillip Morris advertising 
campaign was in its day), although the exact slogan was, “You’ve Come a Long Way, 
Baby.”  Unfortunately, Phillip Morris was extremely successful in its approach, 
tapping into the burgeoning women’s movement and creating the illusion that 
smoking was somehow linked to independence and success.  See id.  So successful 
were they, along with their competitors, that there was a significant increase in the 
initiation of smoking among teenaged girls, proportional to the increase in sales of 
cigarettes targeted specifically to women.  See id.  My use of a variant of the slogan is, 
of course, by no means meant as an endorsement of smoking.  “We’ve Come a Long 
Way, Baby” is also the title of an album and song performed by Loretta Lynn, which, 
quite appropriately to this discussion, includes the following lines: “Up to now, I’ve 
been an object made for pleasin’ you.  Times have changed and I’m demanding 
satisfaction, too.”  See LORETTA LYNN, We’ve Come a Long Way Baby, on WE’VE COME A 
LONG WAY BABY (MCA 1978), available at 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hpHzJ0Igayo. 
 144  KEITH BURGESS-JACKSON, A MOST DETESTABLE CRIME: NEW PHILOSOPHICAL 
ESSAYS ON RAPE 18 (Oxford Univ. Press, 1st ed. 1999) (quoting 1 MATHEW HALE, THE 
HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 635 (1847)).  
 145  Patricia Smith, Social Revolution and the Persistence of Rape, in A MOST 
DETESTABLE CRIME: NEW PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS ON RAPE 32, 35 (Keith Burgess-Jackson 
ed., Oxford Univ. Press, 1st ed. 1999). 
 146  One reform from the common law definition of rape is to frame the offense in 
gender-neutral terms, allowing for the prosecution of rape (or sexual assault) 
committed by a perpetrator of either gender upon a victim of either gender.  See, e.g., 
18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3121 (2011) (defining rape as occurring when “[a] person 
engages in sexual intercourse with a complainant” under proscribed circumstances) 
(emphasis added).  For the purposes of this Article, I maintain the traditional, 
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have done little to assuage the terror of women, traditional rape law 
acknowledged and sought to alleviate men’s fear of being convicted 
for sexual behavior that may have crossed the line by making that line 
very clear and difficult to cross, and by erecting significant substantive 
and evidentiary barriers to conviction.  Hale was absolutely correct in 
one respect: under traditional rape law it was indeed hard to prove 
that a victim of undesired sexual intercourse had, in fact, been raped. 
Standing as an obstacle between perpetrator and conviction, and 
between victim and vindication, various characteristics of traditional 
rape law ensured that only the most egregious acts of sexual 
aggression were punishable.  Blackstone defined rape as “carnal 
knowledge of a woman forcibly and against her will.”147  Under this 
definition, force and nonconsent were both required elements; thus, 
a man who proceeded to have intercourse with a woman, even one 
who clearly did not consent, did not rape the woman if he did not 
have to resort to the use or threat of severe force to accomplish the 
penetration.148  State v. Alston provides an example of this dual 
requirement at work, in which the North Carolina Supreme Court 
overturned the conviction of a physically abusive defendant who had 
demanded sex from his former live-in girlfriend when she told him 
that she wanted to end their relationship.149  The Court had little 
 
gender-specific approach assuming male perpetrators upon female victims, for ease 
of writing, for better applicability to my analogy to the Fourth Amendment, and to 
reflect statistical data.  See JOSHUA DRESSLER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CRIMINAL LAW 
387 (5th ed. 2009) [hereinafter DRESSLER, CASES AND MATERIALS] (referencing 1997 
Bureau of Justice statistics indicating a 1.8 per 100 rate of victimization for women, 
compared to a rate lower than 0.1 for men).  I do not mean in any way to imply that 
men are not also victims of this brutal offense or to minimize the gravity of harm to 
any victim, female or male.  I also wish to acknowledge the important work of 
Professor I. Bennett Capers in raising awareness of “male rape victimization and our 
collective response to such victimization.”  I. Bennett Capers, Real Rape Too, 99 CAL. 
L. REV. 1259, 1262 (2011).  According to a 2008 Bureau of Justice Statistics study, 
“more than 36,000 males age 12 and over were victims of completed rape or 
attempted rape . . . and . . . one in thirty-three men in the United States has been the 
victim of rape or attempted rape.”  Id. at 1261. 
 147  BLACKSTONE, supra note 26, at 210.  See also Keith Burgess-Jackson, A History of 
Rape Law, in A MOST DETESTABLE CRIME: NEW PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS ON RAPE 15 
(Oxford Univ. Press, 1999) (tracing the history of rape law from 1900 B.C.). 
 148  E.g., David P. Bryden, Redefining Rape, 3 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 317, 355 (2000); 
Dressler, Where We Have Been, supra note 31, at 416–17; Estrich, supra note 28, at 
1105–07. 
 149  State v. Alston, 310 N.C. 399, 402 (1984).  After the victim, Cottie Brown, told 
the defendant that their relationship was finished, he “said that since everyone could 
see her but him he had a right to make love to her again.”  Id.  The Court described 
their six-month sexual relationship as “consensual,” despite the fact that Alston had 
“struck her several times throughout the relationship when she . . . refused to do 
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difficulty reaching the conclusion that the victim, Cottie Brown, had 
not consented to the intercourse: she had told the defendant 
immediately preceding the intercourse that she was not willing to 
have sex with him.150  Although the intercourse was clearly “against 
her will,”151 Brown remained passive as Alston undressed her, “pushed 
apart her legs and had sexual intercourse with her” while she cried.152 
The Court recognized, and then dismissed, her “general fear” of 
Alston because, even though her fear was justified by his prior 
conduct, the Court found it insufficient to prevent her resistance to 
that specific act of intercourse on that particular occasion and, 
therefore, insufficient to demonstrate Alston’s use of force.153  
Moreover, not only did the Court not credit Brown’s general fear of 
Alston, based on the couple’s past, but it found that the acts of 
grabbing her arm and threatening to “fix her face” on the very day of 
the alleged rape, after he accosted her at her school, telling her “she 
was going to miss class that day,” were also too remote from the 
intercourse at issue to qualify as the use or threatened use of force 
necessary to support a rape conviction.154 
The result of Alston led Professor Susan Estrich to note the 
paradox created by acknowledging that sex may be simultaneously 
without consent and without force: “In other words, the woman was 
not forced to engage in sex, but the sex she engaged in was against 
her will.”155  This paradox, Professor Estrich tells us, can be expected 
 
what he wanted,” despite the fact that she often remained passive during intercourse, 
and even with the finding that “their consensual sexual relations involved some 
violence.”  Id. at 401. 
 150  Id. at 403. 
 151  Id. at 408. 
 152  Id. at 403.   
 153  Id. at 409.  “[A]bsent evidence that the defendant used force or threats to 
overcome the will of the victim to resist the sexual intercourse alleged to have been 
rape, such general fear was not sufficient to show that the defendant used the force 
required to support a conviction of rape.”  Id. 
 154  State v. Alston, 310 N.C. 399, 402 (1984).   
The State did not offer substantial evidence, however, of the element 
of force.  As we have stated, actual physical force need not be shown in 
order to establish force sufficient to constitute an element of the crime 
of rape.  Threats of serious bodily harm which reasonably induce fear 
thereof are sufficient.  In the present case there was no substantial 
evidence of either actual or constructive force. . . . This threat by the 
defendant and his act of grabbing Brown by the arm at the school, 
although they may have induced fear, appeared to have been unrelated 
to the act of sexual intercourse between Brown and the defendant.   
Id. at 408. 
 155  Estrich, supra note 28, at 1111.  Professor Estrich also describes another 
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when force is understood in terms of the “traditional male notion of 
a fight . . . .  In a fight, you hit your assailant with your fists or your 
elbows or your knees.  In a fight, the one attacked fights back.  In 
these terms, there was no fight in Alston.  Therefore, there was no 
force.”156  For Estrich, physical force can be, but is generally not, 
understood as “the power one need not use.”157  Alston did not have 
to use physical force to engage in intercourse with the passive, yet 
unwilling, Brown because she was unable to fight back: “[h]ers is the 
reaction of people who have already been beaten, or who never had 
the power to fight in the first instance.”158 
If the victim does not or cannot fight back, then of course, the 
perpetrator does not have to resort to force, at least as force was 
traditionally understood.159  Therefore, as a practical matter, the 
prosecution would be unable to prove one of the elements of forcible 
rape—force—without the victim providing the impetus for the use of 
force against her by her resistance.  This de facto element of the 
victim’s resistance, however, does more than simply necessitate the 
use of the required force; it also defines the level of force that is 
punishable and establishes, as an evidentiary matter, another 
required element—the victim’s lack of consent to the intercourse.160 
Thus, if the woman failed to resist, absent good reason for her 
failure,161 the law generally (though not always, as highlighted by 
 
unsettling North Carolina case, State v. Lester, 321 S.E.2d 166 (N.C. Ct. App. 1984) 
(aff’d 313 N.C. 595 (1985), but overruled by State v. Etheridge, 352 S.E.2d 673 (1987)), 
in which the Court of Appeals applied the Supreme Court’s holding in Alston to hold 
that a father alleged to have raped his fifteen-year-old daughter (he was alleged to 
have had intercourse with all three of his daughters, and with this particular victim as 
early as at the age of eleven) did not, in fact, use the required force to support a 
conviction, even though in the past he beat the children’s mother (in view of his 
children), his girlfriend, and his son, and threatened to kill the mother and the 
daughter in question.  Id.  The North Carolina Court of Appeals also found that the 
intercourse was against the victim’s will, but nonetheless had this to say: “There is no 
evidence, however, that defendant used either actual or constructive force to 
accomplish the acts with which he is charged.  As Alston makes clear, the victim’s fear 
of defendant, however justified by his previous conduct, is insufficient to show that 
defendant forcibly raped his daughter [on the days in question].”  Id. at 761 
(emphasis in original).   
 156  Estrich, supra note 28, at 1111. 
 157  Id. at 1115. 
 158  Id. at 1111. 
 159  Bryden, supra note 148, at 356. 
 160  Anderson, supra note 29, at 967; Estrich, supra note 28, at 1130. 
 161  A woman’s will to resist (and thus, the requirement for her to do so) could be 
overcome by sufficient threats on the part of the perpetrator, although as Alston 
demonstrated, such threats had to be specific to the act of intercourse at issue.  See 
SOREE.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 1/9/2013  3:10 PM 
2013] SHOW AND TELL, SEEK AND FIND 165 
 
Professor Estrich)162 presumed that the intercourse was not against 
her will; in fact, the historically prevailing view was that “a truly 
unwilling woman would fight nearly to the death to protect her 
virtue.”163  The victim’s utmost resistance, then, served to put the man 
clearly on notice, thereby eliminating issues of mistake as to consent, 
and also identified the victim who, by risking her life to safeguard her 
chastity, earned the protection of the law as well.164  As for resistance 
and its relationship to force, a requirement of utmost resistance saved 
courts from the difficult task of defining precisely how much force 
 
State v. Alston, 310 N.C. 399, 409 (1984); see also State v. Rusk, 289 Md. 230, 244 
(1981) (holding that a woman’s failure to resist must be a result of threats that 
generate fear that is “reasonably grounded”).  In State v. Rusk, the Maryland Court of 
Appeals reinstated the conviction of the defendant, primarily based on its conclusion 
that the question of reasonableness of the complainant’s fear was a matter for the 
jury.  Id.  In Rusk, the victim, met the defendant at a bar, gave him a ride home to an 
unfamiliar area, and then accompanied him to his room (first having declined his 
invitation) after he had taken her car keys.  Id.  She remained in his room while he 
went to the bathroom, and when he returned, he asked her to undress herself and 
remove his clothing as well.  Id.  The victim described what happened next:  
I was really scared, because I can’t describe, you know, what was said.  It 
was more the look in his eyes; and I said, at that point—I didn’t know 
what to say; and I said, “If I do what you want, will you let me go 
without killing me?”  Because I didn’t know, at that point, what he was 
going to do; and I started to cry; and when I did, he put his hands on 
my throat, and started lightly to choke me; and I said, “If I do what you 
want, will you let me go?”  And he said, yes, and at that time, I 
proceeded to do what he wanted me to.   
Rusk v. State, 43 Md. App. 476, 47879 (1979) (en banc), rev’d, 289 Md. 230 (1981).  
The Court of Special Appeals reversed the defendant’s conviction, finding that none 
of the defendant’s “words or actions created in the mind of the victim a reasonable 
fear that if she resisted, he would have harmed her, or that faced with such 
resistance, he would have used force to overcome it.”  Id. at 484.  The Court of 
Appeals reversed the intermediate court over a vehement dissent, arguing that 
defendant was more a “seducer” than a rapist, and that the truly unwilling woman 
must “follow the natural instinct of every proud female to resist, by more than mere 
words, the violation of her person . . . .  She must make it plain that she regards such 
sexual acts as abhorrent and repugnant to her natural sense of pride.”  Id. at 255 
(1981) (Murphy, J., dissenting).  For Chief Judge Murphy, the fact that the 
defendant did not utter any specific verbal threats to physically and grievously harm 
the victim, coupled with the fact that he did not display or threaten to use a weapon, 
left him unable to “understand how a victim could participate in these sexual 
activities and not be willing.”  Id. at 257. 
 162  See supra note 154 and accompanying text. 
 163  Estrich, supra note 28, at 1130.  Professor Ross recognizes the same 
presumption at work in the criminal procedure context, noting that consent is 
equated with submission to power.  Ross, supra note 3, at 2–4 (“Just as rape victims 
were told they asked for it by wearing short dresses and not screaming for help, 
individuals are told they asked for it by extending their arms to be searched.”). 
 164  Estrich, supra note 28, at 1130. 
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exceeded the legally acceptable limit by demarking that limit with a 
bright, if not unrealistic, line drawn by the victim’s response.165 
In sum, under the traditional approach, if the victim did not 
resist vehemently, neither nonconsent nor force were proved, and 
therefore, the intercourse was not considered rape. Perhaps one of 
the most notorious examples of the utmost resistance requirement 
can be found in Brown v. State.166  The defendant tripped a sixteen-
year-old girl (recently recovering from an episode of measles) to the 
ground, and forced her to engage in intercourse with him.  She 
described her response to his attack in the following way: 
I tried as hard as I could to get away.  I was trying all the 
time to get away just as hard as I could, I was trying to get 
up; I pulled at the grass; I screamed as hard as I could, and 
he told me to shut up, and I didn’t, and then he held his 
hand on my mouth until I was almost strangled.167 
However, there were no tears in the clothing of either party, 
other than a one-inch tear in the victim’s underwear, and no bruises 
or other injuries to demonstrate the “terrific resistance which the 
determined woman should make” and which is “essential to the crime 
of rape.”168  What did the law require of this young woman before she 
could be called a victim of rape?  According to the Wisconsin 
Supreme Court: 
Not only must there be entire absence of mental consent, 
but there must be the most vehement exercise of every 
physical means or faculty within the woman’s power to resist 
the penetration of her person, and this must be shown to 
persist until the offense is consummated. . . . Except for one 
demand, when first seized, to “let me go,” and inarticulate 
screams, she mentions no verbal protests . . . .  [W]e cannot 
conceive it possible that one whose mind and exertions had, 
during an encounter of this sort, been set on resistance, 
could or would in narrative mention nothing but escape or 
withdrawal.  A woman’s means of protection are not limited 
to that, but she is equipped to interpose most effective 
obstacles by means of hands and limbs and pelvic muscles.169 
And what of the fact that there were no marks or signs of a 
struggle?  This leads us to another feature of pre-reform rape law 
 
 165  See id.   
 166  Brown v. State, 106 N.W. 536 (Wis. 1906). 
 167  Id. at 537. 
 168  Id. at 539. 
 169  Id. at 538. 
SOREE.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 1/9/2013  3:10 PM 
2013] SHOW AND TELL, SEEK AND FIND 167 
 
(although not of common law origin): the corroboration 
requirement.170  Other procedural features of pre-reform rape law 
included the “fresh complaint” rule,171 as well as the use of cautionary 
instructions, to ensure that jurors did not rush to convict without first 
“evaluat[ing] the testimony of a victim . . . with special care in view of 
the emotional involvement of the witness and the difficulty of 
determining the truth with respect to alleged sexual activities carried 
out in private.”172 
One final procedural feature of pre-reform rape law to address 
here is the use of the victim’s prior sexual history as a tool of cross-
 
 170  E.g., Estrich, supra note 28, at 1137.  Although not a common law rule, the 
corroboration requirement was set out in the Model Penal Code and was, at one 
time, in effect in a significant number of states.  See MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.6(5) 
(2011); Dressler, Where We Have Been, supra note 31, at 416.  I remind the reader of 
Sir Matthew Hale’s concern for the “never so innocent” party accused of rape, a 
concern prompted by a distrust of women generally and a fear of fabrication on the 
part of a woman whose dishonor may have been discovered, or whose accusation is 
prompted by vengeance, or who simply cannot separate her fantasies about rape 
from reality.  Estrich, supra note 28, at 1137.  Therefore, this evidentiary hurdle to 
conviction was based on the following rationale: “[s]ince stories of rape are 
frequently lies or fantasies, it is reasonable to provide that such a story, in itself, 
should not be enough evidence to convict a man of a crime.”  See id. at 1137 n.157 
(quoting Corroborating Charges of Rape, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1137, 1138 (1967)).  
Because most rapes occur in private, without the benefit of witnesses, the victim’s 
testimony would need to be supplemented by other corroborating evidence, such as 
the bruises, injuries, and other signs of struggle that were so notably absent from the 
body or clothing of either victim or assailant in Brown, a “situation” the court there 
found “well-nigh incredible.”  Brown, 106 N.W. at 539.  Wisconsin, in fact, did not 
have a formal corroboration rule, but even absent such a requirement, the burden 
on the victim to establish that she had been raped (and had adequately resisted) was 
a difficult one to overcome in the absence of physical signs of a struggle.  See id.  
“This court does not hold, with some, that, as matter of law, rape cannot be 
established by the uncorroborated testimony of the sufferer, but, in common with all 
courts, recognizes that, without such corroboration, her testimony must be most 
clear and convincing.  Among the corroborating circumstances almost universally 
present in cases of actual rape are the signs and marks of the struggle upon the 
clothing and persons of the participants . . . .”  Id. 
 171  E.g., Estrich, supra note 28, at 1139.  Although the “fresh complaint” rule 
found its absolute form, again, in the MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.6(4) (2011) 
(providing that prosecution was barred unless the offense was brought to the 
attention of the police within three months of the occurrence, or in the case of a 
child under the age of 16, within three months of a parent, guardian, or other 
similarly situated adult learning of the incident), at common law, delay in reporting 
created a compelling presumption against the victim, based on the fear of a woman’s 
accusations being prompted by discovery of pregnancy, bitterness over the 
dissolution of a relationship, and even the desire to blackmail the former sexual 
partner.  See id. 
 172  MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.6(5) (2011).   
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examination at trial.173  Not only might the victim be cross-examined 
as to her sexual past, but often testimony of third parties was 
introduced as well.174  The victim’s prior history was thought to be 
relevant in two ways.  First, the fact that the woman had an unchaste 
character cast an aspersion on her general character for truthfulness 
as a witness.175 Second, it demonstrated that, because she had 
consented to sexual intercourse on a prior occasion, she was more 
likely to have consented on the particular occasion alleged to be 
rape.176  These practices, however, went beyond simply assessing 
credibility and propensity, by, in effect, putting the victim on trial, 
causing her public humiliation, and attaching blame to her for 
causing her own rape.  Thus, if the victim engaged in a high-risk 
lifestyle, by frequenting singles bars, for example, she was thought to 
have assumed the risk of being raped.177  And, if the victim was 
clothed in a sexually provocative way, she had, again, assumed the 
risk that the man she had so tempted would interpret her attire as 
willingness to be his sexual partner.178 
For example, a three-man and three-woman Florida jury 
acquitted a man of forcible rape, after he abducted the 
victim, who was dressed in a lace mini-skirt without 
underwear, at knife-point from outside a restaurant, and 
repeatedly had intercourse with her during a five-hour 
period.  The male foreman of the jury stated that “[w]e felt 
 
 173  See, e.g., Bryden, supra note 148, at 319; Dressler, Where We Have Been, supra 
note 31, at 416; Estrich, supra note 28, at 1094. 
 174  E.g., Dressler, Where We Have Been, supra note 31, at 416. 
 175  E.g., id.; Klein, supra note 29, at 990. 
 176  E.g., Klein, supra note 29, at 990.  For example, the Federal Rules of Evidence 
provide that, although evidence to prove “action in conformity” with one’s character 
or character trait is generally inadmissible, such evidence may be admitted in certain 
limited circumstances, such as when an accused seeks to offer evidence of the 
character of the victim of the alleged crime.  FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(2).  Whereas today 
the ability of a defendant in a rape prosecution to offer evidence of the character of 
the alleged victim has been limited by the enactment of Rule 412, when the Federal 
Rules were first promulgated, this precise use was so typical that it merited mention 
in the Advisory Committee Notes as an example of the rule.  See FED. R. EVID. 412 
advisory committee’s note (“[A]n accused may introduce pertinent evidence of the 
character of the victim, as in support of a claim of self-defense to a charge of 
homicide or consent in a case of rape.”).  It is this use of prior sexual history 
evidence—to show propensity to consent—that this Article will develop, by analogy, 
in the context of searches, as the Court has taken a similar approach by equating 
voluntary exposure of information to one party with exposure to the public at large.  
See infra note 322 and accompanying text. 
 177  Klein, supra note 29, at 99192.   
 178  See Smith, supra note 145, at 34. 
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she asked for it for the way she was dressed.”  A female juror 
explained, “[s]he was obviously dressed for a good 
time . . . .”179 
Thus far, this examination of traditional rape law has revealed a 
substantive definition of rape that requires both force and 
nonconsent and measures the existence and sufficiency of both these 
elements by the existence and sufficiency of the victim’s resistance 
against her assailant, resulting in a definition of rape that placed the 
burden on the victim to prevent the rape from occurring at all.180  
Further, pre-reform rape law erected additional, procedural barriers 
to conviction in the way of a corroboration requirement, cautionary 
instructions, and use of prior sexual history, resulting in a regime in 
which the victim was in essence blamed (or at the very least severely 
scrutinized) for the violence perpetrated against her.181  It should not 
be surprising that this area of law, as this Article has briefly described 
it, was the target of a great deal of outrage and, ultimately, the subject 
of significant reform.  The Article turns next to the broader criticisms 
and goals of the reform movement that fueled the evolution of this 
area of law. 
B. Rape Law Under Siege: The Impetus for Change 
It should not astonish the reader that the law of rape reflected 
such a male-oriented bias; after all, at the time of its development, 
women had no real influence over legal matters, even those that 
concerned them so directly.182  It is greatly due to efforts of feminists 
that the law has evolved to reflect a more balanced approach, one 
that seeks to ameliorate the effects of this imbalance of power 
between men and women. While one can conceive of this imbalance 
in individual terms—meaning the disparity in physical size and 
strength between the average man and woman, which makes it more 
difficult for women generally to fend off a determined perpetrator 
 
 179  DRESSLER, CASES AND MATERIALS, supra note 146, at 42021 (citing Jury: Woman 
in Rape Case “Asked for It”, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Oct. 6, 1989, at 11). 
 180  See Dressler, Where We Have Been, supra note 31, at 414. 
 181  In developing the analogy to Fourth Amendment search law, this Article will 
demonstrate that the law of searches bears a striking resemblance, at a conceptual 
level, to the law of rape.  The victim of an alleged search must also shoulder the 
burden of demonstrating the desire to maintain privacy (nonconsent), as well as 
sufficient government conduct aimed at breaching that privacy (what this Article will 
refer to as force), by resorting to extreme measures to preserve that privacy, the 
ultimate inefficacy of which often lead to the conclusion that no search has occurred.  
See infra Part III. 
 182  See Dressler, Where We Have Been, supra note 31, at 410. 
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(and has led many to question the wisdom of a requirement of 
utmost physical resistance)183—my focus is on the subjugation and 
disfavored status of women as a class. 
As numerous scholars have noted, in a patriarchal system that 
conceived of women as property, rape was historically considered a 
crime against a man—more precisely a crime against the particular 
man, either the victim’s husband or father, who benefited from 
control over sexual access to the victim.184  Thus, “[r]ape of virgins 
was a serious economic matter, with unmistakable characteristics of a 
crime against property.  For the married victim, rape appeared as an 
excuse to be pleaded by a woman who would otherwise be executed 
for adultery.”185  Thus, women were either valuable commodities in 
need of protection, creating a “dual male role of predator and 
protector of the female prey,”186 or criminal defendants, subject to the 
stereotype, prejudice, and distrust that adheres to most criminal 
defendants, including those seeking to suppress evidence found by 
allegedly unconstitutional means.  Although, happily, women are no 
longer regarded as property, and adultery and fornication are 
generally no longer subject to criminal prosecution,187 the perception 
of the complaining witness in a rape prosecution as being herself on 
trial has persisted.188 
 
 183  See infra text accompanying note 202. 
 184  See, e.g., Bryden, supra note 148, at 362 (citing SUSAN BROWNMILLER, AGAINST 
OUR WILL: MEN, WOMEN AND RAPE 18 (1975)); Smith, supra note 145, at 32–33. 
 185  Donald A. Dripps, Beyond Rape: An Essay on the Difference Between the Presence of 
Force and the Absence of Consent, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1780, 1781 (1992); see also Smith, 
supra note 145, at 33 (“[W]omen were viewed more or less like valuable livestock or 
perhaps uniquely prized possessions.  Women, especially virgins, were very valuable 
property.”). 
 186  Smith, supra note 145, at 33. 
 187  While adultery and fornication are still included in certain state criminal 
codes, these crimes are rarely prosecuted, and, indeed, after the United States 
Supreme Court’s decision in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), which 
invalidated Texas’s sodomy law, fornication laws (and likely adultery laws as well), if 
challenged, will not withstand constitutional scrutiny.  See Joanna Grossman, The 
Virginia Supreme Court Strikes Down the State’s Fornication Law, Indicating that Other States’ 
Antiquated Laws Will Fall if Challenged, FINDLAW (Jan. 25, 2005), 
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/grossman/20050125.html (discussing the Virginia 
Supreme Court’s invalidation of a statute criminalizing fornication, and for an 
analysis of the probable effect of Lawrence v. Texas on a variety of other criminal 
statutes involving consensual sexual activity). 
 188  See, e.g., Estrich, supra note 28, at 10991100.  In State v. Rusk, discussed above, 
see supra note 161, Judge Cole, in his dissent, expressed his dissatisfaction with the 
majority’s decision in terms that strongly reflect this mindset of the victim becoming 
herself the accused by virtue of her bringing forward a complaint.  State v. Rusk, 424 
A.2d 720, 733 (Md. 1981) (Cole, J., dissenting) (asserting that in affirming the 
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Ironically—but perhaps not surprisingly, considering the 
parameters under which it developed—the law of rape, while 
purporting to limit male sexual access to women, achieved the 
opposite.  If the goal of criminalizing rape was to “correct the existing 
imbalance in sexual power . . . [by] constrain[ing] male sexual 
autonomy,”189 traditional rape law, in practice, with its requirement of 
physical resistance on the part of the victim, instead maintained a 
system under which males were ensured extensive access to women 
and only the most extreme uses of violence were punished.190  After 
all, as Susan Estrich points out, the law of rape reflected a male 
perspective and imposed male standards of behavior on female 
victims.191 In other words, the law of rape “has reflected, legitimized 
and enforced a view of sex and women which celebrates male 
aggressiveness and punishes female passivity.”192  Thus, under a 
traditional approach, men are permitted, if not expected, to respond 
to some level of resistance (saying no, for example) with more 
persistence and aggression,193 and the woman is forced to assume the 
guilt for sexual intercourse that occurs in the absence of some ideal 
level of resistance that she may not realistically be able to achieve.194 
While traditional rape law, according to critics, did much to 
ensure the sexual autonomy of men, women did not enjoy a similar 
freedom of choice.  In fact, the sexual autonomy of women was 
discouraged, certainly if one conceives of autonomy as the ability to 
say yes as well as the ability to say no.  Professor Coughlin, however, 
cautions against the implication that men were always granted 
unlimited sexual license, proposing that the development of rape law 
 
conviction, “[t]he majority today . . . declares the innocence of an at best distraught 
young woman.”).  Indeed, the court below, which had reversed the defendant’s 
conviction, began its discussion by describing the victim as a young mother, 
separated but not divorced, who left her two-year-old son with her mother to attend a 
high school reunion with a friend and go “bar hopping.”  See Rusk v. State, 406 A.2d 
624, 625 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1979).   
 189  Coughlin, supra note 28, at 5. 
 190  See id.; Estrich, supra note 28, at 1122. 
 191  Estrich, supra note 28, at 1091 (“It is ‘boys’ rules’ applied to a boys’ fight.”). 
 192  Id. at 1092 (discussing “non-traditional” rapes, meaning those that occur “not 
[in] an alley but a bedroom”). 
 193  Coughlin, supra note 28, at 5 (“Rape law thus instructs men that they are free 
to ignore a woman’s verbal protests and even to construe such protests as expressing 
her agreement to participate.”). 
 194  Anderson, supra note 29, at 957 (arguing that even though the standard of 
resistance has been lowered over time, whichever level of resistance is required by 
the woman still “conceptualizes resistance as a model of exemplary action against 
which a real woman’s actions under the extreme stress of sexual attack are judged”).  
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was inextricably connected with the Puritan prohibitions, applicable 
to both sexes, against fornication and adultery.195  Understood this 
way, the burden on the alleged victim of a rape was akin to the hurdle 
of any defendant asserting duress as a defense to a criminal charge, 
and if she were to fail in her defense, presumably both parties to the 
consensual (but nonetheless illegally extramarital) intercourse would 
be punished.196 
Yet, putting aside fornication prosecutions, the stigma attached 
to the woman engaging in consensual intercourse was, and to some 
extent has remained, disproportionate to that suffered by a man 
exercising the same freedom.  In 1838, Judge Cowen, upholding the 
admissibility of prior sexual history as relevant to sexual propensity in 
People v. Abbot,197asked, 
[A]re we to be told . . . that the triers should be advised to 
make no distinction in their minds between the virgin and a 
tenant of the stew?  Between one who would prefer death to 
pollution, and another who, incited by lust and lucre, daily 
offers her person to the indiscriminate embraces of the 
other sex?198 
 
 195  See Coughlin, supra note 28, at 10.  In fact, Professor Coughlin points to 
historical data indicating that, in the latter part of the seventeenth century, and for 
the greater part of the eighteenth, fornication was prosecuted in county court to a 
greater extent than any other category of criminal case, and, more importantly, 
prosecuted quite even-handedly.  Id. at 43 (quoting CORNELIA HUGHES DAYTON, 
WOMEN BEFORE THE BAR: GENDER, LAW, AND SOCIETY IN CONNECTICUT 160 (1995)).  
That said, however, Professor Coughlin also notes that despite the appearance of 
even-handed treatment, the ultimate goal of most of these prosecutions was to force 
the parties into marriage, “an institution founded explicitly on the subordination of 
women to men,” and further, that the law of adultery itself reflected a “sexual double 
standard on its face,” because, at least in Connecticut, adultery was defined as being 
committed with a married woman, leaving married men legally free to engage in 
extramarital sex as long as their partners were unmarried.  See id. at 4445 (citing 
DAYTON, supra, at 114–15, 173). 
 196  Coughlin, supra note 28, at 42.  Generally speaking, the common law defense 
of duress required that the defendant demonstrate the following:  
(1) another person threatened to kill or grievously injure the actor or a 
third party . . . unless she committed the offense; (2) the actor 
reasonably believed that the threat was genuine; (3) the threat was 
‘present, imminent, and impending’ at the time of the criminal act; (4) 
there was no reasonable escape from the threat except through 
compliance with the demands of the coercer; and (5) the actor was not 
at fault in exposing herself to the threat. 
DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 27, at § 23.01.   
 197  19 Wend. 192 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1838). 
 198  Id. at 195.  Judge Cowen continues, “And will you not more readily infer assent 
in the practiced Messalina, in loose attire, than in the reserved and virtuous 
Lucretia?”  Id. 
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And, while it was entirely proper to use prior sexual history to 
attack a woman’s credibility as a witness, the Supreme Court of 
Missouri, in 1895, disallowed the use of similar evidence to attack a 
man’s credibility, stating, 
It is a matter of common knowledge that the bad character 
of a man for chastity does not even in the remotest degree 
affect his character for truth, when based upon that alone, 
while it does that of a woman.  It is no compliment to a 
woman to measure her character for truth by the same 
standard that you do that of a man’s predicated upon 
character for chastity.199 
Of course, attitudes and mores have changed and today’s world 
bears little resemblance to the one experienced by the Puritans.  Yet, 
Professor Coughlin observes that “[t]he problem for women today is 
that we seem to inhabit neither of these two worlds; rather, we live in 
a world that combines the worst features of both.”200  While adultery 
and fornication, if even still included in criminal codes, are rarely 
prosecuted,201 the substantive law of rape still places a heavy burden 
on women to prove their innocence of one of these offenses.202  
Further, while Professor Coughlin urges doctrinal changes to 
eliminate the dilemma faced by rape complainants—that their claim 
of being raped also serves as an admission of guilt—she concedes that 
doctrinal solutions alone are inadequate to eliminate this prejudice 
against women as long as social beliefs and conventions condemn 
sexual activity by women, with such condemnation being manifested 
through jury verdicts in rape trials.203 
Professor Patricia Smith further explores the sexual role of 
women, noting the inconsistency of public attitudes, particularly in 
the 1950s, that condemned sexual activity on the part of women while 
nonetheless promoting a view of women as sex objects.204  Thus, 
according to Professor Smith, “women were supposed to be seductive 
teasers who love sex themselves but somehow magically remain 
 
 199  State v. Sibley, 131 Mo. 519, 132 Mo. 102, 171 (1895).  The Court continues by 
noting how many “great and noble men,” including Lord Byron, had a “weakness . . . 
for sexual pleasure.”  Id.  
 200  Coughlin, supra note 28, at 45. 
 201  See supra note 187. 
 202  Coughlin, supra note 28, at 45.  I remind the reader of Judge Cole’s 
perception of the complainant, and of his disapproval of the majority’s decision to 
uphold the defendant’s conviction, in State v. Rusk, 424 A.2d 720 (Md. 1981).  See 
supra text accompanying note 188. 
 203  Coughlin, supra note 28, at 4546.  
 204  Smith, supra note 145, at 35. 
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pure.”205  At the same time, of course, women had to be careful not to 
cross the line and tempt too much, as this would be seen as having 
provoked the sexual encounter, or, indeed, be construed as 
consent.206  Taking into account this dual role of women as 
seductresses who should nonetheless remain pure, coupled with a 
distrust of women’s judgment and credibility, it is not surprising to 
read in a 1966 student note, published in the Stanford Law Review, 
that a high resistance standard is necessary, as a matter of fairness to 
those accused of rape,  to ensure that the woman who is ambivalent 
about sex, or indeed may be “meaning ‘yes, yes, yes’” despite saying, 
“‘no, no, no,’” is truly withholding consent at the time of the 
intercourse rather than struggling with “moralistic afterthoughts.”207 
The various critiques briefly sketched above describe the law of 
rape as having a male-oriented bias, and as reflecting the imbalance 
of power between men and women at the time of its development.  
While, according to feminist critics, the substantive definition of rape 
ensured men broad sexual access to women, effectively promoting 
male sexual autonomy while simultaneously restricting female sexual 
liberty, the practice of rape facilitated male control over all aspects of 
women’s lives by creating “an oppressive system in which the 
production of fear has served to maintain women in a condition of 
terror.”208  As mentioned above, men undertook the dual roles of 
protector and predator, and women depended for their safety on the 
very class of individuals that they were taught to fear. Protection, 
however, be it from the law or from men, came at a heavy price—”the 
price of restriction.”209  The woman who asserted her independence 
too vigorously was considered fair game.210 
 
 205  Id. 
 206  Id. at 34. 
 207  Roger B. Dworkin, Note, The Resistance Standard in Rape Legislation, 18 STAN. L. 
REV. 680, 682, 685 (1966) (quoted in Estrich, supra note 28, at 1128).  Professor 
Estrich quotes another student note, one that was quite influential, espousing the 
view that not only do women lie, but that even a “normal girl” may be ambivalent 
with regard to her own sexual desires and, further, that “a woman’s need for sexual 
satisfaction may lead to the unconscious desire for forceful penetration, the coercion 
serving neatly to avoid the guilt feelings which might arise after willing 
participation.”  Note, Forcible and Statutory Rape: an Exploration of the Operation and 
Objectives of the Consent Standard, 62 YALE L.J. 55, 6768 (1952) (quoted in Estrich, 
supra note 28, at 1129). 
 208  Jeffrey A. Gauthier, Consent, Coercion, and Sexual Autonomy, in A MOST 
DETESTABLE CRIME: NEW PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS ON RAPE 71, 73 (Keith Burgess-Jackson 
ed., Oxford Univ. Press, 1st ed. 1999).   
 209  Smith, supra note 145, at 34. 
 210  Id. 
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With these broad critiques in mind, reformers sought to achieve 
significant changes in the law of rape to eliminate the inequality 
between men and women, improve male behavior, and promote 
women’s sexual autonomy.  This Article later argues that these 
goals—achieving balance, improving behavior, and fostering 
autonomy—are highly relevant in shaping Fourth Amendment 
doctrine, in so much as that Amendment was designed to regulate 
the government’s power over its citizens and to support the liberty 
and self-determination of a free people.  As many of the broader 
critiques of traditional rape law find perhaps unexpected parallels in 
the criminal procedure context,211 so too can the specific reforms 
achieved and proposed by rape law reformers illuminate the efforts 
of scholars advocating for change in Fourth Amendment doctrine.  
Before turning to the Fourth Amendment, however, the next section 
of this Article highlights the particular rape law reforms that, by 
analogy, are most useful to developing the more balanced approach 
to Fourth Amendment searches that is the subject of Part IV of this 
Article. 
C. Rape Law Now: Some Welcome Victories 
Perhaps the most universal reform achieved in the law of rape 
has been the abolition—or, at the very least, the significant 
softening—of the resistance requirement, in no small part due to the 
assertions of reformers that resistance to rape was dangerous and 
increased the likelihood of serious injury.212  No jurisdiction today 
requires resistance to the utmost; in fact, many states have eliminated 
any requirement of physical resistance from their statutes, either by 
removing any reference to resistance or by expressly stating that 
resistance is not required.213  A few state statutes, however, continue to 
 
 211  In the criminal procedure context, victims of police misconduct, especially the 
poor and minorities, face the same imbalance of power, both politically and in a day-
to-day real sense.  Search doctrine is geared towards granting the government broad 
access to evidence of wrongdoing while permitting police to use their power and 
discretion to maintain control and inhibit individual autonomy in the very 
communities being policed, creating, I argue, a similar dual role for the police of 
predator and protector.  See infra Part III.B.   
 212  Anderson, supra note 29, at 968.  Professor Anderson critically evaluates the 
empirical studies on which reformers based their claims that resistance should be 
discouraged and presents arguments in favor of encouraging resistance, ultimately 
advocating that any resistance, either physical or verbal, should be sufficient to 
demonstrate nonconsent and force.  See id. 
 213  See Bryden, supra note 148, at 358 n.161 (providing examples of statutes that 
have been amended to remove reference to resistance, or to expressly state that 
victims do not need to resist an attack). 
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refer to some level of resistance, requiring the victim to offer, for 
example, reasonable or earnest resistance.214  Further, even if a statute 
is silent as to resistance, as long as courts must define force or 
determine whether there is sufficient evidence of nonconsent (or 
both), resistance remains a de facto requirement to some degree.215  
Thus, even with the elimination of a formal resistance requirement, 
“courts today often evaluate a woman’s actions in the same way as 
they did when resistance was required.”216  In fact, Professor Anderson 
argues that regardless of the required level of resistance, women’s 
conduct is still held to some ideal standard of behavior that may be 
difficult to achieve.217 
As previously stated, the focus of this Article is not to provide a 
comprehensive survey of the current status of the resistance 
requirement in statutory or common law throughout American 
jurisdictions,218 nor does this Article aim to provide a normative 
critique of the various approaches to resistance with respect to their 
effectiveness as rape law reforms.  It suffices to simply make the very 
modest normative claim that a requirement of utmost resistance 
placed an unfair and unrealistic burden on the victim of an alleged 
 
 214  See id. (providing examples of statutes that require some level of resistance, 
such as reasonable or earnest resistance, or such resistance as would communicate 
nonconsent). 
 215  See id. at 35859; see also Anderson, supra note 29, at 968 (“Whether a state 
rape statute codifies an utmost, earnest, or reasonable resistance requirement, or no 
resistance requirement at all, for many courts, a woman’s resistance still determines 
whether she consented and whether the man used force against her.”).  Virginia law, 
for example, affirmatively states that resistance is not required: “The Commonwealth 
need not demonstrate that the complaining witness cried out or physically resisted 
the accused . . . but the absence of such resistance may be considered when relevant 
to show that the act alleged was not against the will of the complaining witness.”  VA. 
CODE ANN. § 18.2-67.6 (2011).  Thus, although resistance is not technically required, 
it is still relevant: “The Commonwealth still must prove that the assault was against 
the victim’s will.  The statute merely allows the defendant to use lack of resistance to 
buttress his consent defense.”  Farish v. Virginia, 346 S.E.2d 736, 739 (Va. Ct. App. 
1986).  Pennsylvania’s sexual offense provisions also expressly provide that resistance 
is not required, although also stating that the defendant is not prohibited “from 
introducing evidence that the alleged victim consented to the conduct in question.”  
18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3107 (2011).  In addition, rape is defined as sexual intercourse 
accomplished, in relevant part, by “forcible compulsion,” or by “threat of forcible 
compulsion that would prevent resistance by a person of reasonable resolution.”  Id. 
§ 3121.  Thus, even though resistance is not required, the level of threat sufficient to 
trigger the offense is based on the assumption of a woman’s resistance, the absence 
of which can also be used to show consent.  18 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 3107, 3121 (2011). 
 216  Anderson, supra note 29, at 967. 
 217  See id. at 965. 
 218  See Klein, supra note 29, for a thorough treatment of the evolution of rape law. 
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rape, in terms of both what was expected of her to prevent the 
intercourse in the first place, or, if ultimately unsuccessful in her self-
protection, to receive vindication in a court of law.  The advances 
achieved by rape law reformers in this area constitute a welcome 
victory. 
Looking ahead for a moment, this Article will demonstrate that 
victims of alleged searches currently also bear an “utmost resistance” 
requirement, with a corresponding expectation that onerous 
measures be taken to prevent the search in the first place, and a 
similar difficulty of successfully claiming that a Fourth Amendment 
search even occurred if the victim’s efforts to maintain privacy 
ultimately fell short.219  As this Article does not propose to completely 
eliminate a “resistance” requirement in the Fourth Amendment 
context, but argues for something akin to a “reasonable resistance” 
requirement as best suited to establishing the proper balance 
between citizen and government, it is helpful to briefly highlight that 
standard here before addressing other relevant changes in the law of 
rape. 
Missouri, for example, criminalizes forcible rape, defined as 
“sexual intercourse with another person by the use of forcible 
compulsion.”220  Forcible compulsion is further defined, in relevant 
part, as “[p]hysical force that overcomes reasonable resistance.”221  To 
clarify the magnitude of force required to qualify as forcible 
compulsion, the Missouri Court of Appeals provided the following 
guidance: 
The totality of the circumstances determines whether this 
was physical force which would overcome reasonable 
resistance.  Reasonableness is that which is “suitable under 
the circumstances.” Such circumstances in this context 
would include the ages of the victim and the accused; the 
atmosphere and setting of the incident; the extent to which 
the accused was in a position of authority, domination and 
control over the victim; and whether the victim was under 
duress.222 
 
 219  See infra Part IV. 
 220  MO. ANN. STAT. § 566.030 (West 2011). 
 221  MO. ANN. STAT. § 556.061(12) (West 2011).   
 222  State v. Kilmartin, 904 S.W.2d 370, 374 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995) (internal citation 
omitted); see also Jones v. State, 682 P.2d 757, 759 (Okla. Crim. App. 1984) (“In 
Oklahoma, a woman threatened by rape is not required to resist to the uttermost; 
instead, she is not required to do more than her age, strength, and surrounding 
circumstances make reasonable.”). 
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Resistance may also come into play when the offense is framed 
in terms of the victim’s nonconsent, as it is in Delaware.223  The 
Delaware legislature chose to define “without consent” in terms of 
the defendant compelling the victim, by various means, to submit; 
however, the victim’s resistance is still required in order to show that 
she was indeed compelled: “It is not required that the victim resist . . . 
to the utmost, or to resist if resistance would be futile or foolhardy, 
but the victim need resist only to the extent that it is reasonably 
necessary to make the victim’s refusal to consent known to the 
defendant.”224  Both of these approaches to reasonableness of 
resistance—based on an analysis of the totality of the circumstances 
to determine what is realistically feasible for the victim, and as a 
measure of resistance that reasonably conveys the victim’s 
nonconsent, are, I argue, not only appropriate, but in fact called for 
in the search context as well. 
Another reform to rape law that has been urged involves the 
elimination of force and nonconsent as jointly required elements of 
rape; in other words, some scholars advocate that either one or the 
other should be required, but not both.225  Regardless, however, of 
which element is eliminated from the formal definition of rape, 
courts will most likely still continue to require the woman to 
demonstrate, through some ideal standard of conduct, either the 
force or the lack of consent, resulting in the continued vitality of the 
resistance requirement.226  For this reason, Professor Anderson states 
that “force and nonconsent . . . are not neatly separable.”227 
Therefore, this particular proposed reform will have little practical 
effect unless the conduct that will qualify legally as sufficient 
resistance is broadened to reflect how women really resist (thus 
 
 223  See DEL. CRIM. CODE § 773 (2011) (defining rape, in relevant part, as sexual 
intercourse “without the victim’s consent”). 
 224  Id. § 761(j)(1). 
 225  See Anderson, supra note 29, at 1001–02.  Professor Anderson references 
various statutory approaches, some providing only that the intercourse be forcible in 
the definition of the offense (although providing that consent is a defense), others 
defining the offense in terms of nonconsent, and still others that continue to require 
both force and nonconsent as elements, concluding that despite these formal 
differences, most jurisdictions in practice still require both in order to prove that a 
rape occurred.  See id. at 1000–01 nn.280–84 and accompanying text. 
 226  See id. at 100507. 
 227  Id. at 1005.  For example, at first glance, the Model Penal Code’s definition of 
rape seems to focus on the actor, in that rape is defined, in pertinent part, as 
intercourse wherein the man “compels” the woman (other than his wife) to submit 
either by force or serious threat.  See MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1 (2011).  However, 
implicit in “compelling” a woman is the fact that she is not consenting. 
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recognizing verbal protests as resistance).228 Additionally, regardless 
of which approach is taken, neither will be meaningful unless the 
focus on the perpetrator’s conduct (if that is the touchstone of the 
offense) reflects an expansive notion of force, or, alternatively, the 
focus on the victim’s state of mind reflects an expansive notion of 
what constitutes nonconsent.229 
Although this Article argues that in defining a Fourth 
Amendment search, both the force used by police and the consent or 
nonconsent (as demonstrated by the conduct) of the victim of a 
search are relevant,230 it is beneficial to explore both of these 
approaches—defining rape in terms of force used by the perpetrator, 
on the one hand, and defining rape in terms of the victim’s 
nonconsent, on the other—in order to uncover the reasoning 
underlying each approach, which will in turn illuminate the analogy 
to the criminal procedure context.  Those reformers who advocate 
force as the sole barometer of whether a rape has occurred seek to 
shift scrutiny from the victim’s conduct and state of mind to that of 
the actor.231  Proponents of this approach encourage an 
understanding of rape as a crime of violence, rather than as a purely 
sexual crime, thus aligning rape conceptually with assault and 
battery.232  There is, however, an additional reason to focus on force 
 
 228  See Anderson, supra note 29, at 1007. 
 229  See Estrich, supra note 28, at 1133.  Pennsylvania, for example, classifies rape as 
sexual intercourse by “forcible compulsion” 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3121 (2011), which 
is broadly defined as “[c]ompulsion by use of physical, intellectual, moral, emotional 
or psychological force, either express or implied.”  Id. § 3101. 
 230  See infra Part IV. 
 231  See Anderson, supra note 29, at 1005.  However, as Professor Anderson notes, 
force and nonconsent are difficult to separate; in many jurisdictions which statutes 
criminalize forcible intercourse without mention of consent, courts nonetheless 
recognize consent as a defense.  Id. at 1000.  The State of Washington, for example, 
criminalizes intercourse by means of forcible compulsion, defined as “physical force 
which overcomes resistance” or a threat that induces fear of injury or kidnapping, 
but, pursuant to case law, the victim’s consent is an affirmative defense that the 
defendant shoulders the burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence.  See 
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ A9A.44.050, A9A.44.010(6) (West 2011); see also State v. 
Camera, 781 P.2d 483, 485–88 (Wash. 1989) (reasoning that placing the burden of 
proving consent on the defendant was consistent with legislative intent and also 
constitutionally permissible, as this did not relieve the prosecution of its burden of 
proving every element of the offense, including forcible compulsion). 
 232  See, e.g., State of New Jersey in re M.T.S., 129 N.J. 422, 43738 (1992) 
(“Reformers criticized the conception of rape as a distinctly sexual crime rather than 
a crime of violence . . . .  Critics of rape law agreed that the focus of the crime should 
be shifted . . . to its forceful and assaultive, rather than sexual, character.”).  In fact, 
one significant reform in the law of rape is a change in the name of the offense; for 
example, statutes may prohibit “sexual assault” rather than rape, which serves to 
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rather than nonconsent, as expressed by Professor Catherine 
MacKinnon and others: consent should be irrelevant where that 
consent is obtained “under conditions of patriarchy.”233  In other 
words, consent that is not given under conditions of equality is not 
really consent at all.234 
In contrast, those reformers who propose that the victim’s 
nonconsent should be the critical focal point emphasize autonomy 
and freedom of choice as the primary values to be protected.235  This 
consent-based approach has taken various forms: for some reformers, 
a rape has occurred if the actor has intercourse with the victim over 
her specific objection while others go further, criminalizing 
intercourse in the absence of the woman’s affirmative consent.236  
Perhaps the most controversial example of the affirmative consent 
approach is the New Jersey Supreme Court’s unanimous decision in 
State in re M.T.S.237  The Court, in interpreting a statute that defined 
sexual assault as involving the use of “physical force or coercion,”238 
turned to the history of rape reform in order to determine the 
legislative intent behind the statute, which had been in no small part 
promulgated by the National Organization of Women National 
Taskforce on Rape.239  Then, despite the statute’s requirement of 
“physical force or coercion,” the Court held that 
any act of sexual penetration engaged in by the defendant 
without the affirmative and freely-given permission of the 
victim . . . constitutes the offense of sexual assault.  
Therefore, physical force in excess of that inherent in the 
 
emphasize the violent nature of the offense.  See DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL 
LAW, supra note 27, at § 33.01 n.16. 
 233  Anderson, supra note 29, at 1004. 
 234  This is a powerful argument in the criminal procedure context as well, and 
many have argued that the Court, in its enthusiastic approval of consent searches, 
does not have a realistic understanding of consent or the power imbalance between 
the citizen and the police officer that comes to bear on a suspect’s decision to 
cooperate.  See, e.g., Robert V. Ward, Consenting to a Search and Seizure in Poor and 
Minority Neighborhoods: No Place for a “Reasonable Person,” 36 HOW. L.J. 239 (1993).  
Professor Ross, to illustrate this point, discusses scholarship regarding the power 
imbalance between citizen and police, role-conditioning, and race as factors that act 
upon an individual’s ability to freely choose or withhold consent during interactions 
with police.  Ross, supra note 3, at 24–30. 
 235  See Anderson, supra note 29, at 1002–03. 
 236  Id at 1002; see also Klein, supra note 29, at 1004–14 (discussing both the 
affirmative consent and the “no means no” models).   
 237  M.T.S., 129 N.J. at 422. 
 238  N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:14-2c(1) (2012). 
 239  M.T.S., 129 N.J. at 43040. 
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act of sexual penetration is not required for such 
penetration to be unlawful.  The definition of “physical 
force” is satisfied . . . if the defendant applies any amount of 
force against another person in the absence of what a 
reasonable person would believe to be affirmative and 
freely-given permission to the act of sexual penetration.240 
Thus, the New Jersey Supreme Court virtually eliminated force 
from the definition of sexual assault.  However, a focus on autonomy 
and freedom of choice does not necessarily imply that force is 
irrelevant.  If autonomy is understood as freedom to “define all of the 
limits of permissible sex,”241 which would also include freedom to 
engage in forcible intercourse if so desired, then rape can be viewed 
as “the denial of that freedom.”242  Professor Stephen Schulhofer 
recommends that autonomy, as a primary interest to be protected, 
should take “center stage,” proposing that improper interferences 
with the exercise of autonomy, or ability to freely choose, including 
the use or threat of physical force as well as certain nonviolent means 
of coercion, should be criminalized.243  This shift in emphasis may 
result in the recognition that the use of nonforcible coercion may be 
egregious enough to warrant criminal punishment, or may lead to a 
broader understanding of force, aptly described by Professor Estrich, 
as “the power one need not use.”244  In either case, a focus on the 
victim’s autonomy may eventually lead to vindication for those 
victims, traditionally beyond the law’s protection, who have “agreed” 
to intercourse under conditions of deception,245 fraud, extortion, 
 
 240  Id. at 444.  As of 2008, two state legislatures, Wisconsin and Washington, had 
adopted the affirmative consent model.  See Klein, supra note 29, at 1007. 
 241  Estrich, supra note 28, at 1132.   
 242  Id. 
 243  Stephen J. Schulhofer, Taking Sexual Autonomy Seriously: Rape Law and Beyond, 
11 LAW & PHIL. 35, 65 (1992).  Professor Schulhofer proposes the creation of two 
offenses prohibiting such interferences with autonomy.  Rape would be defined in 
terms of forcible intercourse (including the threat of violence), while a new offense 
of “sexual abuse” or “sexual misconduct” (or some variant that would emphasize the 
nonforcible nature of the means used to obtain the intercourse) would punish 
nonviolent constraints on a woman’s free choice.  See id.  Although Professor 
Schulhofer uses the term “nonviolent” in accordance with traditionally held 
conception of the “real” rape, described by Professor Estrich as the type of situation 
in which a “stranger puts a gun to the head of his victim, threatens to kill her or beats 
her, and then engages in intercourse,” it is imperative to stress that any unconsented 
to intercourse is inherently violent and physically painful to the victim.  Estrich, supra 
note 28, at 1092. 
 244  Estrich, supra note 28, at 1115. 
 245  For example, a California court dismissed a charge of rape against a man who 
convinced the victim that, other than submitting to an extremely painful and 
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abuse of professional authority or economic power, and other such 
interferences with a victim’s meaningful choice.246 
While it is extremely difficult and beyond the scope of this 
Article to define which of these coercive interferences merit criminal 
sanctions, Professor Schulhofer provides an analytical framework that 
lends itself easily to the task, still to come, of defining a Fourth 
Amendment search.  At the outset, sexual autonomy, meaning the 
right to control access to one’s body under conditions conducive to 
meaningful choice, must be recognized as a protected value 
independent of the interest in being free from violence.247  Once the 
right of autonomy is recognized, the important questions in shaping 
reform become “whether the preconditions for meaningful choice 
are present and whether behavior that may interfere with meaningful 
choice has adequate social justification.”248 In other words, should 
society tolerate the behavior in question?249 
As in the search context, trying to differentiate lawful from 
unlawful constraints on autonomy will involve delineating socially 
tolerable boundaries.250  In drawing those boundaries, it is critical to 
understand the value of autonomy as necessary to the enjoyment of 
the freedom, security, and dignity that are components of our 
personhood.251  Autonomy can be understood in two dimensions: (1) 
the moral and intellectual autonomy, exemplified by the capacity to 
make unconstrained choices, that serves to express personal 
preferences; and (2) autonomy in the physical sense, asserted to 
preserve bodily integrity.252  Both these dimensions of autonomy are, 
of course, threatened when an individual is coerced or compelled to 
engage in sexual intercourse. 
 
prohibitively expensive surgical procedure, the only way to treat a serious, life-
threatening disease was to engage in sexual intercourse with “an anonymous donor 
who had been injected with a serum which would cure the disease.”  Boro v. Superior 
Court, 163 Cal. App. 3d 1224 (1985).  In response to this decision, the California 
legislature amended its criminal code to include a provision penalizing the 
procurement of consent to intercourse by “false or fraudulent representation or 
pretense that is made with the intent to create fear.”  See CAL. PENAL CODE § 266c 
(West 2012). 
 246  See Schulhofer, supra note 243, at 6593 for a discussion of the complexities in 
determining the desirable scope of legal protection against these and other forms of 
nonforcible coercion. 
 247  Id. at 68.   
 248  Id.  
 249  Id. 
 250  Id. 
 251  See id. at 71. 
 252  Schulhofer, supra note 243, at 71. 
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If autonomy is taken seriously, as the title of Professor 
Schulhofer’s article urges, and sexual offenses are perceived more as 
offenses against autonomy rather than offenses involving physical 
violence, then an affirmative consent model is warranted.253  The 
traditional focus on rape as a crime of violence has led to an overly 
generous understanding of consent, in that the law has required a 
clear demonstration of nonconsent to an act that the victim finds 
abhorrent, thereby in effect equating ambivalence or silence with 
consent.254  Once the focus shifts to autonomy, the argument can 
more readily be made (and accepted) for requiring the same 
standard of consent for all serious bodily intrusions; thus, as surgery 
or any invasive medical procedure requires affirmative consent (and 
consent is not presumed from a patient’s silence or ambivalent 
feelings towards the procedure), so should intrusions of a sexual 
nature.255 
There may be yet another, more pernicious, reason behind the 
different standards of consent applied to sexual versus other bodily 
intrusions, other than the perception of rape as a crime of violence 
rather than an offense against autonomy.  In the context of 
undesired sex, as opposed to an undesired medical procedure, there 
may still be lurking some notion of male entitlement to sex, as a 
vestige of the patriarchal system in which sexual access was a 
commodity belonging not to the woman, but to whichever man had 
legal control over her.  If indeed there is this lingering attitude that 
men are in some way justified in asserting a claim to sex,256 then the 
 
 253  See id. at 77. 
 254  Id. at 76.  Under this approach, the sleeping or unconscious woman is 
protected because she does not have the opportunity to say no, the assumption 
remaining being that if a woman is able to object, but fails to do so, she is a willing 
partner to the intercourse.  See id. at 72.  Another possible explanation for this 
assumption is that sexual intimacy is often a consensual act, desired by both parties.  
Thus, there may be an operational presumption of consent that is absent, for 
example, when a robber demands one’s wallet, or, as relevant to this Article, when 
police search one’s home, person, or belongings for evidence. 
 255  Id. at 7475.  Professor Schulhofer illustrates his argument effectively by 
telling the “parable” of the athlete hesitating to decide whether or not to go through 
with surgery, and the impatient surgeon who, tired of waiting for a yes, “just does it” in 
the absence of a no.  Id. 
 256  While it would certainly overstate the argument of this Article to imply that 
society recognizes any actual right to or privilege of sexual access for men, the fact 
that it remains common to blame the victim for her rape, whether because of her 
attire, her actions, the company she chose, or simply because she placed herself in 
harm’s way, and the fact that juries still acquit defendants because victims “asked for 
it,” demonstrates the public’s willingness to accept some level of male entitlement to 
sex.  See supra text accompanying notes 176177. 
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law, even if acknowledging the woman’s right of autonomy, 
nevertheless may place a burden on her to assert her interest in that 
right as against the countervailing interest of the man who desires the 
sexual intercourse.  In contrast, there is no countervailing 
entitlement, actual or perceived, vested in the surgeon (to use 
Professor Schulhofer’s example)257 who wishes to perform a 
procedure; therefore, the only interest at stake is that of the patient.  
With no competing interest to balance against the patient’s 
autonomy, it follows logic to require greater certainty with respect to 
consent, in the way of affirmative permission, before the surgeon is 
permitted to proceed.  This possible explanation, or partial 
explanation, of why the affirmative consent model is not more widely 
accepted in the rape context is, of course, based on the prevalence 
and durability of outdated attitudes regarding male and female 
sexual roles and behavior—attitudes that should, and hopefully will, 
dissipate with time. 
Before returning once again to the primary objective of this 
Article, applying the lessons of rape reform to the task of creating a 
more normatively satisfying framework for defining the Fourth 
Amendment search, one more significant advance for rape victims 
merits attention.  Prior to the enactment of “rape-shield” laws 
throughout the country, rape victims were often humiliated and 
embarrassed by the admission of evidence of prior sexual history, in 
the form of both reputation and prior specific instances, in order to 
show propensity to consent as well as character for untruthfulness.258  
Thus, one significant victory for rape victims was the enactment of 
statutes prohibiting the use of such evidence, subject to a few 
exceptions.259  In addition, many states prohibit introduction of 
evidence regarding the victim’s attire at and before the time of the 
alleged rape.260 In urging the promulgation of rape-shield statutes, 
reformers sought to encourage victims to come forward without fear 
of public humiliation and also sought to prevent the “re-
 
 257  See supra note 255. 
 258  See supra text accompanying notes 173176. 
 259  DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 27, at § 33.07; see also 
Klein, supra note 29, at 99093.  Federal Rule of Evidence 412(b), for example, 
provides that in criminal trials, evidence of specific instances of the victim’s sexual 
behavior is admissible in three circumstances: to prove that someone other than the 
defendant was the source of physical evidence (such as semen or injury), to prove 
consent if the victim’s behavior occurred with respect to the defendant, or if 
constitutionally required.  See FED. R. EVID. 412(b). 
 260  Klein, supra note 29, at 1028. 
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victimization” of those brave enough to come forward and whose 
complaints resulted in a trial.261 
As a result of such statutes, the law made significant advances 
toward shifting the focus away from the victim, in no small part by 
hampering the defense attorney’s ability to persuade a jury that 
because a victim had freely chosen to engage in intercourse in the 
past, she likely consented on this occasion as well.  This “consent-to-
one, consent-to-all” argument that is no longer available to defense 
attorneys in rape trials, however, still very much remains the 
reasoning of the Court when determining whether police activity 
constitutes a search.  Thus, the adoption of rape-shield provisions 
provides yet another example of a rape reform that can inform the 
movement for change in the Fourth Amendment search doctrine, to 
which this Article turns next. 
IV. FROM RAPE LAW TO SEARCH LAW: A QUANTUM LEAP TO A PARALLEL 
UNIVERSE 
A. Search Law Then (and Now): Helpful to Law Enforcement, Hostile 
to Victims 
Part III.A has described several features of traditional rape law 
that imposed significant barriers to conviction.  This resulted in a 
defendant-friendly doctrine that (1) punished only the most 
egregious conduct; (2) required the prosecution to prove both force 
and nonconsent, as measured by the victim’s most strenuous 
resistance; (3) exhibited distrust of women complainants; and (4) 
placed victims on trial, using prior sexual history to show propensity 
to consent (as well as propensity to lie) and to scrutinize the victim’s 
conduct, essentially allocating to her the blame for her own attack.  
Similarly, the criminal defendant (or civil plaintiff) seeking to show 
that she was the victim of an unlawful search faces a comparably 
difficult challenge; in fact, the first obstacle that must be overcome 
before a court will turn to any question of legality or reasonableness 
is simply to demonstrate that a search even occurred. 
Drawing on the parallel with traditional rape law, and as will be 
developed in this part with respect to search law, only the most 
egregious governmental conduct constitutes a searchthe victim 
must show, through extreme measures to maintain privacy, a clear 
objection to the intrusion and, further, that the government had to 
 
 261  Id. at 991. 
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resort to a high level of force to accomplish the surveillance despite 
that objection.  I use the term “force” to mean the measures utilized 
by the government to overcome efforts to secure privacy.262  In 
addition, the victim’s prior acts of disclosure and conduct are 
scrutinized to show consent (or, in the language of Fourth 
Amendment search doctrine, the lack of a reasonable expectation of 
privacy) and to make the victim shoulder the blame for the 
government’s successful surveillance. 
To begin, the Court, while purporting to express the 
expectations of society in defining the Fourth Amendment search, 
has in reality exempted law enforcement from those very 
expectations and norms.263  In other words, while making “privacy 
protection appear to hinge on lay people’s understandings of how 
they should treat each other,” in its decisions, “the Court has 
reasoned in terms of a narrow, occupationally-grounded conception 
of privacy.”264  As we saw in the rape context, the disparity between 
how people generally are expected to behave and how the 
government is permitted (at least for purposes of the Fourth 
Amendment) to behave has led to police benefitting from what 
amounts to a “special dispensation from everyday privacy norms, one 
that doesn’t extend to egregious violations but that does encompass 
minor ones.”265 
While I have already described some of the most intrusive 
surveillance activities that have indeed achieved the Court’s 
recognition as searches,266 the best way to illustrate the above point is 
by showing the kinds of behaviors that are tolerated, perhaps even 
encouraged, in the name of effective policing, and that are not 
considered searches, even though the same behaviors committed by 
the private citizen would be in many cases unlawful or, at the least, 
highly objectionable.  For example, under Fourth Amendment case 
law, police are permitted to trespass on private property, snoop 
 
 262  I do not mean to equate such conduct such as, for example, placing a 
listening device on the outside of a phone booth, see Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 
347 (1967), or rummaging through garbage, see California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 
(1988), or trespassing, see Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984), with force as it 
is understood in the context of rape.  I use the term in the search context as a 
metaphor, and for purposes of illustrating the analogy between these two areas of 
law. 
 263  Heffernan, supra note 84, at 5.   
 264  Id. at 56. 
 265  Id. 
 266  See supra Part II.A. 
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through garbage, peep through windows, and stalk their prey in 
public.  In Oliver v. United States, the Supreme Court reaffirmed its 
“open fields” doctrine, reasoning that the generally non-intimate 
activities occurring in open fields do not merit protection from 
arbitrary government intrusion, and, further, that such lands are still 
accessible to members of the public or the police, regardless of the 
existence of fences and/or “No Trespassing” signs, thus making any 
expectation of privacy in open fields simply not reasonable.267  
Consequently, the police officers who trespassed upon the 
defendant’s farm to investigate reports of a marijuana crop, reports 
that were confirmed by their discovery of a field over one mile from 
the defendant’s house,268 were simply not governed by the Fourth 
Amendment at all.  Justice Marshall, however, found the majority’s 
decision “startling,”269 and, like him, one may well wonder how Mr. 
Oliver’s expectation of privacy in his land was unreasonable when 
anybody, other than a police officer that is, choosing to ignore his 
wishes and enter on his land did so at risk of incurring “the most 
severe of penalties—criminal liability.”270 
 
 267  Oliver, 466 U.S. at 179 (“In contrast, open fields do not provide the setting for 
those intimate activities that the Amendment is intended to shelter from government 
interference or surveillance.  There is no societal interest in protecting the privacy of 
those activities, such as the cultivation of crops, that occur in open fields.”).  The 
Court first announced the “open fields” doctrine in Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 
557 (1924).  While still endorsing the textual basis of Hester’s reasoning, that an open 
field does not attain the Fourth Amendment’s protection as an “effect,” the Court 
also held the “open fields” doctrine to be consistent with the privacy-based approach 
of Katz.  See Oliver, 466 U.S. at 17677.  The Court’s recent decision in United States v. 
Jones did not call into question the holding of Oliver, or the “open fields” doctrine.  
See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 953 (2012) (“Quite simply, an open field, 
unlike the curtilage of a home . . . is not one of those protected areas enumerated in 
the Fourth Amendment . . . .  The Government’s physical intrusion on such an 
area—unlike its intrusion on the ‘effect’ at issue here—is of no Fourth Amendment 
significance.”). 
 268  Oliver, 466 U.S. at 171. 
 269  Id. at 185 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 270  Id. at 191.  The field at issue was “highly secluded . . . bounded on all sides by 
woods, fences, and embankments,” not visible from any public area, and marked with 
regularly posted “No Trespassing” signs.  Id. at 174.  Officers had to step around a 
locked gate (with a posted “No Trespassing” sign), pass a barn and camper, from 
which someone shouted at them to “come back up here,” and traverse through 
woods to arrive at the marijuana field that was the object of their search, and which 
was surrounded by a chicken-wire fence.  Id. at 17374.  Justice Marshall also 
questioned the majority’s conclusion that no activities worthy of privacy occur in 
fields, noting that “[m]any landowners like to take solitary walks . . . . [s]ome 
landowners use their secluded spaces to meet lovers, others to gather together with 
fellow worshippers, still others to engage in sustained creative endeavor.”  Id. at 192 
(Marshall, J., dissenting).  For Justice Marshall, these potential uses of private 
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So, while in Oliver, criminally liable interlopers set the 
benchmark of conduct, the Court did not raise the bar much in 
California v. Greenwood, as the police, who sifted through defendant’s 
curbside trash, were held to no higher standard than scavengers and 
snoops, even raccoons.271  Needless to say, if an individual followed 
another’s every movement out in public,272 or hovered about peering 
into another’s back yard,273 that individual would be considered a 
stalker.  Yet, the police are permitted to conduct just this type of 
concentrated surveillance, and with the aid of technology no less.  
The reason that such police violations of social and, often, legal 
norms give the Court such little cause for concern is that, under 
Fourth Amendment search doctrine, the emphasis falls squarely on 
the victim and her expectations, and it seems that the individual 
asserting a Fourth Amendment interest cannot reasonably expect 
more from the police than can be expected from any member of the 
public, even a criminal.274  It is not surprising that such an approach 
results in government surveillance being so frequently held to not 
even trigger the Fourth Amendment.275 
 
property merit protection, and the fact that the property was, in fact, being used for 
cultivation of marijuana is irrelevant to the constitutional analysis.  Id. at 191. 
 271  California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 4041 (1988) (holding that there is no 
reasonable expectation of privacy in garbage left at the curb for collection, as “[i]t is 
common knowledge that plastic garbage bags left on or at the side of a public street 
are readily accessible to animals, children, scavengers, snoops, and other members of 
the public.”); see Heffernan, supra note 84, at 38; Colb, supra note 84, at 128 (“When 
the garbage was at the curb, Greenwood’s hypothetical snoopy neighbor might have 
had to violate the law to rummage through it in the way that the police officer did.”). 
 272  See United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983) (holding that the attachment 
of an electronic radio transmitter (or “beeper”) to a container of chloroform 
purchased by defendant, and monitoring the movement of that container in public, 
constituted neither a seizure nor a search, as defendant had no reasonable 
expectation of privacy with respect to his public movement, which could have been 
monitored by naked-eye observation as well).  The Court’s decision in United States v. 
Jones also did not affect the holding in Knotts, as in the former case, the GPS device 
was affixed to the car after it was under the control of the defendant, thus 
constituting a physical trespass upon an effect, while in the latter case, the defendant 
received the container with the beeper already attached.  See United States v. Jones, 
132 S. Ct. 945, 951 (2012). 
 273  See California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986) (holding that aerial surveillance 
of defendant’s curtilage from an airplane at an altitude of 1,000 feet did not 
constitute a search); Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989) (holding that aerial 
surveillance of defendant’s greenhouse from a helicopter hovering at an altitude of 
400 feet did not constitute a search).  
 274  See Colb, supra note 84, at 137 (“People who rummage through their 
neighbors’ garbage, trespass on fenced-off fields, and stalk people . . . are criminals 
who intrude on upon others’ sense of security, safety, and privacy.”). 
 275  See 1 DRESSLER & MICHAELS, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 6.04 (5th 
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As with traditional rape law, the definition of a search also 
requires both the use of force by the perpetrator (here, the 
government) and the victim’s nonconsent, with resistance as the 
catalyst.  As in the rape context, it is difficult to separate force from 
nonconsent; if the subject of surveillance makes any effort to conceal 
information, then some level of force, be it walking around a locked 
gate, sifting through garbage, paying an informant, or hiring a pilot 
to fly a small plane, is required in order to obtain that information.  
In fact, Professor Wayne LaFave provides the following example of a 
traditional definition of a search as implying: 
some exploratory investigation, or an invasion and quest, a 
looking for or seeking out.  The quest may be secret, 
intrusive, or accomplished by force, and it has been held 
that a search implies some sort of force, either actual or 
constructive, much or little.  A search implies a prying into 
hidden places for that which is concealed and that the 
object searched for has been hidden or intentionally put 
out of the way.276 
Regrettably, the Court has given little attention to the use of 
such force by police, and where it has, it has defined it narrowly and 
unrealistically, without addressing or answering, in any satisfying way, 
the most important question in defining a Fourth Amendment 
search: should the police be permitted to engage in certain 
surveillance practices with no constitutional oversight, or is the threat 
to personal freedom and security from such unregulated power 
simply too great a burden on a free society?277 
Professor Dressler identifies the following three factors that the 
Court has turned to in defining searches: (1) the location being 
observed; (2) the measures taken to maintain privacy; and (3) the 
degree of intrusion, which can be understood as encompassing the 
severity of physical intrusion as well as the quantity and quality of the 
information being observed.278  In this framework, one can readily see 
 
ed. 2010).  Professors Dressler and Michaels suggest that a counter-trend may well be 
underway.  See id.  This Article addresses some of the cases that lend support for the 
conclusion that the Court has indicated a willingness to reconsider, to some extent, 
its current approach to defining the search in Part IV. 
 276  WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH 
AMENDMENT § 2.1 (4th ed. 2011) (quoting C.J.S., Searches and Seizures § 1 (1952)). 
 277  Amsterdam, supra note 41, at 403; see also United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 
76869 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 278  DRESSLER & MICHAELS, supra note 275, at 79; see also Wilkins, supra note 109, at 
1081 (arguing that the Court should explicitly adopt the framework that it implicitly 
has utilized in defining searches, namely, examining the “place where governmental 
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force (the degree of intrusion) and nonconsent (demonstrated by 
measures to exclude).  Focusing first on force, how does the Court 
assess the methods used by police to discover information?  If the 
Court even acknowledges the illegality of police conduct, the fact that 
the police are breaking the law while conducting surveillance is given 
little weight in determining whether a search occurred.  One need 
not look further than Oliver for an example of the Court’s approach 
to police lawlessness.  In Oliver, the officers undoubtedly were 
trespassing on private land, something noted by the Court.279  But as 
quickly as the Court recognized the trespass, it stripped it of any real 
significance: “‘The premise that property interests control the right 
of the Government to search and seize has been discredited.’  . . .  
For trespass law extends to instances where the exercise of the right 
to exclude vindicates no legitimate privacy interest.”280 
On the other hand, if the police are acting within the bounds of 
the law, or not violating any rules or regulations, the legality of their 
conduct becomes a central factor in defining the conduct as a non-
search.  Thus, in the “flyover”281 cases, the Court emphasized the fact 
 
surveillance occurs, the intrusiveness of the procedures used, and the object of the 
surveillance itself.”).  For purposes of this Article, the focus when discussing 
intrusiveness is on the methods used by police to conduct surveillance, rather than 
on the object of that surveillance.  Although the Court has discussed the nature of 
what is actually observed or discovered by the police as a factor in determining 
whether or not government conduct constitutes a search, this should be irrelevant in 
determining whether or not the government conduct constitutes a search.  See 
Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 446 (1989) (noting, as a factor supporting the 
conclusion that no search occurred when police observed the contents of the 
defendant’s greenhouse from a helicopter, that no “intimate details about connected 
with the use of the home or curtilage . . . were observed”).  For example, if police 
peer into a backyard, it should not matter, constitutionally speaking, whether they 
observe marijuana plants or a naked sunbather; what matters is that they observed 
the contents of an area that could contain either, and they are in no position to 
know what the yard may contain until after they have observed it.  See DRESSLER & 
MICHAELS, supra note 275, § 6.07 (“Can the Court possibly mean that if the same 
helicopter had observed the contents of the greenhouse as well as consensual but 
illegal sexual acts in the backyard, the surveillance would have been a “search” of one 
but not of the other activity?”). 
 279  Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 18283 (1984). 
 280  Id. (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967)).  Again, is ironic 
that the Court quotes the language of Katz, meant to expand the reach of the Fourth 
Amendment beyond the protection delineated by traditional property rights, to 
narrow the reach of the Amendment by making property rights irrelevant when they 
are in fact implicated. 
 281  In referring to the “flyover” cases for purposes of this Article, the discussion is 
limited to Ciraolo and Riley, which involved the aerial observation of residential 
curtilage.  The Court also upheld such observation, aided by a professional camera, 
of commercial curtilage in Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227 (1986).   
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that police were flying, or hovering, at altitudes permitted by safety 
regulations.282 
It is interesting to note the inconsistency between Oliver, on the 
one hand, and Ciraolo and Riley, on the other.  In Oliver, police were 
trespassing, but that fact was irrelevant because the observation 
occurred in a location, according to the Court, that did not merit 
protection.  In other words, the field that police entered upon was 
not considered part of the curtilage of the home, an area in which 
one generally harbors an expectation of privacy because of its 
intimate connection to the home: 
At common law, the curtilage is the area to which extends 
the intimate activity associated with the “sanctity of a man’s 
home and the privacies of life,” and therefore has been 
considered part of home itself for Fourth Amendment 
purposes.  Thus, courts have extended Fourth Amendment 
protection to the curtilage; and they have defined the 
curtilage, as did the common law, by reference to the 
factors that determine whether an individual reasonably 
may expect that an area immediately adjacent to the home 
will remain private.283 
In Ciraolo and Riley, police observed the contents of the 
defendants’ backyard and greenhouse, respectively, each within the 
curtilage of the defendants’ homes.284  One might think, after Oliver, 
that the legality of police conduct would have been of secondary 
importance to the nature of the location being observed, but it seems 
 
 282  See California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213 (1986) (“The observations . . . took 
place within public navigable airspace.”); see also Riley, 448 U.S. at 451.  The plurality 
in Riley notes the fact that the police are not breaking the law repeatedly: “We would 
have a different case if flying at that altitude had been contrary to law or 
regulation . . . .  This is not to say that an inspection of the curtilage of a house from 
an aircraft will always pass muster under the Fourth Amendment simply because the 
plane is within the navigable airspace specified by law.  But it is of obvious 
importance that the helicopter in this case was not violating the law . . . .”  Id.  Justice 
O’Connor, writing separately, concurred with the plurality, although for her, the 
relevant question was not whether the flight complied with safety regulations, but 
whether such flight was sufficiently “regular.”  Id. at 454 (O’Connor, J., concurring).  
She concluded that there was enough evidence of such regularity, although she 
placed the burden on the defendant to show otherwise.  Id. at 455. 
 283  Oliver, 466 U.S. at 180.  In United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 301 (1987) the 
Court provided a number of factors to aid in the determination of whether an area is 
considered curtilage: (1) the proximity of the area claimed to be curtilage to the 
home; (2) whether the area is included within an enclosure surrounding the home; 
(3) the nature of the uses to which the area is put; and (4) the steps taken by the 
resident to protect the area from observation by people passing by. 
 284  Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 21213; Riley, 448 U.S. at 450. 
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that the Court, in each of these surveillance contexts, chose to focus 
on the specific factor, either police conduct or location, that 
supported the ultimate finding that no search had occurred. 
Moreover, in the flyover cases, not only did the Court focus on 
the legality of the flights, but also made mention, in Ciraolo, that the 
surveillance was conducted in a “physically nonintrusive manner,”285 
and, in Riley, that there was no evidence 
that the helicopter interfered with respondent’s normal use 
of the greenhouse or of other parts of the curtilage.  As far 
as this record reveals, . . . there was no undue noise, and no 
wind, dust, or threat of injury.  In these circumstances, 
there was no violation of the Fourth Amendment.286 
In both these cases, then, the Court embraced the same 
property-based, trespass analysis that Katz repudiated, at least to the 
extent that it supported the outcome in favor of law enforcement.287  
Perhaps this is an attempt by the Court to at least nominally address 
the conduct of the police (what this Article refers to as force) in some 
way, although the discussion is superficial, void of normative content, 
and also, perhaps, disingenuous.  The Court clings to property law 
when it is helpful to the government, and disavows property norms 
when those norms would be helpful to individuals seeking to claim 
the protection of the Fourth Amendment. 
Again, traditional rape law can provide an explanation for the 
Court’s somewhat empty examination of police conduct.  As noted by 
Professor Estrich, the resistance requirement in rape law relieved 
courts of the difficult task of defining force in the context of rape.288  
Similarly, in the search context, the Court’s focus on the victim’s 
expectationsas measured in significant part by resistance, or efforts 
to maintain privacyspare the Court from having to look too closely 
at the government’s conduct.  Resistance also has a role in 
demonstrating the victim’s nonconsent to surveillance, to which this 
analysis will turn shortly, but first, it is helpful to further explore 
resistance in its relationship to force.  While this Article does not 
propose eliminating the resistance requirement entirely from the 
definition of a search, it does submit that currently, in order for 
 
 285  Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 213. 
 286  Riley, 448 U.S. at 452. 
 287  Professor Orin Kerr notes that the “Court’s opinions have sent conflicting 
rhetorical signals” with respect to the place of property law after Katz.  See Orin S. 
Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional Myths and the Case for 
Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801, 825 (2004). 
 288  See Estrich,  supra note 28, at 1130. 
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government surveillance to qualify as a search, it must overcome what 
amounts to utmost resistance, such as was required in traditional rape 
law, placing too great a burden on the victim. 
The Article’s analysis returns once more to the flyover cases, 
specifically Ciraolo, to provide the clearest illustration of the utmost 
resistance requirement at work.  Turning first to Mr. Ciraolo’s efforts 
to keep the contents of his backyard to himself, the Court offers the 
following description of the non-search that revealed the marijuana 
plants in that yard: 
Police were unable to observe the contents of respondent’s 
yard from ground level because of a 6-foot outer fence and 
a 10-foot inner fence completely enclosing the yard.  Later 
that day, Officer Shutz, who was assigned to investigate, 
secured a private plane and flew over respondent’s house at 
an altitude of 1,000 feet, within navigable airspace; he was 
accompanied by Officer Rodriguez. Both officers were 
trained in marijuana identification.  From the overflight, 
the officers readily identified marijuana plants 8 feet to 10 
feet in height growing in a 15- by 25-foot plot in 
respondent’s yard; they photographed the area with a 
standard 35mm camera.289 
What kind of resistance, then, did Mr. Ciraolo offer against the 
visual invasion of his home?  The Court grudgingly acknowledged 
that he “took normal precautions to maintain his privacy,”290 although 
the fact that Mr. Ciraolo erected not one, but two tall fences 
completely enclosing his yard indicates, at least to my mind, 
something more than “normal precautions.”  So, while the Court 
conceded that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy from 
ground-level observation, it was not so generous in acknowledging 
any such expectation from aerial surveillance. 
What would the Court have required from Mr. Ciraolo?  It 
seems, nothing less than the utmost resistance would have sufficed to 
endow Mr. Ciraolo with a reasonable expectation of privacy in the 
contents of his yard, which included, although completely overlooked 
by the majority, a swimming pool and sunbathing patio.291  In other 
 
 289  Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 209. 
 290  Id. at 211 (quoting Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 105 (1980)). 
 291  See Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 222 n.7 (Powell, J., dissenting).  The majority chose to 
describe the defendant’s desire for privacy in the specific terms of his efforts to 
conceal his marijuana plants, rather than in more general terms of an intent to keep 
his backyard private, as an area for personal outdoor enjoyment, used as much for 
swimming and sunbathing as for “unlawful agricultural pursuits.”  See id. at 211. 
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words, by not placing a roof over his yard, something, as Justice 
Powell noted, few people do,292 Mr. Ciraolo knowingly exposed the 
contents of his yard to passengers of low-flying aircraft, or even to 
hypothetical police officers surfing atop trucks and double-decker 
buses.293  Engaging, again, the parallel to traditional rape law, the 
victim bears the burden of preventing the intrusion in the first 
place,294 which Mr. Ciraolo was unable to accomplish with his two tall 
fences. 
If effectiveness of resistance is used to define the level of force 
necessary before something can be qualified as a search, then clearly, 
by the Court’s measure, the force used by the officers in Ciraolo was 
not at such a level as would trigger the Fourth Amendment.  The 
Court described the officers’ conduct as “simple visual observations 
from a public place,”295 reasoning that the Fourth Amendment does 
not require “officers to shield their eyes when passing by a home on 
public thoroughfares.”296  Thus, according to the majority, the officers 
observed nothing more than any member of the public “who glanced 
down” would have seen if flying at that altitude.297 
Let us take a slightly more realistic approach to describing the 
force needed to overcome Mr. Ciraolo’s resistance.  First, officers 
went to Mr. Ciraolo’s home and attempted to view the contents of the 
yard from ground level, but were prevented from doing so by the two 
fences.  Determined nevertheless to accomplish the surveillance of 
the yard, the lead officer hired a pilot to fly a private plane over the 
yard, so that he and another officer, trained in the identification of 
marijuana, could ascertain whether or not the yard did indeed 
contain the suspected marijuana, a fact the officers could not know 
with certainty until after they completed the inspection of the yard.  
As much as Mr. Ciraolo took “normal precautions” to shield his 
property from visual intrusion, the officers engaged in extraordinary 
measures to circumvent those precautions.  One is again reminded of 
traditional rape law, as it reflected an understanding of the sexual 
roles of men and women under which men were expected to increase 
their persistence in the face of a woman’s protests and, indeed, under 
which such protests, if falling short of the most vigorous physical 
 
 292  Id. at 224 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
 293  Id. at 211. 
 294  See supra text accompanying note 180. 
 295  Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 214. 
 296  Id. at 213. 
 297  Id. at 21314. 
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obstacle to the man, were deemed an invitation for men to pursue 
more aggressively.298 
To equate what Justice Powell, in his dissent, described as “an 
overflight at low altitude solely for the purpose of discovering 
evidence of crime within a private enclave into which they were 
constitutionally forbidden to intrude at ground level without a 
warrant”299 with the casual glance of the business or recreational air 
traveler into an unidentified yard during takeoff or landing is simply 
unrealistic and, as Justice Powell concluded, does not accurately 
measure the risk to privacy associated with such directed police  
surveillance.  In fact, Justice Powell noted that the everyday risk to 
privacy from aerial observation by the general public is so minimal 
that few people feel the need to build roofs over their yards to shelter 
their outdoor living activities (as opposed to erecting fences to 
surround their properties).300  Of course, another reason that few 
people build roofs over their yards is the fact that this particular 
precaution is unfeasible and would essentially destroy the very space 
it is meant to protect—that little piece of home in which family and 
friends can gather to enjoy air, sun, sky, and yes, maybe a little garden 
as well.  Ciraolo clearly exemplifies a definition of a search that 
rewards police for resorting to extreme efforts to overcome some 
unfeasible level of resistance.  Again, the parallel to traditional rape 
law is striking.301 
If we now turn to resistance in its second role, as evidence of 
nonconsent, then surely Mr. Ciraolo demonstrated that he had no 
intention of permitting members of the public, no less the police, 
access (visual or physical) to his yard.  Yet, he barely survived the 
Court’s application of the first prong of Justice Harlan’s Katz test: 
whether he “manifested a subjective expectation of privacy in the 
object of the challenged search . . . .”302  The Court began by stating 
 
 298  See supra notes 191194 and accompanying text.  
 299  Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 22425 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
 300  Id. at 224 (Powell, J., dissenting) 
 301  See supra note 194 and accompanying text. 
 302  Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 211 (emphasis added).  The Ciraolo majority actually 
modified Justice Harlan’s language slightly by adding the highlighted phrase “in the 
object of the challenged search.”  See id.  This is not the only time we have seen this 
prong altered, and the reader may recall that the Court, in Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 
128, 148 (1978), also referred to a “legitimate expectation of privacy in the particular 
areas searched.” (emphasis added).  Although Justice Harlan, in Katz, stated that the 
inquiry “[g]enerally . . . requires reference to a ‘place,’” it does not necessarily need 
to.  Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).  The 
proper test for this first prong, to use Justice Harlan’s exact language, is, simply, 
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that “[c]learly—and understandably—respondent has met the test of 
manifesting his own subjective intent . . . to maintain privacy . . . .”303  
Despite the fact that this finding was not challenged below, and that 
the Court acknowledged it was not necessary to address this issue, the 
Court nonetheless felt compelled to do precisely that.  What was once 
clear became “not entirely clear,” as the Court, hypothesizing about 
the inadequacy of the 10-foot fence to protect against citizens and 
police peering into the yard from the roof of a tall vehicle, suggested 
that Mr. Ciraolo had merely a “hope” that his “unlawful gardening 
pursuits” would be free from observation, rather than an “expectation 
of privacy from all observations of his back yard.”304 
What the Court seemed to be saying here is that in order to even 
demonstrate a subjective expectation of privacy, one must have taken 
precautions against any possible invasion, again exhibiting an 
unrealistic and overly permissive view of force and an equally 
unrealistic and overly oppressive requirement of resistance.  How can 
one ever have an expectation that the precautions taken will be 
 
whether the individual has “exhibited an expectation of privacy.”  Id.  Adding a 
limiting phrase, referring to places or objects, allows the Court to manipulate the 
concept of privacy by mooring it to something specific, rather than allowing for a 
more expansive (albeit more nebulous) understanding of privacy.  In Ciraolo, then, 
what exactly is the “object” of the search?  The Court begins by examining whether 
the defendant manifested a desire to keep “his unlawful agricultural pursuits” 
private.  Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 211.  Once the expectation of privacy is associated 
specifically with the object that is discovered (or the object of the search), it is a small 
step to find no legitimate expectation in that particular object.  In Ciraolo, the 
majority focuses on the fact that the marijuana plants were observed in the yard, and 
does not mention other features of the yard that were also viewed and the human 
activity that, at any given time, could have been viewed.  See supra note 291 and 
accompanying text.  In the binary search context, meaning that the search can only 
reveal the presence or absence of contraband and nothing else, the Court has 
reasoned that individuals have no legitimate expectation of privacy in the possession 
of contraband, and that the absence of contraband is not information that 
reasonably matters to anyone, thereby permitting field drug testing and dog sniffs of 
luggage and cars.  See Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405 (2005) (holding that the dog 
sniff of a vehicle does not constitute a search); United States v. Jacobson, 466 U.S. 
109 (1984) (holding that the dog sniff of luggage is not considered a search); United 
States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983) (holding that the field testing of a small quantity 
of powder to ascertain whether it was cocaine was not considered a search).  Thus, 
because the Court has determined that there is no legitimate expectation of privacy 
in either possessing or not possessing contraband, these activities are not considered 
searches, but note that by defining the expectation of privacy narrowly in terms of 
the contraband, the Court did not recognize a broader notion of privacy, one that 
would entitle people to retain control over information of the contents, whether 
contraband or not, of their personal belongings. 
 303  Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 211. 
 304  Id. at 21112 (emphasis in original). 
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absolutely impervious to penetration?  Under the Ciraolo Court’s 
reasoning, then, it seems that even Mr. Katz would have had difficulty 
fulfilling this part of the test, as, failing to check the phone booth he 
used for external bugs, he did not take sufficient precautions and his 
conversation was, after all, intercepted.  What the Ciraolo Court failed 
to take into account was that Mr. Katz didn’t sweep the public phone 
booth for bugs because it was reasonable for him to expect there 
would be none, just as it was unreasonable for the agents 
investigating him to place atop the booth the device that ultimately 
revealed the contents of Mr. Katz’s conversation.305  The Ciraolo Court, 
in contemplating trucks, double-decker buses, and, ultimately, low-
flying aircrafts, as vehicles for spying into Mr. Ciraolo’s back yard, 
never took into account the fact that the ordinary citizen would not 
expect (and therefore would not protect against) such behavior.306 
Professor Sherry Colb has identified two flaws in the Court’s 
reasoning with respect to defining searches, both of which this Article 
will discuss in the context of the victim’s consent.307  The first of these 
is exemplified by the Court’s reasoning in Ciraolo.  According to 
Professor Colb, the Court has equated the risk of exposure with what 
this Article refers to as consent, or, in Katz parlance, “knowing 
exposure.”308  Recall that in Katz, the Court reasoned that, even in the 
most protected of spaces—the home, what one “knowingly exposes to 
the public” is not protected by the Fourth Amendment.309  This idea 
of knowing exposure implies that an individual has in some way, 
either actually or constructively, consented to the observation.  
Although the Court has chosen to refer to consent searches as those 
searches in which an individual affirmatively grants permission to 
search specifically to the police,310 as opposed to merely exposing 
information to members of the public, which is not considered to be 
 
 305  This Article refers to the reasonableness of the measures used to intercept Mr. 
Katz’s conversation, judged by commonly understood social norms (for purposes of 
defining the search), rather than to reasonableness of the agents’ surveillance in the 
more specialized  sense of the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition of unreasonable 
searches and seizures (for purposes of ascertaining whether or not a search or 
seizure, once recognized as such, comports with that Amendment’s requirements). 
 306  The dissent, of course, makes this precise argument.  Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 
22324 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
 307  See Colb, supra note 84, at 122. 
 308  Id.   
 309  Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).  
 310  A search pursuant to valid consent is considered to be a reasonable search and 
is exempted from the usual (at least, in theory) requirements of probable cause and 
a warrant.  See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227 (1973). 
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a search at all, for purposes of analogy, this Article will refer to the 
victim’s consent or nonconsent as relevant to determining what type 
of police conduct constitutes a search.311 
Despite the Court’s equivocality on the matter, this author 
remains convinced that Mr. Ciraolo did not consent to the viewing of 
his yard and adequately conveyed his nonconsent to the world.  One 
is reminded of the paradox identified by Professor Estrich in her 
repudiation of Alston—that the sexual intercourse at issue was at once 
against the will of the victim, yet somehow not committed by force, 
and therefore the perpetrator was not guilty of rape.312  The paradox 
may be even more puzzling in the search context.  Mr. Ciraolo did 
not consent, and he communicated his nonconsent.  Yet, his “no” was 
not respected, not by the police, not by the Court, and not even, at 
least as the Court determined, by society.  As already discussed, his 
resistance was not deemed adequate because it could not prevent the 
method of surveillance the police ultimately resorted to in order to 
view his yard.313  By the same token, because he failed to prevent all 
efforts at securing the privacy of his yard, his nonconsent was also 
discounted, and the Court treated the vulnerability to visual 
penetration from the airways as “knowing exposure.”314  So, just as 
 
 311  As Professor Colb points out, Justice Marshall expressed a similar 
understanding of the central role of consent in defining a search, in that according 
to his (dissenting) view, a citizen’s consent to a search constitutes a choice not to 
exercise one’s Fourth Amendment right to exclude the government, a choice that 
can only have meaning with the knowledge of the right to refuse that consent. Colb, 
supra note 84, at 123.  See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 283 (1973) 
(Marshall, J., dissenting).  This understanding of consent—that a consent search is in 
fact not really a search at all—is inherently logical.  For example, how would it be 
possible for one to invite the police to enter her home, and yet retain a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the contents of the home?  In fact, the Court used the very 
assumption-of-risk rationale often used to find no reasonable expectation of privacy 
to validate third-party-consent searches, holding that any joint occupant of premises 
may consent to a search of areas of common authority, the fruits of which are 
admissible against a co-occupant.  See United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 
(1974) (“[I]t is reasonable to recognize that any of the co-inhabitants has the right to 
permit the inspection in his own right and that the others have assumed the risk that 
one of their number might permit the common area to be searched.”).  Professor 
Colb argues that these two strands of search doctrine should be reconciled and that 
equating consent with knowing exposure might lead the Court to define knowing 
exposure as truly knowing (rather than accidental or unintended), and to require 
that consent, to be valid, also be knowing.  Colb, supra note 84, at 123. 
 312  See supra notes 155156 and accompanying text.  
 313  In other words, just as Professor Anderson described rape victims’ burden to 
live up to a high standard of resistance, see Anderson, supra note 29, at 95758, Mr. 
Ciraolo likewise failed to measure up to some ideal level of resistance. 
 314  California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 215 (1986). 
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Cottie Brown said “no,” yet somehow the physical penetration of her 
body was accomplished without force, Mr. Ciraolo also said “no,” but 
was nonetheless deemed to have consented, making the visual 
penetration of his yard non-forceful as well. 
Ciraolo is but one of many cases in which the Court has relied on 
this rationale, holding government surveillance not to constitute a 
search because the individual has assumed the very risk of exposure 
that the government exploits.  Worse still, the risk contemplated by 
the Court often involves some act of wrongdoing by a third party, in 
the form of a violation of either the law or, at the least, a social 
norm.315  As this Article has already described, under the Fourth 
Amendment, the government is permitted to trespass, rummage 
through garbage, and stalk its citizens to gain access to information it 
otherwise would not be able to acquire—information the government 
seeks to use in wielding its power against those it has targeted.316  
Somewhat ironically, when the Court evaluates the government’s 
force, the criminal or anti-social behavior actually committed by 
police is given little, if any, weight, but the mere possibility of such 
behavior on the part of members of the public, on the other hand, 
no matter how speculative, is heavily relied on to discredit 
individuals’ assertions of nonconsent.  In other words, the Court 
recognizes the prevalence of illegal or socially undesirable conduct 
inconsistently—acknowledging lawlessness in people at large but  
downplaying similar lawlessness on the part of law enforcement—
weakening both elements (as these elements are conceived for 
purposes of analogy) of a search: the victim’s nonconsent and the 
force used to overcome that nonconsent. 
So, similarly to traditional rape law, the force needed to qualify 
 
 315  Colb, supra note 84, at 122.  Professor Colb demonstrates the perverse 
outcome of equating risk-taking with knowing exposure, in that wrongdoing on the 
part of the police is not only excused, but seemingly justified, by invoking the image 
of a man who imprudently falls asleep on a subway, thereby opening himself up to 
the very real risk of being pick-pocketed.  See id.  As easy as it may be for a criminal to 
reach into the sleeping man’s pocket and remove his wallet, stealing the wallet 
remains a crime, and the victim did not, in fact, invite anyone to take his wallet, no 
matter that he should have remained more vigilant and even though some might say 
that he “asked to have his pocket picked.”  Id. 
 316  See supra notes 267273 and accompanying text.  Professor Colb thoroughly 
explores the Court’s use of this reasoning in a variety of surveillance contexts in 
which it has been held that individuals lack a reasonable expectation of privacy, 
discussing the Court’s search jurisprudence involving garbage, open fields, flyovers, 
tracking devices, hidden video cameras, and false friends.  See Colb, supra note 84, at 
12744.  For purposes of this Article, I have highlighted only a few examples from 
the Court’s search cases to illustrate my comparison to traditional rape law concepts. 
SOREE.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 1/9/2013  3:10 PM 
200 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43:127 
 
to meet the definition of a search is given a narrow construction, as is 
nonconsent.  And, if nonconsent is construed narrowly, consent is 
simultaneously given overly generous breadth, leading us to the 
second flaw identified by Professor Colb.  The Supreme Court has 
also equated knowing, but selective, exposure with knowing 
exposure, period.317  In other words, the Court has treated voluntarily 
sharing information with a limited number or for a limited purpose 
as identical to voluntarily disclosing that same information to the 
whole world, thus “failing to recognize degrees of privacy.”318  So, 
when we seek to place a call from our home telephone, the number 
we have dialed is not protected because we have provided it, not even 
to another human being, but to a machine.319  In doing so, we have 
“assumed the risk that the [phone] company would reveal to police” 
the dialed numbers, and therefore, we cannot harbor a reasonable or 
“legitimate” expectation of privacy in those numbers.320  Likewise, 
when we deposit money to our bank, we have relinquished any claim 
to Fourth Amendment protection for our financial information, 
because “[t]he depositor takes the risk, in revealing his affairs to 
another, that the information will be conveyed by that person to the 
Government.”321  In both of these situations, we have revealed 
information to a specific entity for a limited and specific purpose.  
Further, both these risks are, of course, exceedingly difficult, if not 
impossible, to avoid while going about our lives in today’s highly 
interdependent society.322 
 
 317  Colb, supra note 84, at 122.   
 318  Id.  Justice Sotomayor, concurring in United States v. Jones, recognized the 
gravity of this flaw: 
More fundamentally, it may be necessary to reconsider the premise 
that an individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy in 
information voluntarily disclosed to third parties.  This approach is ill 
suited to the digital age, in which people reveal a great deal of 
information about themselves to third parties in the course of carrying 
out mundane tasks . . . whatever the societal expectations, they can 
attain constitutionally protected status only if our Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence ceases to treat secrecy as a prerequisite for privacy.  I 
would not assume that all information voluntarily disclosed to some 
member of the public for a limited purpose is, for that reason alone, 
disentitled to Fourth Amendment protection. 
United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 957 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
 319  Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979).  The Court analogized the switching 
equipment used to complete the call to the human telephone operator of the past.  
Id. at 74445. 
 320  Id. at 744. 
 321  United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976). 
 322  In addition to phone numbers and bank records, Professor Colb also critically 
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Still more troubling, perhaps, is the government’s use of “false 
friends,” a category of surveillance involving undercover agents and 
informants that is also unregulated by the Fourth Amendment.  Just 
as with the phone numbers we dial and the financial information we 
disclose to a bank, the Court has held that when we confide in 
another, whether that other is an old friend who betrays us, or a new 
friend whose very existence in our lives has been artificially created in 
order to gain information for use against us, we have no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in what we have revealed.323  This type of 
surveillance, aptly characterized by Professor William Heffernan as 
“interactive surveillance,” involves something potentially more 
harmful, on a deeply personal level, than the police wrongdoing we 
have thus far encountered: 
[W]ith interactive surveillance, government agents try to 
penetrate human relationships to discover information or 
objects of evidentiary value.  The penetration can be carried 
out by deception. . . .  But the penetration can also be 
carried out by acts of betrayal . . . .  In forging ties with 
others, people take the risk, the Court maintains, that the 
government has either planted friends among them or, the 
associations having been formed, that it has induced their 
friends to turn on them.324 
Yet, the government is permitted to manipulate and interfere in 
our personal relationships with no justification or oversight for the 
same reason as it may access our bank records: because we have 
consented to the sharing of information with some small part of our 
world (whether business or personal), we are deemed to have 
consented towards everyone, including the government.  If this 
sounds familiar to the reader, it should.  Recall the use, in a rape 
trial, of the victim’s prior sexual history to make a strikingly similar 
 
examines the Court’s use of this rationale with respect to garbage.  Colb, supra note 
84, at 153–55.  An alternate justification of the holding of California v. Greenwood, 486 
U.S. 35 (1988), rested on the idea that by leaving her garbage on the curb for the 
trash collector, a homeowner not only assumes the risk posed by snoops and 
scavengers, but also bears the risk that the collector might peruse the contents of the 
trash or, even worse, invite the police to do so, rather than disposing of it in the usual 
way.  Greenwood, 486 U.S. at 40. 
 323  See United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971); Hoffa v. United States, 385 
U.S. 293 (1966); On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747 (1952).  
 324  Heffernan, supra note 84, at 10607.  Professor Heffernan argues that while 
the Fourth Amendment cannot regulate an insider’s choice, of her own volition, to 
betray the subject of the government’s interest, the Fourth Amendment should be 
implicated when the government “takes steps on its own to penetrate intimate 
relationships.”  Id. at 10910. 
SOREE.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 1/9/2013  3:10 PM 
202 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43:127 
 
argument: because she has consented to one instance of sexual 
activity (or perhaps more) in the past, she is likely to consent to any 
and all, and therefore, equally likely to have consented to the specific 
instance of intercourse she claims to be a rape. 
In many ways, then, current search law mirrors traditional rape 
law.  Each doctrine favors the perpetrator of the violation—ironically, 
the government in the former context and the defendant in the 
latter—and places a substantial burden on the victim claiming the 
violation.  In each context, force is construed narrowly and consent, 
broadly.  Great demands are placed on the victim to resist, else the 
violation will not be deemed a search or a rape, as the case may be.  
And, the victim is said to have assumed the risk of the violation if she 
is perceived as somehow having caused or contributed to the 
vulnerability that is exploited against her, by engaging in risky 
behavior or through her associations with others.  With such parallel 
structural features reflecting and reinforcing an imbalance of power 
between government and defendant, on the one hand, and male 
perpetrator and female victim, on the other, it should not be 
surprising that Fourth Amendment scholars have likewise identified 
broader social concerns stemming from the Court’s jurisprudence, to 
which the Article now turns. 
B. Search Law Under Siege 
Part III.B began by noting the disparity in physical strength, 
generally speaking, between men and women, which of course makes 
it more difficult for a female victim to prevent unwanted intercourse 
in the face of a truly determined perpetrator.  At the same time, 
traditional rape law failed to realistically evaluate this imbalance of 
strength and power, placing squarely on the victim the responsibility 
of resorting to extraordinary physical measures to thwart the violation 
of her person.  So, too, the target of government surveillance faces a 
similar disadvantage when all the power and resources of the State 
are brought to bear upon her, and similarly, the law of searches also 
requires extraordinary measures to maintain privacy in the face of the 
government’s determination to breach that privacy and obtain the 
information it seeks. 
The Court’s unrealistic assessment of the imbalance of power 
between law enforcement and the individual,325 and the Court’s 
willingness to permit the government to exploit that imbalance, have 
 
 325  See supra note 234. 
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resulted in a Fourth Amendment that has been noted by scholars to 
be “a whites-only amendment,”326 to “create and sustain” a racially 
biased world,327 and to include a “poverty exception” to its 
protections.328  In short, the Court’s decidedly government-friendly 
doctrine has disadvantaged citizens not only in their individual 
capacities viz-a-viz law enforcement, but has also developed in ways 
that particularly affect individuals as members of larger groups, 
namely minorities and the poor. 
A great deal has been written on the subject of race and the 
Fourth Amendment, and the scholarship is replete with examples of 
legal doctrines and police practices that negatively and 
disproportionately impact minority citizens.329  For present purposes, 
this Article focuses on poverty and its relationship to the definition of 
a search, in particular the disadvantage to the poor inherent in a 
definition of a search that places almost exclusive emphasis on 
precautions taken to preserve privacy and punishes deviation from 
the proscribed level of diligence.  This is not to say that this analysis 
overlooks the implications of search doctrine on minorities.  As noted 
by many scholars, the “huge economic disparities that persist between 
the races” play a major role in the continued segregation of minority 
groups to poor, urban, high-crime areas.330  Professor Amy Ronner 
 
 326  Ronner, supra note 64, at 423.   
 327  Devon W. Carbado, (E)racing the Fourth Amendment, 100 MICH. L. REV. 947, 968 
(2002).  Professor Carbado argues that a colorblind doctrine that takes note of race 
only when a police officer is engaging in obvious racist behavior “obscures . . . the 
racial allocation of the burdens and benefits of the Fourth Amendment.  The 
material result of this racial allocation is that people of color are burdened more by, 
and benefit less from, the Fourth Amendment than whites.”  Id. at 96869. 
 328  Christopher Slobogin, The Poverty Exception to the Fourth Amendment, 55 FLA. L. 
REV. 391, 404 (2003). 
 329  See generally Carbado, supra note 327, at 969; Anthony C. Thompson, Stopping 
the Usual Suspects: Race and the Fourth Amendment, 74  N.Y.U. L. REV. 956 (1999); Tracey 
Maclin, Race and the Fourth Amendment, 51 VAND. L. REV. 333 (1998) [hereinafter 
Maclin, Race and the Fourth Amendment] (discussing the history and present state of 
race-based policing and the disproportionate impact on African Americans of 
discretionary, pretextual seizures); Sheri Lynn Johnson, Race and the Decision to Detain 
a Suspect, 93 YALE L.J. 214 (1983). 
 330  David A. Harris, Factors for Reasonable Suspicion: When Black and Poor Means 
Stopped and Frisked, 69 IND. L.J. 659, 678 (1994); see also, e.g., Ronner, supra note 64, at 
386 (“African Americans and Hispanics tend to populate poor, inner city 
neighborhoods, which are commonly known to be high crime areas.”); David A. 
Harris, Particularized Suspicion, Categorical Judgments: Supreme Court Rhetoric Versus Lower 
Court Reality Under Terry v. Ohio, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 975, 100001 (1998) (“Those 
who live in high crime areas will likely be poor and members of minority groups.”); 
David A. Sklansky, Traffic Stops, Minority Motorists, and the Future of the Fourth 
Amendment, 1997 SUP. CT. REV. 271, 328 (1997) (noting the disproportionate focus of 
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observes: 
[t]he insidious effect of such segregation is that the police 
are able to direct inordinate law enforcement efforts at 
blacks in the urban core.  Also, police officers 
disproportionally stop, detain, and arrest African 
Americans.  They do this without probable cause and 
without articulable suspicion.331 
Just as minorities are more vulnerable to being stopped by 
police, so, too, are people with few financial resources more 
vulnerable to government surveillance that falls outside the scope of 
the Fourth Amendment, requiring no justification at all on the part 
of the police.332  The current definition of a search, as outlined above, 
requiring of individuals that the measures taken to preserve privacy 
be virtually insurmountable before police surveillance will be deemed 
a search, put the poor at a great disadvantage relative to the 
government and to those with greater resources. 
In other words, one’s constitutional privacy is limited by 
one’s actual privacy. . . . [which] leads to the conclusion 
that Fourth Amendment protection varies depending on 
the extent to which one can afford accoutrements of wealth 
such as a freestanding home, fences, lawns, heavy curtains, 
and vision- and sound-proof doors and walls. . . .  As a result, 
 
police on minority suspects because “minority neighborhoods tend to be poorer and 
more crime-ridden”). 
 331  Ronner, supra note 64, at 38687.  Professor Ronner illuminates the repressed 
racism inherent in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), discussing how the Court, in  
permitting stops based on reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, acknowledged, 
then dismissed, the very real potential of “wholesale harassment” of members of 
minority communities, something, the Court stated, the exclusionary rule was 
impotent to prevent or address.  Id. at 40607 (quoting Terry, 319 U.S. at 14).  While 
Terry “laid the foundation for a racist Fourth Amendment,” the Court “installed the 
roof” thirty years later in Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119 (2000) (upholding a seizure 
based on unprovoked flight in a high-crime area).  Ronner, supra note 64, at 405.  
According to Professor Ronner, each of the criteria used by the Court to establish 
reasonable suspicion in Wardlow targets minorities, in that simple presence in their 
own community becomes grounds for suspicion (notwithstanding that presence in a 
non-minority community may also be grounds for suspicion), as does the natural 
response of flight from police, based on a “well-founded and historically ingrained 
fear and distrust of law enforcement” (making flight not quite so “unprovoked” as 
the Court would have us believe), resulting in a “Fourth Amendment [that] cannot 
serve the very class of people that needs it the most.”  Id. at 41323.  Professor Tracey 
Maclin finds it “startling that the Court would ignore racial concerns when 
formulating constitutional rules that control police discretion to search and seize 
persons on the street.”  Maclin, Race and the Fourth Amendment, supra note 329, at 340; 
see also Carbado, supra note 327, at 96567 (arguing that the Court either ignores or 
constructs race in order to reach desired doctrinal outcomes in particular cases). 
 332  Slobogin, supra note 328, at 400.   
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people who live in public spaces (for instance, the homeless 
who reside in boxes) and people who have difficulty hiding 
or distancing their living space from casual observers (for 
instance, those who live in tenements and other crowded 
areas) are much more likely to experience unregulated 
government intrusions.333 
If Mr. Ciraolo, with his doubly-fenced yard (complete with swimming 
pool and sunning deck) did not do enough to earn the protection of 
the Fourth Amendment, how likely is it that the urban poor will be 
able to do so? 
The incongruence between current Fourth Amendment 
doctrine, with its focus on privacy and precautions, and the reality of 
daily life for so many of our citizens becomes all the more evident 
when one considers the following eloquent passage, which, written 
and delivered by Professor Anthony Amsterdam over thirty years ago, 
still resonates today: 
[The framers] did not know the miles on miles of tiny 
boxes in which millions of our people live, driven to the 
streets with all the desperation of a prisoner escaping and 
then dogged down endless, agitated corridors of windows 
till the human soul cries out for someplace it can breathe 
and not be stared at.  They did not know the vast, stinking 
slums of Harlem summers where the people boil like eggs if 
every door and window is not opened, and where to be 
young and black and take to the streets is to be hassled by 
the cops.334 
It seems that, like the Framers, Supreme Court Justices also 
cannot contemplate the conditions described above and experienced 
by so many of our citizens.335  When privacy is the ultimate interest 
protected by the Fourth Amendment’s ban against unreasonable 
 
 333  Id. at 401. 
 334  Amsterdam, supra note 41, at 401. 
 335  For example, as noted by Professor Heffernan, supra note 84, at 8586, when 
deciding that overnight guests in homes are entitled to claim the protection of the 
Fourth Amendment against unreasonable searches, the Justices were able to see 
themselves as guests in an invaded home: “We stay in others’ homes when we travel to 
a strange city for business or pleasure, when we visit our parents, children, or more 
distant relatives out of town . . . .  We will all be hosts and we will all be guests many 
times in our lives.”  Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 99 (1989) (emphasis added).  
However, in concluding that a mobile home was more like an automobile than a 
home, for purposes of qualifying for the automobile exception to the Fourth 
Amendment’s warrant requirement, “we,” the Justices were nowhere to be found.  
Heffernan, supra note 84, at 8586 (discussing California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386 
(1985)). 
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searches, and at the same time privacy is also the yardstick by which 
the existence of Fourth Amendment protection is measured, the 
middle-class homeowner will be better situated than his counterpart 
living in the tenement: the former can shut his outer doors and 
retreat into his home to enjoy his solitude and refuge from the 
outside world. 
But if you live in a cheap hotel or in a ghetto flat, your 
neighbors can hear you breathing quietly even in temperate 
weather when it is possible to keep the windows and the 
doors closed.  For the tenement dweller, the difference 
between observation by neighbors and visitors who 
ordinarily use the common hallways and observation by 
policemen who come into the hallways to “check up” or 
“look around” is the difference between all the privacy that 
his condition allows and none.  Is that small difference too 
unimportant to claim Fourth Amendment protection?336 
Thus, requiring a high level of actual privacy before one is entitled to 
Fourth Amendment protection further diminishes what little privacy 
is afforded to those living in conditions of poverty. 
Perhaps, as suggested by Professor Yale Kamisar, “few of us have 
ever seen or thought much about the plight of an individual who is 
being searched illegally in a poor neighborhood . . . .”337  If we care 
about equality, and if we, as a people, believe the guarantees of the 
constitution should apply to one and all, regardless of the ability to 
purchase those guarantees, we must care about the very different 
Fourth Amendment experienced by minorities and the poor. 
The reader has already seen this before, of course—a system 
under which individuals are in effect held responsible for the 
circumstances thrust upon them or for the consequences of 
exercising some small bit of personal freedom or autonomy.  Recall, 
in the traditional rape context, how the prevailing attitude was one 
that punished women for engaging in consensual sexual activity or 
 
 336  Amsterdam, supra note 41, at 404.   
 337  Yale Kamisar, The Warren Court and Criminal Justice: A Quarter-Century 
Retrospective, 31 TULSA L.J. 1, 43 (1995) (comparing the seeming indifference to unfair 
search practices with the enthusiastic public reception of the Court’s decision in 
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (holding that the Sixth Amendment right 
to counsel is a fundamental right, and that as such, indigent defendants are entitled 
to appointed counsel)).  Professor Kamisar mentions another possible explanation 
for such disparate public reactions: “Too many people . . . are roused by any violation 
of ‘the symbol of a ceremonial trial,’ but ‘left unmoved by an ordinary 
nonceremonial injustice.’”  Kamisar, supra, at 44 (quoting THURMAN W. ARNOLD, THE 
SYMBOLS OF GOVERNMENT 142 (Harbinger ed., Harcourt, Brace & World 1962)).  
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even for placing themselves in risky situations where they might be 
victimized.  Recall how, according to feminists, the law and practice 
of rape kept women at home and under control, existing “in a 
condition of terror” and relying on protection from the very group 
they needed protecting from.338  Similarly, current search doctrine 
punishes individuals for stepping outside their homes (or failing to 
adequately secure them) or for interacting with others, making all of 
us truly “secure” only behind bolted doors and drawn window shades 
and in nearly complete solitude.  And, especially in poor, urban 
areas, the police take on the dual role of protector and predator as a 
means of social control.339 
Further, if rape victims found themselves, rather than their 
attackers, to be effectively on trial in a rape prosecution, 
experiencing all the distrust and disapproval inuring to criminal 
defendants generally, how much greater the disadvantage must be to 
most victims of police surveillance who seek to claim a Fourth 
Amendment violation before a court, who find themselves not only 
effectively, but actually, on trial as criminal defendants.  Search 
doctrine is almost exclusively driven by the Court’s response to 
defendants’ claims of violations, with those claims arising, generally, 
only because something incriminating was found. 
In other words, the champions of our Fourth Amendment rights 
are often factually guilty, and the Court’s hesitation to reverse 
convictions and deprive the State of valuable evidence may well be 
the true motivation behind the government-friendly doctrine that has 
developed.  However, such a narrow focus on the immediate 
consequences of a decision bearing on the constitutionality of a 
police investigative practice misses the larger picture and makes us all 
 
 338  See supra notes 20820 and accompanying text.  
 339  Professor Ross notes that “there is a culture of masculinity within police 
departments that places ‘an emphasis on demonstrating the aggressive demeanor 
known as command presence. . . . A corollary of that attitude is that police officers 
feel the need to punish disrespect.’”  Ross, supra note 3, at 26 (quoting Frank Rude 
Cooper, “Who’s the Man?”: Masculinities Studies, Terry Stops, and Police Training 
(Suffolk Univ. L. Sch. Research Paper No. 08-23, 2009), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1257183).  The Court, in Terry v. Ohio, also recognized 
aggressive policing as a source of friction between law enforcement and minority 
communities, noting that “[t]his is particularly true in situations where the ‘stop and 
frisk’ of youths or minority group members is ‘motivated by the officers’ perceived 
need to maintain the power image of the beat officer, an aim sometimes 
accomplished by humiliating anyone who attempts to undermine police control of 
the streets.’”  Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 1415 n.11 (1967) (quoting PRESIDENT’S 
COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE 
REPORT: THE POLICE 183 (1967)). 
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more vulnerable and less secure.340  Whether fueled by animus 
towards the exclusionary rule and a reluctance to overturn 
convictions or by a categorical preference for the interests of law 
enforcement, an overwhelming number of the Court’s Fourth 
Amendment decisions have favored the government.341 
Professor Tracey Maclin describes the Court’s post-Katz 
jurisprudence as abandoning that case’s “individualistic, protection-
oriented approach” in favor of an approach weighing individual 
interests of freedom from government intrusions against the 
government’s interest in law enforcement, with the Court’s balancing 
approach eventually morphing into a “‘police perspective’ 
approach.”342  In determining whether individuals possess a legitimate 
or reasonable expectation of privacy, then, the Court adopts the 
perspective of the “government agent seeking to destroy that 
privacy. . . .  In effect, the Court has adopted the outlook of the fox in 
defining the rules that will govern the henhouse.”343  This, of course, 
turns the Fourth Amendment on its head and destroys the intent of 
Katz, in so much as that case reflected an understanding of the 
Fourth Amendment as a provision meant to protect the citizenry 
against the excesses and arbitrary exercise of official power, and not a 
provision meant to aid the government in the enforcement of its 
laws.344 
A Court wishing to craft a government-friendly Fourth 
Amendment doctrine has three tools at its disposal: it can recognize 
police activity as implicating the Fourth Amendment, but determine 
it to be reasonable; it can acknowledge a Fourth Amendment 
violation but uphold convictions obtained with illegally obtained 
evidence by limiting the reach of the exclusionary remedy; or it can 
simply hold that the police conduct at issue simply does not trigger 
the Fourth Amendment at all.  This Article, of course, is concerned 
with the third method of ensuring a favorable Fourth Amendment 
landscape for law enforcement.  However, all three doctrinal 
 
 340  See Maclin, Government Perspective, supra note 95, at 66970 (“[T]he Court is 
often unable (or unwilling) to appreciate the implications of its rulings for persons 
not immediately involved in the cases before it . . . whenever the Court upholds a 
challenged police practice against an obviously guilty individual, the Court is also 
licensing similar intrusions against not-so-obviously innocent persons as well.”). 
 341  Silas J. Wasserstrom, The Incredible Shrinking Fourth Amendment, 21 AM. CRIM. L. 
REV. 257 (1984). 
 342  Maclin, Government Perspective, supra note 95, at 66970. 
 343  Id. at 67475. 
 344  See id. at 67778. 
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approaches achieve the same practical result for the government: 
broad access to individuals despite the Amendment’s purpose to limit 
such access.  The reader may recall that rape law scholars described 
traditional rape law in similar terms: despite the offense of rape 
purporting to limit men’s access to women, the law, as construed, 
accomplished quite the opposite.345 
The reader should also here recall the Article’s discussion, in 
Part III.B, of some of the broader concerns that fueled the reforms 
achieved in the law of rape.  Rape reformers sought to address the 
imbalance of power that skewed doctrine in favor of men as the 
advantaged group, and which resulted in a law that did little to 
improve male behavior and much to burden women both in their 
individual and collective capacities.  While male sexual autonomy was 
valued and promoted, the autonomy of women was not only 
discouraged but, in effect, punished.  The same broad criticisms are 
mirrored in Fourth Amendment search doctrine.  The Court’s 
jurisprudence promotes, and thus enhances, the imbalance of power 
between government and individual, resulting in search law that 
provides law enforcement expansive investigatory freedom 
(autonomy) with little or no restrictions on its behavior.  Not only do 
the victims of intrusive police surveillance find themselves at a severe 
individual disadvantage, but entire groups of citizens are 
disproportionately burdened, namely minorities and the poor.  
Individual autonomy, as in the rape context, is discouraged and 
punished, and victims are blamed for their failure to secure 
themselves against intrusion if they have in any way placed themselves 
at risk.  Thus the broader goals of rape reformers—to promote 
equality by addressing the imbalance of power, to improve behavior, 
and to promote autonomy—are applicable to this context as well.  
The next section completes the analogy between these two areas of 
law by turning again to the specific reforms achieved in and proposed 
to the law of rape as they inform the pursuit of the above-mentioned 
goals in the law of searches. 
C. Search Law Tomorrow: What We Can Learn from Rape Reform 
1. Abolishing the Utmost Resistance Requirement 
One of the most significant reforms (and victories) achieved by 
rape reformers was the abolition of the utmost resistance 
requirement.  A parallel change in the law of searches is warranted 
 
 345  See supra text accompanying notes 189190. 
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and adequately supported by Katz.  The Fourth Amendment 
described above, with what effectively amounts to an utmost 
resistance requirement,346 excludes too many from its protective 
reach.  While Katz does not, in this author’s view, require an abolition 
of any resistance requirement, it can be understood to support a 
requirement of reasonable resistance.  After all, Mr. Katz did resist the 
aural intrusion perpetrated on him by “occup[ying] [the phone 
booth], shut[ting] the door behind him, and pay[ing] the toll . . . .”347  
Further, the Katz majority’s mention of what one “seeks to preserve as 
private”348 implies some action on the part of the individual to 
exclude others. 
The question of how much is required of individuals can and 
should be understood in terms of reasonableness, as described in 
various formulations of the reasonable resistance requirement in 
rape law, with resistance serving two functions: to demonstrate that 
the force used by police to overcome that resistance is sufficient force 
to constitute a Fourth Amendment search and to demonstrate the 
victim’s nonconsent.  In the rape context, the Missouri Court of 
Appeals, for example, engaged in a totality-of-circumstances analysis, 
taking into account the ages of victim and perpetrator, any relative 
advantage the perpetrator could exploit, and the setting of the 
attack.349  In other words, the force used by the perpetrator was 
measured not by an ideal standard of utmost resistance, but by the 
more realistic standard of the victim’s capabilities and ability to resist 
under the circumstances.  As for the second function of resistance, 
serving as a demonstration of nonconsent, reasonable resistance has 
been defined as what was reasonably needed to inform the 
perpetrator of the victim’s lack of consent, without requiring the 
victim to resist to the utmost before the perpetrator would be 
obligated to take her “no” seriously.350  Similarly, police surveillance 
should be deemed a search when police overcome reasonable 
measures taken by the victim to maintain privacy, basing a finding of 
reasonableness on a realistic assessment of a given victim’s capability 
to resist the police and not requiring of the victim more than 
practicably or economically possible, taking into account the 
imbalance of strength and power between government and victim. 
 
 346  See supra text accompanying notes 289299. 
 347  Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352 (1967). 
 348  Id. at 351. 
 349  See State v. Kilmartin, 904 S.W.2d 370, 374 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995). 
 350  See, e.g., DEL. CRIM. CODE § 761(j)(1) (2011). 
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Finally, traditional rape law evolved to recognize as rape when 
the perpetrator, through deception, intoxicants, threats, or other 
means, prevented resistance by the victim.  In the search context, 
deception and secrecy are police tools of the trade.  Obviously, true 
consent searches aside, police would acquire considerably less 
information if they announced their surveillance to suspects.  This 
surreptitious nature of surveillance is troubling, however, when the 
definition of a search requires such vigorous resistance on the part of 
the victim, as most often the victim has no idea that extraordinary 
precautions are even needed. 
Of particular concern is the use of undercover agents and 
informants, described by Professor Albert Alschuler as a “dark corner 
of law enforcement that is all but immune from judicial control,”351 
whereby police, whether by posing as drug buyers or meter readers, 
or worse yet, by manipulating relationships (either artificially creating 
new or maliciously destroying existing friendships) deceive 
individuals into permitting access into their homes and lives.  As far 
as the use of “false friends,” the Court justifies this unregulated form 
of surveillance on the theory that the target has assumed the risk that 
her relationships might not be as she believes them to be. 
Pointing out again the de facto resistance requirement 
permeating the reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test, what if the 
government does more than deceive the victim into letting her guard 
down, and takes affirmative steps to thwart the victim’s ability to 
resist?  In 1994, to accommodate the FBI’s concern over new 
telephone technologies that would hamper the government’s ability 
to listen in on our conversations, Congress enacted the 
Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA).352  
Professor Lee Tien offers the following description: 
CALEA in effect mandates that telecommunications be 
designed to facilitate government surveillance . . . .  Under 
CALEA, “carriers must take steps to ensure that the broad 
technological trends in the industry do not eliminate law 
enforcement access to communications of targeted 
individuals” . . . .  For instance, carriers subject to CALEA 
cannot provide carrier-based encryption services without 
assuring that law enforcement can decrypt the 
 
 351  Albert W. Alschuler, Interpersonal Privacy and the Fourth Amendment, 4 N. ILL. U. 
L. REV. 1, 38 (1983). 
 352  Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA), Pub. L. No. 
103-414, 108 Stat. 4279 (1994) (codified as 47 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1010 (2000) and in 
portions throughout Title 18). 
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communications.353 
With such measures implemented to facilitate governmental 
intrusion into our communications, the government is having its cake 
and eating it, too.  As long as the reasonableness of an expectation of 
privacy depends on the victim’s precautions to maintain that privacy 
(precautions, as we have seen, that must be all but impervious to 
penetration), the government effectively destroys any reasonable 
expectation by rendering resistance impossible.  Making matters even 
worse, victims are lulled into a false sense of security in their 
communications because they may believe that they have in fact taken 
precautions (or that such precautions are already in place), and that 
their conversations are protected from outside interference. 
This very real method of eliminating reasonable expectations of 
privacy is far more dangerous to personal security than the 
hypothetical posed by Justice Blackmun in his opinion for the Court 
in Smith v. Maryland, contemplating the Government’s sudden 
announcement, on “nationwide television that all homes henceforth 
would be subject to warrantless entry,” which would, naturally, 
eviscerate any “actual expectation of privacy regarding [our] homes, 
papers, and effects.”354  In Justice Blackmun’s totalitarian world, at 
least, citizens would be on notice of the government’s surveillance 
activities, and could prepare accordingly.355  For purposes of defining 
the search, then, resistance should not be required where the 
government has taken affirmative steps to preclude the possibility of 
such resistance, any more than resistance is expected from the victim 
of date rape when she has unknowingly been given an intoxicant that 
renders her incapable of resisting. 
 
 
 
 353  Lee Tien, Doors, Envelopes, and Encryption: The Uncertain Role of Precautions in 
Fourth Amendment Law, 54 DEPAUL L. REV. 873, 905 (2005) (quoting James X. 
Dempsey, Communications Privacy in the Digital Age: Revitalizing the Federal Wiretap Laws 
to Enhance Privacy, 8 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 65, 90 (1997) (arguing that the government 
should not be constitutionally permitted to secretly interfere with the ability to take 
precautions against surveillance)). 
 354  Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 n.5 (1979). 
 355  See also Tien, supra note 353, at 888 (“[W]e are unlikely to take precautions if 
we are not aware that our privacy is threatened.  If the government installs highly 
conspicuous video surveillance cameras in some public places, people who do not 
like to be photographed might avoid those places.  They would have no reason to 
avoid those places if the cameras were hidden.”). 
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2. Recalibrating Force and Nonconsent 
Many of the advances in rape law were driven by the twin goals 
of improving male behavior and promoting women’s autonomy.  
Recast in Fourth Amendment terms, these goals resonate with those 
urging change in criminal procedure doctrine as well and are 
consistent with the purpose of that Amendment (and others): to 
cabin official power and promote individual liberty and freedom.  
However, the Court’s deference to the needs of law enforcement over 
individual interests has fostered the opposite result, and the 
government’s ability to intrude upon its citizens, often with no 
justification whatsoever, has been greatly augmented.  Numerous 
scholars have reached the conclusion that the Court’s privacy-
centered approach has failed to deliver the “security” promised to the 
“people.”356 
What does it mean to be secure?  Professor Thomas Clancy, for 
example, answers that question by equating the right to be secure 
with the right to exclude.357  Moreover, the right to exclude does not 
require justification based on the pursuit of other aims, although the 
assertion of that right may be motivated by a desire to enjoy property, 
to maintain privacy, to preserve dignity, or even simply to express 
anti-government sentiment.358  The Fourth Amendment right to be 
secure may also be understood as an interest in exercising some level 
of control over one’s person, house, papers, and effects—in other 
words, as the right to autonomy and self-determination. 
What of property and privacy, respectively representing the pre-
Katz and post-Katz regimes, as the primary measures of the Fourth 
Amendment’s scope?  Professor Halliburton proposes that the Fourth 
Amendment be reunited with its property-based roots, but urges that 
 
 356  See generally Clancy, supra note 83, at 307–08 (“Only by understanding the 
meaning of the term ‘secure’ is it possible to determine the scope of the Fourth 
Amendment’s protections . . . .”); Halliburton, How Privacy Killed Katz, supra note 76, 
at 814 (arguing for a reinvigorated view of “property of personhood” to replace 
privacy as the primary interest protected by the Fourth Amendment); William J. 
Stuntz, Privacy’s Problem and the Law of Criminal Procedure, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1016 
(1995) (arguing that criminal procedure should focus less on privacy and more on 
police coercion); Tomkovicz, supra note 79 (promoting an instrumental view of 
Fourth Amendment privacy). 
 357  Clancy, supra note 83, at 308–09.  Professor Clancy identifies property, privacy, 
and security as the three “possible candidates” for delineating the scope of Fourth 
Amendment protection, arguing that property and privacy have proved inadequate 
measures of the Amendment’s protection, and that security, as the right to exclude, 
is the interest best suited to the task.  See id. 
 358  Id. at 309. 
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property be broadly understood in terms of its connection to and 
enrichment of personhood.359  Professor Halliburton draws upon the 
work of Professor Margaret Radin in exploring the “relationship 
between the law of property and what she calls the ‘personhood 
perspective’ . . . . The core ‘premise underlying the personhood 
perspective is that to achieve proper self development—to be a 
person—an individual needs some control over resources in the 
external environment.’”360 
Professor James Tomkovicz, on the other hand, urges an 
instrumental understanding of privacy as the core value to be 
protected by the Fourth Amendment, which includes, but is not 
limited to, a view of privacy as promoting secrecy for the sake of 
secrecy alone.361  An instrumental conception of privacy promotes a 
great deal more than secrecy, and perhaps was given its most 
eloquent and concise expression by Warren and Brandeis, who 
described Fourth Amendment privacy as “the right to be let alone.”362  
When we are afforded privacy, or let alone, we are given the space 
and freedom to constitute ourselves as individuals, and privacy can 
realize its function “as a medium within which other rights and 
interests can survive, even flourish.”363  While confidentiality and 
solitude at times provide the necessary shelter from the world in 
which we can freely be ourselves, at other times, “a degree of openness 
is essential to and integrally connected with the exercise and 
 
 359  Halliburton, How Privacy Killed Katz, supra note 76, at 851.   
 360  Id. at 852 (quoting Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. 
REV. 957 (1982)). 
 361  Tomkovicz, supra note 79, at 648.  The Court’s conception of privacy as 
protecting only, or primarily, secrecy, not only has affected the substantive Fourth 
Amendment right, but has also affected the availability of its primary remedy—
exclusion.  The Court’s narrow conception of Fourth Amendment privacy is 
evidenced by its reasoning that once privacy has been breached it cannot be 
restored, and therefore, exclusion is not a personal constitutional remedy, but a 
method of deterring future Fourth Amendment violations.  See United States v. Leon, 
468 U.S. 897, 906 (1984) (establishing the good-faith exception to the exclusionary 
rule) (“[T]he exclusionary rule is neither intended nor able to ‘cure the invasion of 
the defendant’s rights which he has already suffered.’”) (quoting Stone v. Powell, 428 
U.S. 465, 540 (1976) (White, J., dissenting)); see also United States v. Calandra, 414 
U.S. 338, 354 (1974) (holding that the exclusionary rule is inapplicable to grand jury 
proceedings) (“Th[e] wrong . . . is fully accomplished by the original search without 
probable cause. . . .  Questions based on illegally obtained evidence are only a 
derivative use of the product of a past unlawful search and seizure.  They work no 
new Fourth Amendment wrong.”).  Id. 
 362  Samuel Warren & Louis Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 193 
(1890). 
 363  Tomkovicz, supra note 79, at 667. 
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enjoyment of constitutional rights.”364  Thus, current search doctrine, 
which penalizes, by removing from the definition of a search, virtually 
anything we share with others (even inadvertently), forces an 
impermissible choice between constitutional protections: we exercise 
associational and expressional freedoms at the cost of our Fourth 
Amendment rights. 
Whether the core interest to be protected by the Fourth 
Amendment is identified as security, property-as-personhood, 
instrumental privacy, autonomy, or simply the “right to be let alone,” 
we can once again turn to rape law scholarship for insight.  Professor 
Schulhofer, in urging that autonomy, as something more than simply 
freedom from violence, should become the focal point for reform, 
identifies two dimensions of autonomy: physical autonomy, meaning 
a right to bodily integrity, and moral or intellectual autonomy, 
involving the capacity to express one’s personal preferences.365  
Understood this way, autonomy is as much about the “right to be let 
alone” as it is about the right to choose not to be let alone, and to 
define the scope of our involvement and interactions with others.  
Therefore, any use of force that interferes with an individual’s 
unconstrained choice with respect to her physical or intellectual 
preferences is destructive to autonomy. 
As for the dual requirement of force and nonconsent, while 
many rape reformers advocate for the abolition of one or the other, 
the two elements may not be so easily severable.  Maintaining that a 
search requires, as its elements, both the victim’s nonconsent and the 
government’s use of force to overcome that nonconsent, the Court’s 
conceptions of what constitutes sufficient force and what amounts to 
consent or nonconsent must be reevaluated in light of a more 
realistic account of social attitudes and norms. 
Those rape law scholars advocating for the law to criminalize the 
use of force to obtain intercourse without regard to the victim’s state 
of mind criticize traditional victim-centered law on two grounds: (1) 
they are troubled by the law’s almost exclusive focus on the victim’s 
conduct and seek to shift attention to the perpetrator and his 
 
 364  Id. at 682.  In advocating for an instrumental conception of privacy, Professor 
Tomkovicz argues that the reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test should be 
abandoned in favor of an approach that examines not one’s expectations with 
respect to privacy, but whether the individual claiming a search has a “legitimate 
need[] for privacy.”  Id. at 700 n.216.  “In other words, a qualifying privacy need must 
have a basis in the laws, principles, traditions, or customs of the American social 
order . . . .”  Id. at 700. 
 365  See Schulhofer, supra note 243, at 71. 
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conduct, and (2) they are skeptical about the law’s reliance on 
nonconsent as the touchstone of  rape, when much behavior that is 
construed as consent is obtained under conditions of physical, 
economic, and political inequality.366  Thus, rape victims are 
essentially blamed for the violations of their person, and their 
passivity, ambiguity, weak resistance, or acquiescence, even under 
illegitimate pressures, is construed as consent. 
The current definition of a search suffers from the same flaws: 
the Court fixes its attention almost exclusively on the individual 
claiming a violation when determining whether the victim enjoyed a 
reasonable expectation of privacy.  But this unilateral approach fails 
to ascertain from what or whom the individual should expect privacy 
and constructs privacy in a normative vacuum.  In other words, the 
part of the reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test that should give 
normative content to what citizens have a right to expect from their 
government is simply missing.  This focus on the adequacy (or 
inadequacy, as is most often the case) of the victim’s precautions 
against the possibility of intrusion has resulted in what Professor 
Heffernan describes as a “vigilance model of privacy, one that 
requires people to be constantly alert to the way in which others can 
intrude on their lives.”367  This model of privacy requires that people 
remain on high alert to expect the worst from their fellow citizens 
and, consequently, from the police.  Under this model, a failure to 
guard against having those low expectations met results in a 
divestiture of Fourth Amendment protection.368 
Professor Heffernan argues that, instead, Fourth Amendment 
privacy should be based on an “expectation of forbearance on the 
part of others—that is, in an expectation that others will restrain their 
curiosity with respect to those aspects of life that are essential to 
defining and maintaining individual identity.”369  A forbearance 
model of privacy is imbued with a strong equality ideal, in that the 
prevailing expectation is that others will not exploit vulnerability or 
take advantage of relative positions of superior strength and 
resources, allowing individuals some measure of personal security 
regardless of their economic means.  In the words of William Pitt to 
 
 366  See supra text accompanying notes 233234. 
 367  Heffernan, supra note 84, at 6. 
 368  Of course, living in a constant state of vigilance precludes us from 
experiencing the security and ease that allow us the time and peace of mind to 
engage in other more personally and socially valuable pursuits.   
 369  Id.  See also Tien, supra note 353, at 884 (discussing social precautions). 
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the House of Commons, words that still resonate today: 
The poorest man may, in his cottage, bid defiance to all the 
forces of the Crown.  It may be frail; its roof may shake; the 
wind may blow through it; the storm may enter; the rain 
may enter; but the king of England may not enter; all his 
force dares not cross the threshold of the ruined 
tenement.370 
Pitt’s powerful words are really as much about affording even the 
“poorest man” security in his home as they are about physical 
trespass, although he could not have known when those words were 
uttered that, over two hundred years later, police could (and would) 
hover in helicopters over that tenement, their prying eyes entering 
through cracks in the frail roof alongside the wind and rain.  I join 
Professor Heffernan in advocating that the Court adopt a 
forbearance model of privacy, and in doing so, give meaningful 
review to the means used by police to breach that privacy, because 
when the Fourth Amendment is said to permit the government’s 
violation of ordinary social and legal norms, none of us can claim the 
security promised to us by that Amendment.371 
Turning to nonconsent, those rape law scholars, on the other 
hand, who advocate for a definition of rape that focuses on the 
victim’s consent or nonconsent, seek to elevate autonomy to a 
position of primary importance in the movement for reform.372  For 
 
 370  NELSON B. LASSON, HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO 
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 49–50 (1937) (quoted in Heffernan, supra 
note 84, at 14–15). 
 371  Professor Scott Sundby proposes that “government-citizen trust” should be an 
animating principle in the formation of Fourth Amendment doctrine and values.  
Scott E. Sundby, “Everyman”‘s Fourth Amendment: Privacy or Mutual Trust Between 
Government and Citizen?, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1751, 1754 (1994).  Under this view, which 
is consistent with the forbearance model described above, citizens should be entitled 
to trust that the government will refrain from abusing its power, as the government 
should trust that its citizens are obeying the laws.  Id. at 1777–78 (emphasizing the 
importance of the trust being reciprocal).  For Professor Sundby, where government 
action is inconsistent with the assumption that citizens are acting lawfully, such 
action should be deemed a search.  Id. at 1791.  This position is counter to the 
Court’s current approach, which seems to permit the government to assume 
individual wrongdoing, and subsequently allows governmental measures to verify 
that assumption, while requiring the public to trust that the government will not 
intrude unreasonably.  Id. at 1811.  I submit that the Court’s current model defining 
searches is based on a vigilance model, under which police assume citizen 
wrongdoing; and citizens, in order to gain Fourth Amendment protection, must also 
assume that anyone, including government agents, may (and often do) resort to 
unlawful or socially unacceptable means to violate privacy, and must protect 
themselves accordingly.   
 372  See supra text accompanying note 235. 
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these scholars, an exclusive focus on force fails to take into account 
non-forcible methods of violating bodily integrity, such as deception, 
fraud, extortion, or other coercive abuses of power that interfere with 
the victim’s meaningful choice.  Further, an autonomy-based 
approach recognizes that autonomy involves more than a negative 
interest in preventing unwanted intercourse, but also includes the 
positive interest in permitting and engaging in desired intercourse.  
If we now consider the word “intercourse” outside of its sexual 
context, the preceding statement applies equally to an autonomy-
based conception of the Fourth Amendment. 
Of course, in constructing its search doctrine, the Court does give 
almost exclusive attention to the element of consent, but certainly 
not with the aim of promoting individual autonomy.  The Court, 
rather, construes consent broadly, equating limited consent with 
knowing exposure, and simultaneously undervalues or completely 
disregards expressions of nonconsent.  Whether described as 
instrumental privacy or security, the interest of autonomy, in both its 
negative and positive aspects, and in both its physical and intellectual 
capacities, should be given more prominence in defining the search.  
And if autonomy is to be taken seriously, then consent must be 
defined more narrowly and any expression of the victim’s nonconsent 
must be given credit. 
One more reform achieved on behalf of rape victims merits 
particular attention for its applicability to the law of searches: the 
enactment of “rape-shield” laws.  Prior to the enactment of these 
evidentiary provisions, rape victims were essentially put on trial, with 
their past sexual history, their attire, and their sexual behavior 
regularly paraded in front of juries to prove both propensity to lie 
and propensity to engage in sexual intercourse.373  Noting again the 
positive expression of autonomy, permitting women to choose when 
to engage in sexual activity, as well as when not to, rape-shield statutes 
sought to prevent juries from punishing women who voluntarily 
engaged in intercourse (or appeared as if they wanted to) by finding, 
as a matter of fact, that a woman who would consent to one would 
likely consent to all. 
This reasoning is, of course, precisely the logic underlying the 
Court’s treatment of voluntary disclosure to third parties as knowing 
exposure to the public.  As long as privacy-as-secrecy is treated as the 
primary interest protected by the Fourth Amendment, the individual, 
 
 373  See supra text accompanying notes 173176. 
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in disclosing information to anyone, has relinquished his privacy in 
an absolute sense, and therefore has forfeited any reasonable 
expectation of privacy.  Again, a shift in focus to a broad autonomy-
based model of Fourth Amendment protection would respect and 
permit an individual’s choice to share certain information in a 
limited way (which, in today’s world, is often not really any choice at 
all), without equating that choice with a complete forfeiture of 
Fourth Amendment protection. 
3.  A Balanced Approach to the Katz Reasonable-
Expectation-of-Privacy Test 
Drawing from rape law and analogizing to Fourth Amendment 
search law, this Article has identified the similar broad goals of 
improving the behavior of those in power, encouraging autonomy of 
the subjugated group, and promoting equality.  The realization of 
these goals in the context of defining a search can be assisted 
through the adoption of parallel reforms—namely, expanding the 
notion of force, narrowing the understanding of consent while 
recognizing nonconsent expansively, and lowering the resistance 
requirement to a reasonable level.  This Article next turns to situating 
these reforms within the framework provided by Katz v. United 
States.374  Part II of the Article has presented support for this balanced, 
conduct-oriented approach in the text of Katz, examining Justice 
Harlan’s concurring opinion, from which the Court has derived the 
current reasonable expectation of privacy definition of a search, in 
conjunction with Justice Stewart’s opinion for the majority.  A careful 
reading of these opinions will demonstrate that the reforms 
suggested above provide a model of defining the Fourth Amendment 
search that is truer to the letter and spirit of Katz than the Court’s 
current approach. 
Justice Harlan’s definition of a search requires “first that a 
person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy, 
and, second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to 
recognize as ‘reasonable.’”375  Thus, once a person has exhibited, 
through physical or social cues,376 that he subjectively wishes to keep 
 
 374  Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
 375  Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 376  See Tien, supra note 353, at 883–84.  While physical precautions, such as 
fences, doors, window blinds, and luggage, block visual or aural access to 
information, social precautions entail reliance on the observance of social norms.  
For example, when one enters a bathroom stall or changing room and closes the 
door, one expects that others will not peep through cracks, or from above or below 
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something private, the first prong of Justice Harlan’s test has been 
met, whether or not those wishes are ultimately respected by the 
police.  Perhaps it was Justice Harlan’s use of the word “expectation” 
that led the Court down an empirical (and quite cynical), rather than 
normative, path in defining searches, leading to the conclusion, 
based on rather low expectations of human behavior, that we cannot 
reasonably expect much from anyone, let alone the police. 
Justice Stewart’s opinion for the Court, however, contemplates 
“what [one] seeks to preserve as private,”377 without reference to any 
expectation regarding his subjective intent.  If our expectations, 
however, are viewed from the perspective of the forbearance model 
proposed by Professor Heffernan,378 then we can legitimately expect 
that others will respect our wishes to keep certain aspects of our lives 
private.  On the other hand, “[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to 
the public . . . is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection.”379  
Thus, the first prong of Justice Harlan’s formulation, based on Justice 
Stewart’s language, is all about consent.  By seeking to preserve 
something as private and by exhibiting that subjective intent, an 
individual demonstrates her nonconsent to physical or visual 
penetration.  Knowing exposure, however, may be seen as 
constituting affirmative consent, described in the rape context as 
“affirmative and freely-given permission,”380 which can be expressed 
through words or actions. 
Although Justice Stewart used the word “knowingly” rather than 
“intentionally” with respect to exposure to the public, knowing 
exposure can be understood, in conjunction with its opposite state of 
actively seeking to conceal, as the intentional failure to take any 
precautions to conceal that which is known to be open to view.381  
 
the door, to observe what is commonly understood to be a private activity, even 
though it is entirely possible (and easy) to do so.  See id.  The efficacy of social 
precautions as creating legitimate expectations of privacy, of course, assumes a 
forbearance model of privacy.  See supra text accompanying note 369. 
 377  Katz, 389 U.S. at 351 (emphasis added). 
 378  See supra text accompanying notes 369370. 
 379  Katz, 389 U.S. at 351 (emphasis added).  Note that Justice Stewart talks about 
knowingly exposing something to the public, and not the type of limited exposure to 
third parties that the Court subsequently has equated with knowing exposure. 
 380  State in re M.T.S., 129 N.J. 422, 444 (1992).   
 381  At common law, the definition of “intent” included the mental state of 
knowledge that the proscribed result was practically certain to occur.  See DRESSLER, 
UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 27, § 10.04.  Therefore, there is support 
for equating knowledge that exposure is a virtual certainty with intentional exposure.  
While I may err on the side of a more protective definition of a search by equating 
knowledge with intent with respect to exposure, the Court has erred in the opposite 
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Borrowing once again from an affirmative consent model of rape, in 
State of New Jersey in re M.T.S., the New Jersey Supreme Court defined 
physical force as “any amount of force against another person in the 
absence of what a reasonable person would believe to be affirmative 
and freely-given permission . . . .”382  Similarly, this Article argues that 
any measures taken by police in the face of the victim’s exhibited 
nonconsent constitute force, thus avoiding the paradox identified by 
Professor Estrich in her criticism of State v. Alston: that unwanted 
penetration can be simultaneously against the will of the victim, and 
yet not accomplished by force.383  On the other hand, what has been 
knowingly or intentionally exposed to the public requires no force to 
be seen, and the police are situated similarly to any member of the 
public. 
The second prong of Justice Harlan’s test is implicated when the 
individual seeking privacy has indicated his intent through certain 
cues and precautions, and the police have used force to overcome 
those precautions.  This Article proposes that this prong, under 
which the reasonableness of privacy expectations is determined, be 
infused with the normative values and judgments described above.  
Once the victim of the surveillance has met the threshold of the first 
prong, by exhibiting some desire to maintain privacy, courts should 
realistically evaluate the adequacy of the precautions taken.  To that 
end, this Article advocates for a reasonable resistance approach, with 
the reasonableness of one’s resistance or precautions, as well as the 
reasonableness of the force used to defeat those precautions, 
analyzed under the totality of the circumstances. 
The circumstances examined would include an honest 
assessment of the feasibility and availability, to that particular 
individual, of additional or more effective precautions, not requiring 
more resistance than realistically possible in her situation.  Such a 
fact-sensitive, case-by-case analysis may be more difficult to 
administer, and may hamper the creation of bright-line categories of 
searches and non-searches, but is nevertheless preferable to the one-
 
direction, essentially equating knowledge with recklessness or negligence.  See Colb, 
supra note 84, at 122 (“[The Court] treats the risk of exposure to third-party 
wrongdoing as tantamount to an invitation for that exposure . . . .”). 
 382  M.T.S., 129 N.J. at 444.  Note that the New Jersey Supreme Court provided for 
a reasonable mistake-of-fact defense, an approach that may be appropriate in the 
search context as well, for it is difficult to maintain that police are acting improperly 
if they in fact reasonably believe, from the circumstances, that the subject of the 
search has consented.  See id.   
 383  See Estrich, supra note 28, at 1111. 
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size-fits-all approach the Court has adopted, especially when the “all” 
are generally wealthy, white individuals who have greater access to 
effective precautions and are less often the victims of police targeting 
in the first place. 
Any force, then, used to overcome what have been determined 
to be reasonable precautions, would be a sufficient amount of force 
to trigger Fourth Amendment protection, and the circumstances 
taken into account when evaluating the use of force would certainly 
include inquiry into police violations of social and legal norms, as 
those norms are intimately tied to the precautions people generally 
feel the need to take.  An assessment of the reasonableness of force, 
in its relationship to resistance, should also include a conception of 
force as measures taken to prevent or nullify the efficacy of  
resistance, including deception, coercion, or the use of certain 
technology. 
4. Minnesota v. Carter: The Road Not Taken 
Justice Breyer’s concurring opinion in Minnesota v. Carter384 
provides an example of the type of nuanced, fact-sensitive inquiry 
that a balanced, conduct-oriented approach to defining a search 
would entail, and demonstrates that courts are eminently capable of 
conducting such an inquiry in this context.385  Carter held that 
defendants, who were observed by police through a gap in closed 
window blinds, had no legitimate expectation of privacy or “standing” 
to contest the search of the apartment in which they were bagging 
cocaine because their only connection to the apartment was of a 
“purely commercial nature” and they had spent only a short amount 
of time therein.386  Justice Breyer concurred in the result, but not on 
“standing” grounds.  Rather, Justice Breyer determined that no 
search had occurred, even had the defendant been the homeowner, 
 
 384  Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83 (1998) (holding that defendants had no 
legitimate expectation of privacy in an apartment they occupied for only a short 
time, to engage in a purely commercial activity).   
 385  Indeed, courts regularly engage in totality of the circumstances analysis in a 
variety of settings, including, for example, in determining whether an individual has 
been seized, see, e.g., United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980) (“We 
conclude that a person has been ‘seized’ . . . only if, in view of all the circumstances 
surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not 
free to leave.”), and, of course, in deciding questions of voluntariness, see, e.g., 
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226 (1973) (“In determining whether a 
defendant’s will was overborne in a particular case, the Court has assessed the totality 
of all the surrounding circumstances . . . .”). 
 386  Carter, 525 U.S. at 91. 
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based on an analysis of resistance and force such as this Article has 
outlined.387 
Acting on a tip from an individual who, while walking past a 
basement-level window, had observed a group of people bagging 
cocaine in a garden apartment, Officer Thielen walked within twelve 
to eighteen inches of the window in question and observed the 
described criminal behavior through venetian blinds.388  To Justice 
Breyer, whether the blinds had holes or had been simply adjusted in 
the wrong direction was irrelevant, because “[o]ne who lives in a 
basement apartment that fronts a publicly traveled street, or similar 
space, ordinarily understands the need for care lest a member of the 
public simply direct his gaze downward.”389  In other words, the 
defendant did not exercise reasonable resistance under the 
circumstances, and nothing more would have been required of him 
than to take care that the blinds were correctly drawn.390  It is also 
relevant that the area from which the activities inside the apartment 
were observed was not just a public thoroughfare, over which people 
passed by quickly, but a grassy area where families congregated to 
walk and play, and where people commonly stored bicycles,391 thus 
increasing the risk of observation by the public.  Thus, for Justice 
Breyer, Officer Thielen observed no more than any member of the 
public could have, and indeed, had already, observed. 
If the defendant’s resistance was not sufficient, what of the force 
used by Officer Thielen?  Interestingly, the Minnesota Supreme 
Court had reached the opposite conclusion, determining that 
“Officer Thielen had engaged in unusual activity, that he ‘climbed 
over some bushes, crouched down and placed his face 12 to 18 inches 
from the window,’ and . . . saw into the apartment through ‘a small 
gap’ in blinds that were drawn.”392  Justice Breyer found that the 
record did not support these factual assertions, and thus, did not take 
note of these particular facts in making his determination.393  What is 
most interesting, however, is that Justice Breyer implied that, had the 
 
 387  Id. at 103–06 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 388  Id. at 103. 
 389  Id. at 105. 
 390  The first prong of Justice Harlan’s test would have been met, as by drawing the 
blinds, even though not perfectly, the defendant did indicate a desire to maintain 
privacy in the apartment, and cannot be said to have knowingly exposed his activities. 
 391  Carter, 525 U.S. at 103 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 392  Id. at 104–05 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 393  Id. at 105 (Breyer, J., concurring) (“I would not determine the constitutional 
significance of factual assertions that the record denies.”). 
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record permitted him to consider these facts, it may have made a 
difference.  Thus, Justice Breyer allowed for the possibility that, had 
Officer Thielen climbed over hedges and crouched down, behavior 
that is clearly contrary to social norms, rather than merely standing in 
a common area and directing his gaze downward, this distinction may 
have had constitutional significance.394  In any case, Justice Breyer’s 
opinion demonstrates that courts are capable of careful application 
of specific facts, and indeed, he underscored “the importance of 
factual nuance in this area of constitutional law . . . .”395 
V. CONCLUSION 
This Article concludes by reiterating the value of exploring the 
parallel between rape law and search law, and of applying the insights 
of rape law reform to the law of searches.  Space constraints do not 
permit a thorough exploration of how the proposed changes to the 
current definition of the Fourth Amendment search would affect 
existing examples of search doctrine, other than to mention the 
obviously likely result of the inclusion of more governmental 
surveillance into the protective reach of the Amendment.  The most 
significant benefit of comparing these two seemingly unrelated areas 
of law, however, may simply be to promote a shift in perception by 
engaging the analogy provided by rape law reform.  When police 
surveillance is understood as an exertion of official power over a 
victim to obtain information for use in “fortify[ing] the coercive 
power of the state against the individual,”396 and the subjects of 
surveillance are seen as potential victims of such exercise of power, 
then the concerns, goals, and achievements of rape law reformers 
illuminate the pursuit of balance, equality, dignity, and autonomy in 
Fourth Amendment doctrine as well. 
The time is ripe to advocate for significant change, as the Court, 
even prior to its decision in United States v. Jones,397 has indicated its 
 
 394  The more unreasonable the measures undertaken by the police, the more 
reasonable, by inverse proportion, the precautions exercised by the victim seem to 
be.  For example, if Officer Thielen indeed had to climb over bushes to reach an 
area in which he could crouch in front of the window, then perhaps the drawn 
blinds, even assuming a small gap, should be considered reasonable as a precaution, 
as we do not regularly expect people to go through such lengths to look into our 
homes.  In other words, there is a proportional relationship between the 
reasonableness of precautions and the reasonableness of force used to overcome 
those precautions. 
 395  Carter, 525 U.S. at 105 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 396  Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 365 (1959). 
 397  United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012). 
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willingness to reconsider some of the reasoning that has driven much 
of its post-Katz jurisprudence.398  For example, in Bond v. United States, 
the Court held that the exploratory squeeze of luggage placed in the 
overhead compartment of a bus was a search, and that the defendant 
passenger rightfully claimed a reasonable expectation of privacy in 
his luggage so placed because “he does not expect that other 
passengers or bus employees will, as a matter of course, feel the bag 
in an exploratory manner.”399  The Court adopted a forbearance 
model of defining a search, and recognized the legitimacy of the 
defendant’s expectation despite the fact that he did not resist to the 
utmost (he could have kept the luggage under his seat or on his lap), 
and despite the fact that the police, while clearly violating social 
norms, did not do anything more than another other passenger could 
have done.  Taking social norms into account both bolstered the 
adequacy of precautions taken by the defendant, and supported a 
finding of unreasonable force used to overcome those precautions.400 
In Kyllo v. United States, the Court held that the use of a thermal 
imager to detect relative levels of heat escaping from a home 
constituted a search, as the “Government use[d] a device that is not 
in general public use, to explore details of a private home that would 
previously have been unknowable without physical intrusion . . . .”401  
As in Bond, the defendant in Kyllo did not take the most rigorous 
precautions possible, as he could have insulated his home more 
thoroughly to conceal the production of excessive heat in his home 
to the outside world.402  The Court’s reliance on the fact that the 
technology used by the police in Kyllo was not in general public use is 
significant because the Court signaled its understanding that when 
police resort to extraordinary technological measures to invade 
privacy, with such means being generally available only to police, 
individuals fail to successfully resist the intrusion, both because 
 
 398  See Colb, supra note 84, at 160–84, for a thorough discussion of numerous 
cases in which the Court has demonstrated ambivalence concerning the flaws 
identified by Professor Colb, namely equating vulnerability to exposure with knowing 
exposure, and equating limited exposure as exposure to the general public. 
 399  Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334, 338–39 (2000). 
 400  The Court also found significant that the squeeze of the luggage involved a 
physical, rather than merely visual, inspection.  Id. at 337.  Of course, this rationale 
for finding that the government conducted a Fourth Amendment search is entirely 
consistent with the physical trespass reasoning of Jones with respect to the GPS placed 
on the defendant’s vehicle.  See supra note 18 and accompanying text. 
 401  Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 27 (2001). 
 402  This fact is noted by Justice Stevens, in dissent.  Id. at 45 (Stevens, J., 
dissenting). 
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successful resistance is not feasible in light of the superior 
technological capability of the police, and because people would not 
be on notice of the need to resist.  In Kyllo, then, the Court adopted a 
reasonable-resistance approach and demonstrated a broader 
understanding of force used by government. 
Finally, in Ferguson v. City of Charleston, the Court held that the 
drug testing of the urine of pregnant women, and dissemination of 
the results to law enforcement for the purpose of forcing those 
women testing positive into drug treatment, did not qualify as a 
special needs search.403  Because of the procedural posture of the 
case, the Court did not resolve the question of whether the women 
had consented to the searches.404  By remanding on the issue of 
consent, the majority seemed at least open to differentiating between 
knowing exposure, which can be viewed as consent to all, and the 
informed consent provided to few and limited to a specific purpose.405  
Thus, by implicitly holding that providing police with the results of 
the urine testing without specific consent for that purpose 
constituted a search, the Court indicated its willingness to consider 
narrowing the scope of consent in the context of defining searches,406 
which is consistent with the goals of respecting and promoting 
autonomy identified by rape law and search law scholars alike. 
This Article urges criminal procedure scholars to look to the 
development of current rape law for the insights that may promote 
similar development in the law of Fourth Amendment searches.  At 
the very least, the specific reforms this Article has identified from 
rape law and proposes should be considered in defining searches—
namely, adopting a reasonable (rather than utmost) resistance 
requirement, emphasizing the conduct of police to delineate 
reasonable expectations of privacy (rather than focusing solely on the 
victim’s conduct), and narrowing the definition of consent—will 
contribute to the important goals of improving government behavior, 
promoting individual autonomy and liberty, and realizing the 
aspiration of equality, both between government and citizen and 
between wealthy and poor.  Most importantly, however, a broader 
definition of the Fourth Amendment search will ensure that a great 
 
 403  See Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67 (2001). 
 404  Id. at 67. 
 405  See id.   
 406  See id.  This is precisely what Justice Sotomayor urges the Court to consider in 
her concurring opinion in United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 957 (2012) 
(Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
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deal more of governmental surveillance will be subject to judicial 
scrutiny, resulting in a Fourth Amendment that truly protects people, 
and not police.407 
 
 
 407  This is, of course, a reference to Justice Stewart’s famous declaration in Katz: 
“For the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places.”  Katz v. United States, 389 
U.S. 347, 351 (1967).  In closing, I wish to emphasize that a more inclusive definition 
of a search will not necessarily result in complete inaccessibility of information to law 
enforcement.  By including more surveillance within the scope of the Fourth 
Amendment, however, police will be required to comply with its substantive and 
procedural requirements.  What those requirements are, or, in other words, what 
renders searches reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, is a separate, although 
related, issue.  For one approach to the question of balancing a more inclusive 
definition of a search with law enforcement needs, see Christopher Slobogin, Peeping 
Techno-Toms and the Fourth Amendment: Seeing Through Kyllo’s Rules Governing 
Technological Surveillance, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1393, 1427–33 (2002) (arguing for a 
proportionality principle in Fourth Amendment search doctrine, pursuant to which 
the definition of a search would be expanded to include a great deal more of the 
government surveillance activity that the current narrow definition excludes, but 
adjusting the level of justification required for the search according to its level of 
intrusiveness). 
